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Abstract 
The Hong Kong government in the 1970s and early 1980s was on a whole 
unwilling to embark on privatization policies, the necessity of centralized control was 
then a dominant belief within the administration. After the 1984 Joint Declaration, 
the government upheld that stability of civil service in the transition period as a 
paramount consideration for any privatization policy. In mid-1980s, the 
circumstances of Hong Kong did not favor the fermentation of large scale 
privatization. However, the local medical and health system did pursued privatization 
as a major strategy ofreform. This move affected the career of over one-tenth ofthe 
civil servants. This privatization policy was unprecedented in terms of scale and its 
nature. Another feature ofthis reform has been its incompleteness. It is an incomplete 
privatization policy in a sense that the institutional structure of the Hospital Authority 
is established, but the corresponding financing system is not simultaneously 
actualized. The policy is 'implemented by parts'. Besides, the policy is also 
incomplete in a way that it failed to address issues like the balance between the 
private and the public sector, and the integration between different tiers of care 
services. 
This research intended to find out the factors that contributed to the forging of 
this unlikely policy. Besides, the study also set out to identify factors and 
circumstances that led to the incomplete policy design and implementation.. 
This thesis contended that the reason why government rushed into this 
privatization policy was prompted by: i) a preoccupation of curative care within the 
policy circle; ii) the bureaucratic problems; and iii) the inability of generalist 
administrators to come up with concrete policy alternative, which left room for the 
medical profession to pursue its course. The medical profession advocated 
privatization in the mid-1980s. In the process of policy making, there were 
miscalculations on: i) the strength ofthe 'legacy of free service'; and ii) the financial 
benefits that can result from privatization. 
For the problem ofincomplete policy, it is contended that the poverty ofpolicy 
ideas within the government has been one of the major contributing factor. The 
government's privatization ideas in the eighties dealt mostly with issues in the 
functional and/or operational level. These understandings of privatization were 
adequate only for policies concerning physical services (e.g. gas, railway). They did 
not suffice policy makers to address the value issues that pertains exclusively to 
human services. 
The incompleteness of the privatization project is manifested in several ^eas 
(e.g. integration among different tiers of services), yet the most prominent 
manifestation has been the lacking of a financing policy. It is contended that this 
situation has been mainly caused by the "legacy of free services", which consolidated 
since early years' of service development. This legacy exhibited itselfin the form .of 
rigidity ofdemand, hindered the government from embarking on large scale financial 
reform. 
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This introductory chapter set out to lay the ground work for the discussion of 
privatization' of medical care in Hong Kong. First of all, the Hong Kong people's 
health status and the background of the health system is outlined by means of 
commonly used health indicators. Secondly, the rationale, focus and the objectives of 
the study will be exlpained. Thirdly, the major findings of the research is highlighted. 
Followed by the layout ofthe chapters in this thesis. The last section ofthis chapter is 
a review ofprivatization literature, besides, in the light of the contemporary literature, 
a framework for policy analysis will be formulated. 
To start with, the following sub-section reviews the local medical service and 
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the health status of the people through several common indicators : the infant and 
matemal mortality rates, the changes in the morbidity structure, and the public 
expenditure on the services. 
Hong K0n2 People's Health Status and the Health Svstem 
The general impression is - for the past five decades, the colony's health 
condition has caught up rapidly with other advanced industrial societies. Viewed by 
. the commonly used health indicators, Hong Kong is doing as good as other health 
systems in the West. 
Prior to the Second World War, mortality rate per 1000 was much higher in 
comparison with that after civilian rule was restored in 1946.3 This rate plunged 
sharply after 1946 and fell steadily until it reached almost a constant of 5 since late 
1960s. While for the birth rate, except the ‘baby bloom’ in the 1950s, it declined 
steadily and seemed to level out at about 12.5 births per 1000 persons in late 1980s.^ 
Fertility declines, yet the Hong Kong people are expecting longer life. The life 
expectancy of both sexes fall short ofthe U.K., U.S. and Japan in the early sixties.^ 
However, the colony caught up rapidly, and in a decade's time her record was already 
comparable with the these countries. Hong Kong now follow the pattem in the U.S.， 
with longer life expectancy, aged population accumulates and brings forth new 
pressure to the system. Geriatric problems are becoming more prevalent and in the 
end called for expansion in chronic treatment facilities. 
Another relating issue is the changes in the morbidity structure, the dominant 
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types of pathology causing death have shifted from infectious diseases and 
respiratory problems to cancers and circulatory illness，Cancers inflicted mainly the 
adult population, while circulatory problems cause death mostly in the aged segment 
of the population. Another point to make is that the sub-tropical colony which once 
haunted by fever and epidemics had succeeded in combating these diseases, this was 
probably the achievement of better sewage system, education and the extensive 
immunization projects. For example, in 1950 alone, there was altogether 2,163,653 
vaccinations and inoculations, the estimated population by the end of the year was 
2,060,000^ meaning that individual citizens on an average receive 1.05 vaccinations. 
Clear records of the local infant mortality rate could only be found as far as 
1946. From the heightened rate of every ten newbom babies one failed to survive in 
the late 1940s, this rate dropped rapidly in the 1950s. It plunged to 41.5 per thousand 
in 1960. The speed of decline slowed down since then and at the end ofthe 1990，it 
reached the level of 5.9.^ The current infant mortality rate is among the best in the 
world, in 1987 H.K. did better than the U.K., the U.S., W. Germany and Australia^ 
Another common health indicator is the matemal mortality rate.'^ Analyzing 
the records of the past forty years, the improvement was as spectacular as the infant 
mortality rate, it was a drastic drop from 1.15 death per 1000 births in the 1950s, to 
0.36 in the 1960s. It eventually fell below the level of less than one death in ten 
thousand births for most ofthe time in the 1980s. Actually, back in 1969 Hong Kong 
had already achieved better matemal survival chance compared with Singapore, 
Japan, the U.K. and the U.S." 
In the debates of reforming the health sector, officials often comment the 
system in Hong Kong as trim and efficient. Dr. Peter Yuen also maintained that 
“from a cost-effectiveness point of view, the existing health care system in Hong 
Kong must be regarded as laudable"'^. The expenditure on medical and health from 
the fifties up to the nineties varied between 6 to 11 percent of the total public 
expenditure.'^ For most of the time it was below 10 percent，this figure is not 
particularly impressive comparing with other places. For example, in the U.K., 
expenses on the National Health Services accounted for 8.9 percent of total 
government expenditure in 1960; 11.1 percent in 1980; and 13.85 percent in 1991**. 
For the United States, the percentage back in 1986 was 11.55 percent, while toward 
1992，it rose to 15.99 percent'^ It appeared that in terms of the share in gross public 
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expenses, fhe system in Hong Kong has not been particularly frugal. 
Of course, this percentage is inadequate to describe the scale of the system. 
One must considers the share of health expenditure in the GDP. First of all, public 
expenditure in Hong Kong on an average chewed up only 16.5percent of the GDP,'^ 
while in the U.K., the public expenditure had a lion share of 41.1percent in 1960，and 
it climbed up to over 50percent toward the eighties. Thus, Hong Kong with a 
minimal government, the public health system is actually accounting for a limited 
portion of the GDP. The local health system used on average 1.52percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product, this amount is much lower compared with other countries」？ 
However, scholars pointed out that the actual aggregated health spending in 
Hong Kong, which includes all the private consumption of medical services, is 
compatible with the advanced societies in the West. The apparently lean public 
expenditure actually excluded the transaction in the private market, and the bulky 
amount used in pensions, housing allowances and other fringe benefits ofhealth care 
personnel'^. Hay suggests a further explanation that several items of expenditure of 
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the Medical & health Department were buried in other departmental budgets. For 
example, the laundry work done by prisoners, electrical maintenance, transportation 
services, publications, postal and stationary, office equipment and supplies, etc. 
Therefore, whether the local health system is a frugal depends on how the 
expenditures are perceived. 
On the whole, whether the excellent vital data of Hong Kong is attributable to 
the public health system is hard to determined. Joel W. Hay contended that the good 
health of the local residents might have been the result of healthy lifestyles, strong 
family ties^^, a young population, a low degree of substance abuse, and the l i ke�� . 
These arguments are not without supports, for example, the dependency ratio^' and 
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the median age of the Hong Kong population actually favors good health statistics. 
The population on as whole can be considered young and robust in the recent decades. 
With a large portion of the residents in their early or mid-adulthood, relatively well-
educated, conscious of health and hygienic issues, it is conceivable that their health 
status should not be bad. 
In short, as seen from the changes in the morbidity structure, the health system 
in the past five decades succeeded in combating infectious diseases, it is where its 
^ 
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strength lies. The plagues and the epidemics in the pre-World War II and early post 
war period had triggered the colonial government's efforts in improving the sanitary 
system and extensively performed anti-epidemic immunizations. Cases of plague, 
cholera, typhus, and smallpox rapidly plunged to almost zero in early post war 
period23. However, there had been other areas of service which the Hong Kong 
system neglected. For example, the lacking of a specialized pediatric hospital in the 
seventies; the shortfall of long term hospital beds for chronic patients and the 
severely mentally handicapped"^; and the slow development in tertiary level care. 
Another set of criticisms made by Joel W. Hay concerns the lacking data of chronic 
illness of the population and other dimensions of the health, such as obesity, etc. 
Without these information, even with commendable vital statistics，it is still hard to 
evaluate how healthy the people are and how effective is the system. 
A general impression from the health indicators is that the H.K. health system 
improved itself at a remarkable speed since the early post war years. Against this 
background, it is interesting to know how this system improves and develops itself. 
By taking an indepth look, we discovered yet another spectacular phenomenon 
pertinent to the system - it is the colony's health reform, which took place in the mid-
1980s. 
The Focus - Reforms in the 1980s 
Hong Kong government in the 1970s and the early 1980s was on the whole 
unwilling to embark on privatization policies, the necessity of centralized control was 
then a dominant belief within the administration. After the 1984 Joint Declaration, 
the government upheld that the stability of the civil service in the transition period 
was a paramount consideration for any privatization policy, meaning that any plan to 
privatize government activities should not induce unrest, nor undermine the morale 
ofthe civil service. However, in the mid-1980s，the Hong Kong medical and health 
system suddenly pursued privatization as a major strategy of reform. This move 
affected the career of over 14 percent of the civil servants, and series of industrial 
actions were provoked in 1989. This privatization policy was unprecedented in terms 
of its scale and nature. Local privatization policy in the past focused on physical 
services such as the post office and the railway, while medical care is a social service 
involving much more difficult value decisions, such as equity and legitimacy. The 
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government had no prior experience in launching large scale privatization of social 
services, nor did it has other pertinent privatization projects since the set up of the 
Hospital Authority. The HA reform seemed accidental and hapazard, without a 
broader underlying policy. 
A second significant feature of the hospital services privatization in Hong 
Kong is the incompleteness of the reform. Here it means that the reform was 
incomplete in term of its formulation, as well as in its implementation. The policy 
was designed in a way to solely privatize the production function of the services, 
while some vital policy issues pertinent to the provision function were being left out, 
without clear policy directions，these issues were left in a state of flux. For example, 
the government has been indecisive on issues such as the financing of the entire 
health system. To address the intensifying problems in health financing, high 
powered study groups within the government were formed and a Green Paper was 
published, but the government failed to act upon in f\ill strength any ofits proposals. 
The HA was set up in 1990 while the Green Paper publicized in 1993, yet the . 
financing issue is still not resolved in 1996. The government also failed to come up 
with clear policy directions on how to balance between the public and the private 
sector, nor did it capable of appreciating the tradition of the medical profession in 
shaping the health market. 
Objectives o f Studv 
The circumstances back in the mid-1980s did not favor the fermentation of 
large scale privatization. In view of the forgoing phenomenon, our research aims at: 
(1) to track down the factors which contributed to the unlikely decision of 
privatizing hospital services in the mid-1980s. 
Besides, we notice that the decision to review and privatize hospital services 
around 1985-86 was only the starting point of the reform. The factors that catalyzed 
the birth of the privatization policy are not necessarily the same set of factors that 
affected its later development. The policy evolved over roughly a decade, as it 
unfolds, it exhibited more and more of its incompleteness, which the government was 
unable to tackle with. These incompleteness might be caused by a different set of 
circumstances or factors. In view of this unfolding incompleteness, a second aim of 
this research is: 
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(2) to account for the problems appeared when this incomplete policy was 
launched, as well as to search for explanation(s) for the incomplete policy design. 
Thirdly, in the literature review done in this research, it is found that no studies 
in the past focused exclusively on the development of local medical and health 
system. lt is also found that a comprehensive historical account on the policy 
development is not available in current literature. The present study attempts to fill 
this gap. Existing studies often focused on the umbrella term of social policy, where 
the development of Hong Kong's health services is assigned a subsidiary position in 
the d i s c u s s i o n . 2 5 In most literature, the five decades of policy development only 
received very brief attention, often the focus of discussion is biased to the changes of 
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disease pattem or of the organization of the executive department. In view of this 
gap, the third objective of this study is: 
(3) to make a comprehensive historical account on the development of local 
medical and health services, with a time frame from the pre-war years up to 1995. 
This development of health system will be viewed against the background of 
germination of privatization ideas and policies in Hong Kong. 
This research topic is so chosen for flirther reasons that this privatization 
exercise invited more staff unrest and public objections than other privatization 
activities in the past. Secondly, it is a major reform in the local health system since 
the post-war years. Lastly, the ideas of privatization underwent changes in the reform 
process, which worth a systematic study to unveil these developments. 
All in all, the study achieved several things. Firstly, by mean of an historical 
account, it unveils the uniqueness of the Hong Kong medical care development. 
Secondly, a range of factors which commonly taken as contributing to privatization 
in Westem countries are examined, so as to determine whether they are applicable in 
this case of Hong Kong. Lastly, the case of the Hospital Authority (HA) is looked 
upon as an incomplete case of privatization. In my attempt to explain this 
incompleteness, I hope that it may shed light on how the government should pursue 
privatization of other human services in the future. 
Major Findin2S 
This sub-section briefly summarize the major findings in this study. Firstly, as 
far as the emergence of the privatization policy is concerned, it is found that the 
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reason ; h y government rushed into review and the privatization ofhospital services 
were not so much due to ideological, political or economic factors, as in the case of 
some foreign countries. The privatization of medical care in Hong Kong was 
prompted by three factors: 
i) a preoccupation of curative care within the policy circle; 
ii) the bureaucratic problems in the service delivery structure; and 
iii) an unwritten labor division between the medical profession and the generalist 
administrators - since the generalists were unable to come up with concrete policy 
alternative, the doctors were left with sufficient room and leverage to pursue its own 
course, and it is found that the medical profession in the mid-1980s was a major 
advocate for privatization. 
Additionally, it is found that in the process of policymaking, the administration 
had miscalculations in two areas: i) the strength of the 'legacy of free services' in 
shaping the public opinion; and ii) the financial benefits that can be reaped from 
privatization. These miscalculations have the effect of presenting the privatization 
proposal as something more desirable than it actually was. These miscalculations in 
other words, had helped to prompt the administration into adopting the proposal. 
The study demonstrates that the Hospital Authority reform has been a partial, 
as well as incomplete privatization policy. Evidence show that when the Hong Kong 
government shifted toward privatization of medical care in mid-1980s, the officials' 
ideas of privatization enabled them to tackle only the functional and^or operational 
level of privatization. These ideas did not suffice the government to address the 
complicated value issues that pertains to human service. This led to the 
incompleteness of the subsequent policy. The policy is 'implemented by parts'-
meaning that the institutional structure of the Hospital Authority is established, but 
the corresponding financing system is not simultaneously actualized. Besides，some 
other issues such as the proper balance between the public and the private sectors 
were not achieved. 
Lastly, the "legacy of free medicine" which is deep seated within the 
community, has been the major factor that hindered the administration to proceed 
with reforming the financing of the health system. 
Layout of the Chapters 
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The 'rest of chapter one will review contemporary literature on privatization. 
Importing ideas from various authors, a framework for policy analysis will be 
constructed to guide the research. Besides, the methodology of the research process 
will be explained toward the end of this chapter. 
Chapter two is a reconstruction of Hong Kong's medical and health services 
development process, with a time span from the pre-war period up to 1995. It is 
essentially a historical reappraisal of the rise of the local health system. 
Though local scholars offered various stage models to account for the social 
policy development, this paper contends that they are not applicable in the present 
case for reason of differ focus and emphasis, kistead, a six stages scheme is adopted 
to serve our research's particular needs. The uniqueness of these six stages lies in 
viewing the medical and health policy development against the evolution of 
privatization policy of the Hong Kong government. Toward the end ofthis chapter, I 
will single out several major trends/features of policy development. 
Chapter three focuses on the forging the privatization policy. A range offactors 
(e.g. political, economic, ideological, etc.) are examined in detail. The aim is to shed 
light on how these factors had contributed to the forging of the privatization of 
hospital services in the mid-eighties. This chapter also reconstructs the story of why 
the government rushed into reviewing hospital services and endorsed the Hospital 
Authority (HA) project, when the circumstances in 1985 discouraged the pursuit of 
large scale privatization. 
Chapter four argues that the HA policy is a case of incomplete privatization. 
This incompleteness manifested itself partly in term of the institutional design ofthe 
HA. Secondly, the evolution of cost recovery debate into the broader issue of health 
financing is also an important pointer indicating the incompleteness ofthe policy. 
Chapter five provides explanations to the incomplete formulation as well as 
incomplete implementation of the HA policy. The legacy of free medical services and 
biases of government's privatization ideas are considered crucial to the incomplete 
actualization of the HA reform. 
Chapter six as a concluding chapter aims to summarize the findings. 
Additionally, to refine, revise and amend the framework that is constructed at the 
beginning of the thesis. 
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Moving onward, it is essential to review the contemporary literature on 
privatization, so as to formulate in the light of these ideas, an analytical framework 
for the present study. 
The literature selected fall within the decade from around the mid-1980s' to the 
mid-1990s'. The review aimed to achieve several objectives: i) to define the 
privatization concept for the present study; ii) to account for the origin, practice and 
tradeoffs of privatization movement; iii) to outline privatization movement in the 
scope of health care policy; iv) to account for the factors regarded by scholars as 
contributing to the actualization of privatization; and finally, v) to formulate a 
framework for the present study in the light of the reviewed literature _ the 
framework is put together by importing concepts and constructs from the works of 
different scholars, also in consideration of the conditions of medical care 
development in Hong Kong. 
De fining Privatization 
The review of literature below discuss in details on how scholars defines 
privatization. Conclusively speaking, this thesis takes privatization as the tendency of 
moving towards more reliance in the non-government sector to perform originally 
government activity. This may mean policy changes which follow a tum in policy 
ideas or the people's value that some formerly state activity should be shifted out of 
the government boundary. Additionally, privatization can also mean the actual 
tuming over to the non-government sector the production/provision function of the 
government. Lastly, privatization also encompasses the use of the non-government 
sector's mode of operation in performing state activities. This definition is formulated 
by making certain adjustments to Kolderie's ideas of privatization. One major caveat 
here is to avoid the concepts of 'public' and 'private,, which are commonly used in 
defining privatization (e.g. in Kolderie's f o r m u l a t i o n ? ) . This move is to avoid 
getting involve in the disputes of the meaning of private and public, as some may 
argue that all organizations are public in nature. 
Leafing through the works of scholars, the privatization concept is found to has 
been defined roughly under three perspectives. Namely, i) the normative perspective, 
which handles the abstract, philosophical and normative issues of privatization; ii) 
the functional perspective, which focus on what government functions to privatize; 
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and iiij the operational perspective, which focuses on the specific modes of 
privatization in actual practice. 
As it will be demonstrated in chapter five, a balance of views in these three 
perspectives are crucial to the privatization of social services. The H.K. government 
articulated privatization only from the functional and operational perspective, this has 
led to the incomplete policy design in its medical services reform. Policy ideas that 
built from the normative perspective is required in the privatization of human 
services. 
The three perspectives of privatization are delineated below. 
The Normative Perspective 
The central concern of the normative perspective is how privatization can be 
understood in terms of the optimal arrangement between the public and the private 
sectors, as well as how does its actualization affects the existing societal structure. 
When a government activity/ service is being privatized, the original 
arrangement of what is public and what is private is changed. Whether this change is 
acceptable to the community is the core concem for the discussion of privatization 
under the normative perspective. An privatization endeavor may unwittingly alters 
the publicness of a government activity that it deviates too much from the people's 
taste, value and expectation. In other words, privatization of government activities 
demands policy planners to appreciate people's taste and judgment of where within 
the institutional arrangement of public and private should a particular government 
activity be located. 
Under the normative perspective, scholars guide the readers to view 
privatization more in terms of the balance between the private and the public sphere; 
the shifting of private-public boundary through privatization attempts or the blurring 
of such boundary. This issue of balance is not purely of material interest, nor political 
in nature, but concerns of the respective roles that the 'public' and the 'private' should 
play in a particular domain of activities (e.g. how far should prisons be privatized). In 
actual analytic work, these definitions facilitates the study of more abstract topics 
such as the changing of traditional perception of private and public, the dismantling 
of citizenship in the face of privatization, transformation of citizen into consumer; 
community into market place, the loss of social solidarity, the role of civil society, 
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and other normative issues. 
The discussion ofthe normative type of definitions necessitate the demarcation 
between public and private sphere?^ The problem is, however, the private and the 
public have no incisive boundary, it varies from case to case. For example, Starr 
maintained that the difference between public and private schools in the US are not 
the same difference between private and public television broadcasting channels. The 
nature and substance of private (or public) varies for different utilities, goods or 
services. Therefore, in this very context, the normative type of definition of 
privatization can only be used to "describe a direction of change, but it does not 
denote a specific origin or destination. Its meaning depends on the point ofdeparture 
- the public/private balance previously struck in a particular domain".^^ Normative 
definitions of privatization are therefore often less used to study phenomenon in the 
operational level, such as private or public organizational changes. 
There are examples of definitions put forwarded by scholars using the 
normative perspective. Morgan offered a definition which reads 
"Privatization [as] a term used to cover a variety o f policies aimed at re-establishing 
the primacy of'market forces' as the best means of distributingjobs, wages, goods and 
. II 30 
services . 
While Rose suggested that 
"Privatization is the process of increasing the scope o f the market, that is, the private 
actions o f producers and consumers - in the production and allocation o f good and 
services. Its opposite is nationalization, increasing the scope o f g o v e m m e n t directly or 
through state owned corporations producing and allocating goods and services". 
It is found that the normative definitions are particularly common in the studies 
of privatization movements in the post-Communist countries, where the re-building 
of market infrastructure, the reconstituting of the civil society, and the practical 
issues of disbanding formerly state owned enterprises are central considerations. 
Without a well established market, the post-Communist countries expectedly need to 
search appropriate principles to guide the overall marketization process. The market, 
the civil society and the state have to be differentiated, with their roles, relation and 
turfredefmed. In the study of these post-Communist societies, normative definitions 
of privatization would be in better accordance with the analytical tasks, rather than 
the functional/operational type of definitions which often assume the availability of 
capitalistic institutions，such as contract and stock market, etc. 
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The Functional Perspective 
Moving to the functional perspective of privatization, Ted Kolderie defmed 
privatization as turning to private sector the provision and/or the production fimction 
of government.^- Where provision refers to activities like policy-making, deciding, 
buying, requiring, regulating, franchising or subsidizing. Whereas production is taken 
to mean operation and the delivery of service, doing, selling or administering.^^ Other 
similar definitions came from the works of Stuart Butler and Ian Thynne. Butler 
coined privatization as "the shifting o f a function, either in whole or in part, from the 
public sector to the private sector,?^ While for Thynne, he defined privatization as 
"the transfer from the public to the private sector of various functions anchor things 
of direct significance to those functions".^^ Functions here is articulated as provision 
and production of services; facilitation of provision and production; facilitation of 
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consumption of goods and services; and regulation of the forgoing activities. 
The above definitions are classified as attempts to employ a functional 
perspective in defining the concept. Privatization is viewed as a shifting, a transferal 
of originally government functions to the private sector. The functions could be 
numerous, ranging from higher level policy-making, funding, advisory, regulating, to 
the operational level of producing, or even delivery of services. However, this 
diversity could be satisfactorily grouped under the concepts of provision and 
production, and thereby incorporate different hybrid forms privatization under a 
manageable number of categories.〗？ 
As mentioned before, this type of definition also help us to understand the 
present study of Hong Kong's medical care services, for the reason that the HA 
reform involved the changes of the provision and production role ofthe government. 
The Operational Perspective 
The major concern of this perspective is the specific changes pertaining to 
privatization, andA>r the mode of operation of privatization initiatives. For example, 
Starr argued that privatization has acquired both a general and a specific use. The 
general sense refers to any reduction in the scale or scope of government. The more 
specific sense is the transfer of ownership of assets and production of goods and 
o^ 
services to the private sector. 
Scholars delimited the concept to a specific mode of operation usually for two 
12i 
reasons: The first is for analytic purpose. Scholars may found it more rigorous to 
delimit the concept into 'assets sale'. For example, for economists, their particular 
interest often lies in the economic impetus of privatization, the effectiveness of 
selling state owned enterprise, and the impacts on the industries' efficiency thereafter. 
Therefore, though they acknowledged that privatization involves varies hybrid modes 
(e.g. contracting out), their studies often defined privatization exclusively as the 
partial or total transfer of an enterprise from public to private ownership.^^ Dieter 
B6s's Privatization - A Theoretical Treatment is an example of this kind of study. 
The second purpose ofusing a delimited definition of privatization is simply to 
achieve better clarity. For example, in Thynne's recent work, privatization is defined 
in two-folds, i) to transfer something from the public to the private sector，ii) to 
privatize ownership, arrangement of performance, financial bases, competition 
arrangement. Thynne noted that the latter way of defining privatization is more 
focused on specific changes in privatization process, rather than on principles.^® As 
the modes of privatization are becoming increasingly complex and diverse, and also 
because it began to merge into an even bigger category of marketization,i -^  jg 
therefore necessary to spell out clearly the type of privatization one is dealing with. 
Apparently, this type of definition which bome out of a operational perspective 
would tend to define the concept by means of the strategy in privatization process. 
It seems that when the scope of the privatization concept is delimited by 
scholars to refer solely to the operational level, it is for most of the time taken 
exclusively to mean selling of state assets, which is the purest kind of privatization, 
both the provision and production functions are tumed over to the private sector. 
That 'privatization' in early eighties being equated with 'assets sale' seemed to be a 
commonplace conclusion, however, its has the significance that when the Hong Kong 
government initiated to set up an independent Hospital Authority in the mid-1980s, it 
provoked panics in the public, the government was accused of selling off the 
hospitals. More proper concept(s) or language to articulated what the government 
actually intended to do were not found both within and outside the government then. 
Partly because of this, the public for a long time was not convinced nor at ease with 
the government's policy motives. 
Historv and Recent Development in Privatization 
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Major privatization movements were witnessed in the 1980s’’ followed the 
disenchantment of the welfare state. The ever expanding public sector in the welfare 
states have become difficult to manage and too expensive to sustain. 
As a policy, privatization was recorded to be first suggested by the Austrian-
bom American management professor, Peter F. Drucker in 1969. The term used then 
was 'reprivatize'. At the same time, E.S. Savas, then a NewYork City official, 
independently promoted privatization as a pragmatic policy to improve cost-
effectiveness of municipal services.^^ Later on，the coming into office of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively in 1979 and 1980 opened up real 
opportunities for actualizing the idea, also to forge the ideological support for 
subsequent privatization movements.^^ Toward the end of the eighties, the movement 
had already propagated to the Latin American countries. With the dismantling of 
communist countries after 1989, new interest in privatization was stimulated. Much 
studies have been focused on how to transform state owned enterprises in these 
formerly Leninist regimes. 
Currently, the development of privatization is viewed as turning from 'physical, 
commercial services' to 'protective and human services'.^ The main thrust ofthis tum 
is the introduction of complicated value issues of human services into privatization 
discussion. For example, in privatizing health services or custodian services such as 
prison, issues like legitimacy, accountability, equality and equity are difficult to 
resolve, yet they are also inevitable. 
Strategies of Privatization and the Hong Kong Context 
Other than selling state assets, which is a complete shedding of government 
responsibilities, privatization has come in various degrees in different hybrid modes. 
The following paragraphs briefly account for the strategies of privatization. 
E.S. Savas attempted to offer a taxonomy of privatization strategies, his 
classification has three major categories, under which hybrid modes of privatization 
are grouped. The main categories being divestment, delegation and displacement/^ 
This classification scheme is able to cover most of the strategies in current 
l i t e r a t u r e . 4 6 However, one inadequacy is that attention is only paid to the 
government's acts to retreat from business or from the services, the so called 'active 
role’ of the government is in retreating itself from its former endeavors. This 
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assumption failed to account for some other strategies like corporatization. t i 
corporatization, the focus is not so much on retreating from business, but on the 
government's intention in enhancing its own organizational capacity through 
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privatizing. 
Other than the forms suggested by Savas and Thynne, terms given for 
privatization strategies are numerous (and confusing), for example, farming out, 
liberalization, de-monopolization, hiving off, user-charges, and so on. Yet not all 
these labels have well defined contents or institutional arrangements attaching to 
them, thus they could be safely set aside from the discussion of privatization 
strategies. 
Tuming to Hong Kong, it is obvious that privatization strategies found in the 
literature are not necessarily those understood by the government. Privatization was 
used interchangeably with hiving off services in the mid-eighties. Clear classification 
was not available until the publication of Puhlic Sector Reform document in 1989，by 
the government's Finance Branch. Currently, privatization in Hong Kong takes 
several forms, namely through public corporations; non-departmental public bodies 
(NDPBs); and private participation. 
For public corporations and NDPBs, both of them are bodies established by 
statute. A main different between the two is that the former operate commercial and 
cost recovering services (e.g. railway), while the latter operate services which tend to 
be free of only partial cost recovery is possible (e.g. consumer protection). 
Private participation is an umbrella term which covers the arrangements like: 
service contracts; management contracts; Build-Own-Operate Schemes ^OOs); 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer Schemes (BOOTs); and divestiture. The BOOs allow 
the government to shed responsibility in designing, planning, building and operation 
of some infrastructure projects, such as tunnels. The ownership of these projects 
remains private. In some cases, the projects will be transfer back to the public sector 
after the private participants have made a certain amount of retums through the 
projects, these are called BOOTs. Lastly, divestiture basically means the selling of 
government assets, shares, retreats from market, and so on. It should be noted that 
according to the Hong Kong government's understanding, privatization is used 
strictly to describe the complete retreat of government from ownership, provision and 
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production. Activities like contracting out and corporatization are not regarded as 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n . 4 8 Such definition differs from that adopted in this study. 
Tradeoffs of Privatization 
Debates over the tradeoffs of privatization are never absented from the 
literature,9 accusations on privatization come from many diverse respects. For the 
sake of better clarity, the disadvantages of privatization are grouped under three 
categories, namely institutional flaws; disruption in private-public balance; and the 
detrimental power constellation. As it will be demonstrated in later chapters, the 
problems ofthe Hospital Authority reform also fell into these three categories. 
The first is the 'institutional flaws". The institutional design of privatization 
programs can be flawed, creating harms in lieu of social benefits. Privatization itself 
does not guarantee competition, the program may become replacing a pubHc 
monopoly with a private one.50 Contracting out services is also problematic. The 
process itself invites corruption, the contracts sometimes turned out to be bad. There 
were cases of failure like a local government contracted out trash collection service 
and close down its own department, only to discover that the contractor ran quickly 
into bankruptcy. 
Privatization is at limes infested witk the problem of 'creaming’，that is, only 
services that guarantee stable and satisficing retums are produced. Or the producers 
eventually will concentrate on the profit making services while the other services are 
only minimally produced. Such creaming depends on the institutional design if i t is to 
be prevented. Another pertaining problem is that the institutional arrangement in 
privatization forged a preoccupation with efficiency, the producer in the production 
process tends to overlook other social values (e.g. equity) which are vital for social 
well being. 
The second type of disadvantage is the 'disruption in the private-public balance'. 
Privatization is often accused of causing the community spirit to decline. The 
traditional community is lost to the market place, citizens becomes consumers, 
involving in a pure cash nexus with neighbors^\ the social bonds are replaced with 
economic relations. Also, the mission of civil service is also lost. 
Besides, as the public sector contracts, its control over some domains also 
diminishes, this can result in the government's inability to redistribute wealth. The 
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government will also be ineffective in protecting the poor, the disabled and the 
elderly. These groups are often squeezed out from the service structure by market 
forces. 
The final category is the 'detrimental power constellation', yet whether this type 
of effects are truly disadvantageous is a matter of opinion, depending on where one's 
foothold is. At the national level, when assets sale is opened to foreign investors，the 
result will be foreign power comes into play in domestic political process. Especially 
for the third world countries, privatization movements are often sponsored and 
propagated by international powers. 
Another form of power shift is the decline of union movements. Privatization 
is sometimes argued as a political conspiracy to shattered the bargaining power ofthe 
unions.52 Moreover, economic powers also undergo shifts in the privatization process. 
The sales of state enterprises initially achieved a so called public ownership, yet this 
is transitory because a rush of buying and selling of shares will follow, small 
investors want to reap quick profit. As a result the ownership will soon concentrate 
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again on the hands of a few, the objective of public ownership is sabotaged. 
Starr wamed that privatization can be self-limiting in a sense that the cost of 
privatization will eventually makes the initial benefit appeared trivial. The 
introduction of voucher systems and contracts in some services tend to create new 
spending coalition or constituencies. This is particularly true for human services such 
as food vouchers, education, health and corrections, because they will continue to 
rely on the public purse. These powerful groups will have the incentive of ever 
lobbying for a bigger public expenditure. This triggers a 'counter-cyclical resurgence' 
of the public sector" the vision that privatization reduces public spending can be 
illusory. 
Privatization in Medical and Health Services 
Scarpaci pointed out that state's intervention in medical and health care had 
been minimal all along until the nineteenth century: 
"Until the advent o f germ theory...Private services were the predominant mode o f 
medical care delivery around the world. Historically, only selected populations 
received state-funded curative care, and these populations tended to be strategic civil 
servants such as soldiers, politicians and government administrators" 
With national wide preventive measures became possible and essential, state-funded 
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health services began to flourish. Free or cut price medical services were also utilized 
to counteract the radicalization of union movements since the Industrial Revolution. 
Later on, under the influence of the building of the welfare state, the health system 
expanded correspondingly. There appeared to be no clear and general time marker of 
when the health system of Westem industrial societies undergone privatization. 
However, at the eve of privatization or the launching of other reform programs, the 
systems tended to be infested with several common problems. Such as the surging 
cost of operation, the rising public expectation on service provision and quality, the 
demand of service outstripped the supply, the system being accused of being 
irresponsive and bureaucratic, a desire of the authorities to shift from an administered 
system to a managed system, the over-medicalization and unnecessary care, the lack 
of coordination among service providers, the inequities in access and payment, and 
finally, there were no way to hold the medical profession accountable of 
unsatisfactory services.�� 
While attempts to reform the health system are numerous, not all ofthem can .. . • 
be classified as privatization. Reviewing several current reform initiatives, when 
privatization ideas are applied, they are often actualized as installation of quasi-
market, this is often achieved through splitting the purchaser from the producers of 
service. The government purchases services from the private producers, which 
operated in a regulated quasi-market. Another proposal is the managed competition 
in the United States, the producers are private and the users purchase services out of 
their own assets, but the government managed the competition so that the less well 
offusers will not be left out from the system. Besides, the competition is managed in 
a way to curtail the users unlimited desire on high-tech treatments. Other 
privatization initiatives put into practice involve the use of contractual relationships, 
and the redefining of relationships between government, service producers, insurers 
(voluntary and public) and users? 
The privatization of medical and health services are not the only way nor a 
sufficient way to reform the system, they are usually accompanied by other measures 
such as the empowerment of patients, the emphasis on a different management 
culture, devolved hospital managements, and the like. 
Causes of Privatization 
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Ih contemporary literature, numerous possible causes, impetuses or 
contributing factors of privatization movements have been reasoned by scholars. 
Firstly, there is the political factor. Privatizing is seen as a way to reconstitute 
political coalition; to undermine organized labor; to gain electoral support; to 
unburden the administration; and to get rid of politically troublesome state 
enterprises.57 
Secondly, a bureaucratic factor is found to propel privatization. The traditional 
departments have become over-manned, lack of flexibility and responsiveness. There 
are complaints from the public that the departments are inefficient and the 
operational procedures are obsolete. Privatizing is viewed as a way to revitalize the 
service delivery structure. 
Thirdly, the economic factors such as persistent slow growth overtime and 
loss-making among state owned enterprises can strengthen the government's 
determination to privatize. Starr argued that the post-industrial transition tends to 
reward flexibility in production and responsivessness to rapid changes (i.e. Market . • ‘ 
and technology changes), while the large-scale mass production mode adopted by 
state enterprises are becoming difficult to survive.^^ Closely related to the economic 
factor is the fiscal factor, privatizing is regarded as a way to generate revenue (may it 
only be short term), and in a long run to reduce budget deficit by sizing down the 
public sector. 
Ideology is another factor that shaped the attitudes for privatizing. For example, 
there were aspirations like achieving public ownership and minimal government. 
Some basic tenets of economics such as the advantage of competition, and the private 
sector's creativity also formed the ideological basis of privatization. 
Lastly, there is the external factor. For the advanced industrial societies， 
domestic privatization initiatives are strengthen by the emerged global trend of 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n . 5 9 Imitation and competition have helped to catalyze privatization 
decisions. In the late developing countries, privatizing sometimes is the last resort to 
get out of heavy debts and deficits. The sales of assets invite foreign investment 
flows which are vital for domestic economy. 
Conclusively speaking, the numerous causes of privatization can be grouped 
under the labels of political; bureaucratic; economic; fiscal; ideological and external 
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factors." Ahd in tum, these labels can be pooled together under two categories -
domestic and external. Later on, in the analysis of the case of Hong Kong, this 
classification scheme will be adopted with some adjustment. 
A Framework ofAnalysis 
To study privatization in Hong Kong with a special focus on medical care, a 
framework for systematic organization of empirical data is proposed. Ideas of 
privatization are imported from the forgoing review of literature to formulate the 
framework (see Figure 1). It depicts three groups of factors influencing and/or 
showing association with privatization decisions, hi chapter three, these factors will 
be examined individually to determine their relative significance and relevancy to the 
case of Hong Kong. 
Group one refers to factors unique to the domain of medical and health policy. 
Earlier literature review identified several precipitating factors for health care reform, 
like surging costs; rising public expectation; obsolete service delivery structure; 
inequities of access, and so on. However, it is argued that three other factors are 
significant in forging the privatization decision. These factors namely the 'legacy of 
free medical service'; the 'preoccupation with curative care' and the 'dynamics 
between professionals and generalists'. The manifestation of these three factors may 
not be unique to Hong Kong, yet their emergence are rooted in specific social factors 
(e.g. clashes between Chinese and Westem medical culture) and the development of 
the Hong Kong society. 
Group two encompasses factors that are labeled as: political; bureaucratic, 
economic; fiscal and ideological. In current Westem literature on privatization, these 
factors are commonly believed to have played significant roles in forging the 
privatization policy and ideas. 
Group three refers to factors external to the colony, apart from those influence 
suggested by other scholars (e.g. advance countries sponsoring privatization in less 
developed countries). Hong Kong has a particular external factor that is the influence 
from the United Kingdom, which channeled to Hong Kong through the colonial 
government. Besides, local health system can easily imitates the system in the U.K., 
since the medical training of the colony copies from its home country, hi brief, one of 









































































































































































































































































































































































these factors, and their relation with subsequent policy decisions. 
Figure 1 indicates that the three sets of factors influenced two paths of 
development of privatization: one exclusively in the area of medical care; the other 
being the overall development of the government's privatization ideas, studies and 
the "public sector reform" initiatives. The privatization of medical care took place in 
mid-1980s，this period was also when the government underwent a process of 
elaborating its own ideas ofprivatization. The two paths of development can be seen 
as running parallel with each others. The relationship between the two paths is not 
explicit, it is not obvious whether the reform in medical care affected the 
administration's ideas ofprivatization or vice versa. But I tend to anticipate a positive 
relationship between the two. As seen from the history of privatization movements, 
they were closely connected with ideas about the use of the private sector to perform 
state activity. As demonstrated earlier, these ideas concem with the mode of 
organization (i.e. of the operational level), the functions of state activity (i.e. the 
flinctional level), and also the value issues of privatization (i.e. the normative level). 
For the present case, I suppose privatization ideas and the reform of Hong Kong's 
medical care holds certain relationship, only that it is not obvious at this stage. 
Discussion in later chapters will attempt to establish the relationship between the two 
paths. The concluding chapter will attempt to revise this figure and provide a 
preliminary answer on the relationship of the two paths ofdevelopment. 
The Methodology of Policy Analysis 
To dig up the explanatory factors of the policy that were embedded in the 
history ofthe medical system, the present research is not so ambitious as to pin down 
the exact causation of the reforms, but to unearth the immediate events that happened 
round the formation and initiation of the reforms, and that to highlight among this 
array of events, those that showed influence andA)r association with the forming and 
initiating of the privatization exercise. This paper examines the direction of influence 
and the strength of these factors, one can coin this a search for elective affinity 
between factors and the policy decisions. 
Affinity is originally an idea from alchemy and later on used in chemistry, 
which describe the property^^ of substances. Its first use in social science was found 
in the writings of Max Weber.^ ^ Li his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
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Capitalism, Weber addressed the difficulty for finding neat casual explanation(s) for 
the rise of capitalism, instead he attempted to demonstrate the elective affmity 
between ethics and the spirit of capitalism. Elective affinity refers to the close 
associations and seemingly coincidence between events and/or ideas - the emergence 
of an event/idea appears to be associated with another event/idea. Weber maintained 
that: 
"In view o f the tremendous confusion o f interdependent influences between the 
material basis,...social and political organization, and the ideas...we can only proceed 
by investigation whether and at what points certain correlations [elective affinities ] 
between forms o f religious belief and practical ethics can be worked out. At the same 
time we shall as far as possible clarify...by virtue of those [elective affinities], the 
religious movements have influenced the development ofmateriaI c u l t u r e " . 
"...we have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis 
as that the spirit o f capitalism...could only have arisen as the result o f certain effects 
o f t h e Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation o f t h e 
Reformation....On the contrary, we only wish to ascertain whether and to what extent 
religious forces have taken part in the...formation and the...expansion o f t h a t spirit [of 
capitalism] over the world."^^ 
As Gidden commented, Weber did not claimed that the rationalization of Protestant 
ethics as the only significant influence that separate economic development in the 
West from that of the rest of the world^^ Acknowledged the complexity of human 
conditions, Weber made sure that "human actions cannot be explained in terms of 
law-like relations of cause and effect"^^. Transporting this mentality to the present 
research, this paper modeled Weber's strategy by looking into elective affinities 
among events^^ and not necessarily causal relations. By clarifying, tracing and 
working out directions of influences through the identification of these affinities, the 
present case of privatizing medical care can be adequately understood. 
To go about studying the case at hand, the basic strategy is by coupling two 
techniques, that is to make descriptive historical accounts and to conduct 
comparative works. The former excavates the events that precede, surround and 
pertain to the privatization exercise. These historical facts could be at time self-
explanatory in showing their relations with the formation of the policy, while at other 
times, they requires re-interpretations by the researcher so as to communicate to the 
readers their significance in the privatization process. The second dimension is the 
comparative method, it is adopted for reason that comparisons help to highlight the 
uniqueness of our case. Besides, some information will not be as self-evident or 
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illuminated without contrasts and comparisons. A comparative method is employed 
for its usefulness in yielding understandings of the multi-facets ofthe case. 
In this research, data is collected from sources including the publicized 
government policy papers, the internal documents from related policy branches of the 
government, minutes of the Legislative Council meetings, speeches of officials and 
leading figures in the policy circle, newsletters of professional bodies, in-depth 
interviews with insiders of the HA project, and also interviews with hospital 
administrators from the private sector. 
Data collection is by means of library research, office interviews and telephone 
interviews. Access to internal documents of the government applied through the 
Code on Access to Information. 
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‘By privatization we mean the tuming to non-govemment sector the provision and/or the production 
function of originally government activities. 
-The data presented is only one of the many possible constructions of the state ofbeing ofthe health 
system. Advocates for reforms would depict the system as problem ridden by focusing on camp-beds; 
manpower wastage, staff grievances; long waiting-list for surgery; etc., while officials would focus on 
the lean and efficient aspects of the system. Our purpose on the other hand, is firstly to depict in 
general the scale of the services; and secondly to make comparisons with other countries. In this sense, 
the choice of the commonly accepted indicators arejustified. 
3 It rose from 17.6 per thousand persons in 1926 to an unprecedented height of37.4 in 1941, as far as 
written records can be found. 
4 For data concerning mortality and birth rates, see Hong Kong Government. (1981)，(1991), (1993), 
(1995), Hong KongAnmial Digest ofStatistics.; Hong Kong Government. (1969), Hong Kong 
Statistics 1947-1967; United Nations. (1974), The Demographic Situation in H.K: 
5 For data on life expectancy, see: Yuen (1991), P.25, Hong Kong Government. Hong Kong. (1989), 
(1995), Hong Kong Government. (1981), 1981 Census Main Report, Vol.: 1., United Nations. (1974)， 
The Demographic Situation in H.K. 
6 See Hong Kong Government. (1981), (1991), (1993), (1995), HongKongAnnual Digest of 
Statistics:’ United Nations. (1974), The Demographic Situation in H.K. 
7 See Hong Kong Government. (1969), Hong KongStatistics 1947-1967. P.14, 194. 
8 See Hong Kong Government. (1981), (1991)，(1993), (1994), Hong KongAnnual Digest ofStatistics; 
Hong Kong Government. (1969), HongKongStatistics l947-1967\ United Nations. (1974), The 
Demographic Situation in H.K. 
9 In 1987, the rate of Hong Kong is 7.5, while for the mentioned countries the figures ranged from 8.3 
to 10.0. Yet Japan had the lowest among the above, achieving a rate of 5.0. See Yuen (1991)，P.25. 
'° See Hong Kong Government. (1981), (1991),(1993), (1994), HongKongAnnual Digestof 
Statistics-, Hong Kong Government. (1969), Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967; United Nations. (1974)， 
The Demographic Situation in H.K. 
“The rate ofthese countries ranged from 0.19 to 0.58. See United Nations. (1974), The Demographic 
Situation in H.K. P.78. 
'-See Yuen(1991). P.25. 
” S e e Lo (1990). pp.l29-133.; Hong Kong Government. (1993), (1994), (1995), HongKongAnnual 
Digest ofStatistics; Hong Kong Government. (1969), Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967. 
14 See Judge (1987), P.5., and Aldridge & Sundarapandiyan (1995), "The Convergence Model in 
Health Care Reform: Experiences from Singapore, The United Kingdom and the United States", in 
Asian Journal ofPiiblic Administration, Vol. 17，June 1995. P.70. 
15 See Aldridge & Sundarapandiyan (1995), P.73. 
16 Computed from data ofHong Kong Government. (1987), (1989), (1995). Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
Government. (1981), (1990), (1993)，(1994), Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics. 
17 A comparison of selected places' share of total health expenditure, as a percentage ofGDP: 
Countries U.K. U.S. Japan Australia Singapore 
Percentage ofGDP in 199115.39 3.94 6.8 8.6 1.40 
Sources: Aldridge & Sundarapandiyan (1995), Scott & Thynne (1994), P.95. 
'^See Hay(1992), pp. 9-11. 
19 The family bonds may constitute to less cases of drug addiction, less accident and injuty proneness. 
Strong family and matrimonial values may contribute to the lower rate of un-wed mothers giving birth 
to children, which might have caused higher infant mortality rate in the U.S. See Hay (1992). P.2. 
20 See Hay (1992), Pp. 2-4，8, 31-32. 
-'Dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of population of age < 15 and ^ 65 to eveo' 1000 
persons ofage between 15 and 65. Dependency generally implies economic dependency, however, 
population on both of the extremes occasionally also have higher need ofmedical services. For 
example, deaths caused by neoplasms and circulatory disease are very much skewed to the old-age 
groups. From 1961 to 1991,the local dependency ratio declined from 774 to 420. 
“The median age ofH.K. in 1961, 1971, 1981,and 1991 wererespectively23.2,21.7, 26.0 and 32.0. 
. - — ^ 
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See Hong Kong Government. (1976), Hong Kong By Census 1976 Main Report, Vol. 1: Analysis.; 
Hong Kong Government. (1981), 1981 Census Main Report, Vol.: 1; Hong Kong Government. (1991), 
Hong Kong 1991 Population Census - Summary Results; and Hong Kong Government. (1991)，Hong 
Kong 1991 Population Census - Main Tables. 
- 'See Hong Kong Government. (1969), HongKongStatistics 1947-1967. P.195. 
-^  The shortfall ofS.M.H. beds reached over 800 in 1990. The service was traditionally offered by the 
Siu Lam Hosiptal for the Sub-Normal, the number of beds provided by this institution stagnated 
throughout the 80's, and the waiting list for admission extended to an average waiting time often 
years. 
-'Examples ofthis type ofstudies are Jones (1990), Tang (1994), Chow (1982). 
-^  Examples can be found in the works ofThong (1987) and Chao (1985) in Medical Directory of 
Hong Kong (3rd edition). 
27 See Kolderie, Ted. (1987). "What Do We Mean by 'Privatization'?", Society, Vol. 24，No.6. Pp. 46-
51. 
28 See Kamerman, Sheila B. & Kahn, Alfred J. (ed.) (1989). Privatization andthe Welfare State. 
Princeton University Press. P. 20. 
J' Ibid. P.21. 
30 See Morgan, Philip, (ed.) (1995). Privatization and the Welfare State - Implications for Consumers 
and the Workforce. Dartmouth. P. 4. 
” See Suleiman, Ezra N. & Waterbury, John. (1990). The Political Economy ofPublic Sector Reform 
and Privatization. Westview Press. P. 10. 
32 See Kolderie, Ted. (1987). "What Do We Mean by ‘Privatization，？”，Society, Vol. 24，No.6. Pp. 46-
51. 
33 Ibid. P. 47. 
34 See Gormley, Jr.，William T. (ed.) (1991). Privatization and its Alternatives. The University of 
Wisconsin Press. P. 17. 
3) See Thynne I.，（1989). 'A Framework for Analysis', in Thyrnie I & AriffM. eds., Privatization: 
Singapore Experience in Perspective, (Singapore: Longman, 1989). P. 2. 
^Ibid.P.6. 
” With the two pairs of concepts, that is 'provision & production’，and 'public sector and private sector', 
Kolderie put forwarded a two-by-two matrix of privatization typology. The matrix yields three types of 
privatization, namely: public provision with private production of services; public production with 
private provision of services; and in the third case moving totally into private production and provision. 
See Kolderie, Ted. (1987). Pp. 46-51. This matrix will be adapted in our study in the later on 
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Chapter Two 
The Evolutionary Stages ofMedical Care in Hong Kong 
This chapter is a re-interpretation of local medical and health policy 
development. Six stages is proposed to depict the development of the colony's 
medical and health policy from the pre-war years to 1995. From the seemingly 
haphazard events throughout these years, four main developmental trends are 
identified. These trends shaped the policy in significant ways. The four trends are 
respectively: i) the 'legacy of free medical services'; ii) a growing preoccupation in 
curative care; iii) the steady development of privatization ideas within the 
government since the eighties; and iv) the dynamics between professionals and 
generalists - since the post-war years, an unwritten understanding between the two 
parties slowly emerged; the generalists dominated the agenda setting process while 
the professionals retained their influence in the choice of policy alternatives. 
Differentiating the Stages 
This thesis classifies the policy development into six stages, namely: the Pre-
World War II and Occupation, Divergence of Opinion, Convergence of Opinion, 
Reaction and Growth, Privatization of Medical Care - Controversies and Decisions; 
and finally, Consolidation and Other Reforms. Besides, in our subsequent 
deliberation of the six stages, attention is paid to the parallel development of 
privatization debates within the government. This arrangement of discussion has not 
been attempted by scholars in our literature review, yet it is crucial to our 
understanding of privatization in medical care. 
Scholars have introduced different stage models^ as tools to understand the 
policy development in Hong Kong. Most of them focus on the entire sector of social 
service. Though the medical policy is incorporated under the umbrella term of "social 
services", its development (e.g. expansion in provision) is not necessarily in the same 
pace as other services (See Appendix One for a comparison between different stage 
models). Some others who pinpoint exclusively on medical policy often do not come 
up with clear stages. For these reasons, I propose alternatively the six stages ofwhich 
the scope and focus are geared to the unique development of local medical policy. 
The works ofother scholars are considered not appropriate to be directly imported for 
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our present use, yet each of their models gives a sound and helpful framework for 
comprehending the social policy from their own perspectives. 
The criteria for delineating one stage from another vary greatly for different 
authors. For example, major events such as the abrupt discontinuation of British rule 
during the Second World War is a commonly used time marker to identify one stage 
from another. Other criteria involve ideological conflicts and changes among policy 
m a r k e r s 2 , major policy documents as time markers^ significant changes in policy 
making modes^, etc. Some medical professionals use the change ofmorbidity and the 
different functions discharged by the Medical and Health Department over the years 
as markers to differentiate the stages. In this study, the main criteria of demarcating 
the stages include: i) significant historical events and, ii) the magnitude of influence 
from the medical profession and the generalist within the government machinery. 
Events such as the Second World War and 1967 Riots brought abrupt changes to the 
colony and called for revision in the policies. As for the relative influence of 
professional and generalist, the findings in this research suggest that in the medical 
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field it has been the dynamics between professional ideas/opinions and generalists' 
political considerations which shaped the policy most. This dynamic relationship 
permeats the five decade of policy development I studied. Thus its changes serve as 
excellent indicators for separating one stage of development from another. 
The medical policy remained largely the turf of doctors and administrators. 
Other political actors had not the knowledge to query the profession's opinion. 
Politicians other than those from the medical or health care functional constituency 
often showed inability (or unwillingness/ to address the core of health reform 
debates. As Gould observed, 
"While the legislators voted in favour of reform, much of the debate was spent 
arguing over the wording of the motion, rather than on the substance of the reform 
itself. Most pointedly, there was no political support for any of the reform options 
which the government put forward....The general tenor of members' speeches is what 
the Chief Secretary called 'constant, depressing，criticism”'， 
Other than common rhetorics like urging the administration to shoulder the financial 
responsibility of medical care, commitment to resolve the problem of manpower 
shortage, and the like, an average politician without relevant professional knowledge 
understandably had little to offer in the policy debates. 
In short, the six stages are differentiated firstly by significant events and 
29i 
secondly, magnitude of influence between the medical profession and generalist in 
the government. 
Pre-World War IIand the Occupation Period 
Prominent features of medical and health service in the pre-war years can be 
concluded as follows: most of all, the plagues and wartime experience nutured the 
heroism among the doctors. This sentiment fortified itself and grew into a strong 
profession conviction. This conviction moved the professionals to pursue their ideals 
in the post war years, making them active and influential participants in the policy 
circle. 
Secondly, in this period, the colony's health debates centred around epidemics, 
plagues and the nagging sanitary problems. Thirdly, in the medical circle, clashes of 
opinions between Westem medicine and traditional Chinese medicine had been the 
leitmotif of this period. Lastly, on the administrative level, the colonial surgeons 
stood in opposition to the administrators, denouncing their inertia in improving 
health conditions; while the administration was in tum faced with constant resistance 
from the Chinese community, whether in exercising a piece oflegislation or other 
administrative orders. Also，influence from the home government of England also 
had a retarding effect on service development. 
The first colonial surgeon took office in 1843. Before that the government was 
denied ofmedical support from London for the reason that the civil servants in Hong 
Kong were of lower grades, and so their medical needs could be met by private 
practitioners^ The colonial surgeon then had no responsibility for the community's 
health. Services were confined to civil servants while the Chinese who were in 
g 
destitution were allowed to be admitted to the government hospital only after 1864. 
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The government had the ieast enthusiasm to intervene and provide services. 
Nevertheless, there was several attempts to impose legislation concerning public 
hygiene. The effectiveness ofthese government efforts were sometimes hampered by 
corruption, but mostly by opposition from the Chinese community? which asked for 
no more than to be left alone'‘. 
The administration was repeatedly accused by the colonial surgeons of doing 
too little. The doctors made use of their annual reports to launch heavy accusations 
on the government's failure to improve the colony's health conditions. Sometimes the 
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criticisms "were so heavy that their reports were s u p p r e s s e d . 〗 ？ Nevertheless, the 
inertia of the administration might also be due to the obstacles imposed by the home 
government. For example, the Secretary of State insisted on having the colony's 
hospital plans prepared at home. The result was much delay in policy making^^. In 
another example, on the issue of re-organization of the sewage system, the plan was 
shelved since the home government did not want to disturb Chinese residents nor to 
transfer the financial burden to the tax-payers in EnglandJ^ 
The third line of conflict lay within the medical circle. Mutual understanding 
between Westem medicine and Chinese medicine was lacking. In dealing with the 
plagues around the mid-1890s, the Tung Wah hospital came under criticism. In 1896, 
"the government medical officers demanded the abolition of the Tung Wah and its 
replacement by a government pauper hospital". The first Principal Civil Medical 
Officer (a new post to replace the colonial surgeon)i5, j ^ Atkinson, stigmatized 
Chinese medicine in the Tung Wah as 'empiricism and quackery’�& Nevertheless, the 
Colonial Office in London resisted the requests to sabotage the Tung Wah, probably 
for the sake of avoiding social unrest. 
To sum up, in the pre-war period the administration was faced with pressures 
respectively from the medical profession, the Chinese community and the home 
government. Policy making appeared loose and tentative, forward planning was 
almost not in existence. The Chinese would opt for no interference from the 
government. The medical profession itself had been outspoken and assertive, 
unhesitatingly pressing for whatever course it saw right. It also made severe criticism 
against the Chinese medical practice, custom and denounced the 'prejudice toward 
Westem medicine’ of the Chinese. Assertive the doctors might have been, the 
government bent more to the protest of the military and the businessmen,^^ rather 
than the criticism ofthe doctors. On the whole, the government used the enforcement 
of laws and regulations to achieve its goal of disease control, yet it is bound to have 
limited effectiveness. The cultural barrier between the governing and the governed 
was great. It was no little challenge to integrate the Chinese population into a British 
administration'^ The government did provid limited medical service for the public 
free of charge or at cut-price level, but the problem was that the Chinese were not 
ready to use them.'^ 
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For the years of Occupation, officials of the Medical Department under Dr. 
Selwyn-Clarke were exempted from the Stanley intem camp until 1943.2® j^ ^ these 
years of limited freedom, the daily operation of the department included prevention 
of epidemics, picking up bodies from the street (around 200 corpses daily), etc?' 
Whereas during the years of internment, the officers assumed camp 
responsibilities as part of their official duties. "[V]ital statistics of camp births and 
• • 2 2 
deaths were kept as required by law as a matter of normal civil service rout ine" . 
Meanwhile, the Japanese administration had devised a governance structure of their 
own. There was a Governor Office, bureaux, and functional departments. Medical 
services pertained to one of these departments.^^ As food supply plunged and sanitary 
condition deteriorated, the Japanese took measures to prevent epidemic outbreaks. 
Vigorous campaigns were launched with free inoculations, propaganda talks, touring 
vans and posters. 
Conclusively speaking, the occupation period saw the tentative health 
provisions on the Japanese side, and limited operation on the side of the colony's 
Medical Department. Where uncertainties prevailed and external constraints were 
heavy, officials of the Medical Department performed their duties were primarily out 
of personal conviction and discretion. This heroic sentiment though transitory, did 
not rapidly subside after the War. It tended to carry over into the next stage and 
affected the policy decision of the early post war years and the growth ofprofessional 
conviction. 
Early Post-WWII to 1957: Divergence of Opinions 
This stage could be examined in two respects, firstly, the priority ofhealth care 
in the overall rehabilitation of the colony from war damages. Secondly, the 
interaction between professionals and generalists in policy making in the area 
medical and health. 
In rehabilitating wartime damages, the original plan of Governor Mark Young 
was to rebuild public services. Yet in the end the plan tilted toward fast rehabilitation 
of production. This was not due to financial reasons, but rather a decision of the 
administration to secure supply of food and also to placate business interest. The 
colonial treasury had sufficient surplus to fund the expansion of public services. 
Official statistics showed that a heavy deficit of $116,546,276 was recorded for the 
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year 1946M7^ yet for the following year (i.e. 1947/48) there was already a forecast 
ofsurplus of$5,395. In reality, the unused funds in the end of 47/48 tumed out to be 
$36,597，136，26 almost 6800 times larger than the original estimation. The 
administration's failure to commit more funds on public service provisions was due 
to the influx of refugees and a seemingly transient population. There was the worry 
that welfare would attract refugees from the north, in the end making the societal 
conditions deteriorate in lieu of improving. 
Another crucial institution in the rehabilitation period was a ten-person 
committee which was set up in June 1946. This committee was in charge of the 
overall rehabilitation planning, and was backed up by a fimd of £ 1,000,000 
allocated to Hong Kong by the British government under the terms of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act 1945^ Under the committee was six subcommittees 
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specialized in different areas of planning; public health was among one of these. 
The year 1947 saw no concrete work done by the committee nor by its affiliates. The 
reason for this delay was the complexity of the projects which required lengthy, time-
consuming ddiberations.29 From 1948 onward, it is obvious that the committee 
steered toward boosting up primary productions. 
Where health conditions and medical facilities were concerned, the 
responsibilities rested upon the Medical and Health Department rather than the 
Tublic Health’ sub-committee under the committee for rehabilitation. Li the post-war 
years, the medical profession as before, pursued their own course disregarding the 
fact that their proposals might be sabotaged by the administrators. The speeches of 
the Directors of Medical and Health Services during the Legislative Council 
meetings reflected their professional conviction and heroic aspiration of serving the 
community. This sentiment, bome out of the profession's tradition, was reinforced by 
the wartime experience, and at this stage found support among the legislators. For 
example, Dr. Selwyn-Clarke mentioned that "it is our ambition to provide [services 
ofthe Medical and Health Department] for all sections of the community, especially 
for the underprivileged whose needs have been so ably championed by the 
Honourable Unofficial Members of Council"? After the dark days of Occupation, 
the colony suffered acute shortage of free medical service. The atmosphere of the 
Legislative Council in early post-war years had been one of extending these vital 
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services arid reliefs in a universal manner. 
Fanned by these sentiments and having the power of drafting plans on their 
own, the professionals of the Medical and Health Department struggled for what they 
reckoned essential, eventually came up with something that the administration 
considered unpalatable - a fifteen-year plan of the colony's medical and health 
development was submitted to the government in 1957. As described by Dr. Thong, 
the Directors of the Department before the Secretaryy^ranch system was introduced 
in the mid-70s', had always been accorded high status and adequate powers to initiate 
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and formulate policies, including all the crucial and professional decisions. 
Additionally, with the Chinese attitudes toward Western medicine changed and 
became positive, "the population [developed] a greater appreciation of the services 
provided and is making more use of them".^^ In view of these developmental trends, 
it is conceivable that the medical profession would put forward plans that the 
generalist administrators might have considered grandiose. Li response to the fifteen-
year proposal, a later Medical and Health White Paper commented: 
"In 1957, an outline of a 15 year-plan of development of medical and health services 
was submitted to Government...in the absence of factual census data upon which 
population projections could be based, the detail of planning was best undertaken in 
five-year phases. Further, uncertain economic trends and changing pattem of demand 
for medical and health services would require the maximum of flexibility in any long-
term programme".""^ 
This criticism from the administration was not unfounded, because the department 
only started to acquire a small planning unit in 1959.^ ^ Before that the policy 
planning was inevitably defected by mere professional speculations and empiricism. 
This deficiency in policy planning was common among other departments. The civil 
service then did not have the manpower, nor organizational structure to undertake 
planning duties and to coordinate policy initiatives.^^ The doctors in estimating, for 
example, the cost of hospitals, had to draw comparisons with figures from regions 
like the U.K., Nigeria, Gold Coast，and Sudan〗&，but in no concrete ways could they 
convert these standards into befitting figures for the Hong Kong society. 
It is concluded that the divergence in policy ideas between the medical 
profession and the generalists was great. The administration focused on the day-to-
day tasks of rehabilitation, as long term reform was considered not appropriate nor 
p r a c t i c a l . 3 7 It was busy rebuilding the primary production system, and stepping up the 
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garrison td ward off Communist influence. In the fifties it shifted to placate investors 
and thereby maintained a robust economy. While for the doctors, driven by 
professional conviction, performed heroic deeds such as running evening-clinics on 
voluntary basis/^ and embarked on reforming the medical system. Diverged in 
opinions, the professionals and generalists went after what they regarded as 
indispensable. As in the previous stage, this time was ended up again in the 
generalists having the upper hand, the ambitious fifteen-year plan of reform and 
service expansion was tumed down. Developing into the next stage, the atmosphere 
in the Legislature changed again. Challenges on the dominance of professional 
opinions and the doctors' administrative ability were frequently heard. 
The above discussion omitted the actual duties discharged by the Medical and 
Health Department in this stage. Therefore, as a final remark at this stage, a 
description by Dr. Thong can essentially captured the state of medical and health 
service in the early post-war years: 
"The influx of returning residents and the rising wave of immigration, which reached 
its peak in 1949 and 1950, resulting in an increase of more than one million 
population, imposed not only a heavy strain on all branches of the existing health 
services but also brought into the territory the dangerous communicable diseases. The 
priority of the medical services then was still very much directed to the control and 
prevention of communicable diseases while the general hospital services became 
progressively overloaded."^^ 
1958-1966: Convergence of Opinions 
For this stage, our discussion focuses on several respects. Firstly, professionals 
of the Medical and Health department were challenged for their planning and 
administrative competence. Nevertheless, the professionals succeeded in bringing 
into convergence of opinions about the need of forward, long term planning. 
Secondly, the consequence of this opinion convergence facilitated the forging of the 
colony's first medical and health white paper. Thirdly, some remarkable changes in 
the health status of the colony together with the recurrent emphasis on hospital beds 
consolidated a mindset. I coined it "preoccupation with curative services", that is 
persistently placing curative medicine at top priority of the colony's mediCal service 
development. In practice, it was almost an obsession in the importance of hospital 
beds. The number of hospitals and beds became a fundamental device to gauge 
service development. This mindset prevailed in the policy arena up to the mid-
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eighties (to be demonstrated in later stages). Lastly, this section will discuss the 
preliminary emergence of the concept of charging the service users. 
Following Governor Grantham's retirement in 1957, the British government's 
concem in Hong Kong declined flirther. It was not until 11th April 1963 that the 
House of Commons had the opportunity of reviewing post-war Hong Kong in any 
detail. There was little controversy between the two sides of the House and the 
general agreement that Hong Kong was doing well/° Welsh termed this neglect as 
"autocolonization"，in the sense that the colony was left alone to develop. With this 
declined influence of the home government in the colony's health matters, this factor 
can be safely set aside and focus should be placed on the local policy circle.^^ 
After the shelving ofthe 15-year proposal in 1957, the following two years saw 
no breakthrough in the policy. The discussion of health matters in the Legislative 
Council was without a sense of urgency, but only focused on routines prevention of 
infectious diseases. Behind the scene, a small planning unit was pooled together in 
1959 within the Medical and Health Department. The planners severed a five year 
segment (i.e. 1960-65) from the original proposal. This segment was approved in 
principle by the Executive Council in 1960.^ ^ However, the five-year plan turned out 
unable to smooth out rising discontents in the Legislature, Council Members called 
for more comprehensive and long range planning. The existing approach was being 
criticized as piecemeal and temporary. An expedient ten-year phased programme was 
s u g g e s t e d . 4 3 The administration at first tried to defend its five-year plan. Nevertheless, 
it slowly began to address the need for more comprehensive planning. Thus, with 
statistics yielded from the 1961 census, reliability in policy making was largely 
enhanced. The five year plan never saw its completion. The year 1963 was "adopted 
as a new base line, and a wholly-revised development plan was prepared for the 
period 1963 to 1972".^^ It was later on published as the white paper, named 
Development of Medical Services in Hong Kong, the first of such paper in the 
colony's history since 1841. It went over issues like the development of services from 
before 1942 to the early sixties: infectious disease, hospitals, clinics and geriatric 
problems, and other factors for forward planning. Afterall，a major contribution it 
achieved was to clarify that it was the burden of service expenditure which would 
rest on public funds.^^ 
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tKe medical profession's earlier vision was recognized with the emergence of 
the white paper. It gained sympathy from members of the Legislature that forward, 
long range planning was essential. However, interpenetrating these policy debates 
were severe attacks on the truism of medical opinions. With service expansion and 
near completion of earlier hospital projects, the professionals of the department were 
faced with surging demands in theirjobs. Also，the rise in overhead cost of hospital 
projects gave the impression that the department imprudently aspired for ever newer 
and better equipment.^^ This invited much criticism. Unofficial Member, Mr. 
Ruttonjee queried the administrative competence of the doctors in coordinating the 
expanding department. He suggested to create a Deputy Director post in the 
department, and that the office should be held by a generalist administrator, so that 
the department's work will be in alignment with the rest of the government. He made 
some sour remarks such as: 
"Is he [the Director of Medical and Health] afraid...of being condemned by the small 
proportion of our population who can afford high standards themselves? Or is it 
because of professional pride that he wished Hong Kong to have a medical service 
second to none?"^^ (criticism on the over-spending of the department). 
"...a professional man cannot be expected to be a hundred per cent practical when it 
comes to non-professional matters. 1 have therefore come to the conclusion that there 
should be someone in the Medical and health Department, seconded from the General 
Administration".to relieve...the Director from some of his many non-professional 
burdens - an administrator who can correlate that department's planning with 
reality".48 
In response to these criticism, the doctors denied any over spending ofpublic money, 
and defended their administrative competence. Yet they did admit that planning 
would have been better if inputs from a qualified Cost Accountant were available.^^ 
Accompanied with these attacks against the doctors, there was a proposal of setting 
up a Hospital Board to achieve rationalized and systematic operation of hospital 
services. The blueprint was suggested by Mr. Ruttonjee, it had some resemblance 
with the current Hospital Authority, in the respects of management improvement, 
cost control, parity between government institutions and the assisted partners. Mr. 
Ruttonjee proposed that: 
”a Hospital Board be created....It would have jurisdiction over all Government 
controlled and Government assisted hospitals...the management policy of these 
hospitals should be one of the responsibilities of the board. The Board, composed of 
doctors，laymen, and others who have experience in hospital administration and 
planning."At present we stand guilty of a lack of comprehensive planning...丨？。 
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This proposal was not solely due to the lack of confidence in the medical profession 
to perform administrative work, but also out of the assessment that the standing 
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Medical Advisory Board was no longer suitable in the current state of affairs. This 
proposal was never actualized. Instead, the government reconstituted the Medical 
Advisory Board with new terms of reference which would make it a policy advisory 
body.52 
From 1958 to 1966，there were several remarkable developments. Firstly, the 
expenditure in medical and health increased to an unprecedented scale. On average, it 
accounted for 10.33 percent of total public expenditure. Among the later stages, this 
percentage on an average fell below the ten. Secondly, both the overall mortality rate 
and infant mortality were dropping fast in this period. Thirdly, matemal mortality rate 
for the first time fell stable below the ratio of 1 in 1000 since the year 1958. Fourthly, 
a drastic change in morbidity pattem was noted; the proportion of deaths caused by 
infectious diseases and diseases pertaining to respiratory and intestinal system 
declined significantly. All these gave a commonsense impression that the preventive 
measures were frugal and e f f e c t i v e , ; This was tempting for policy makers to tum to 
what was believed as under-achieved, that is, the persistent shortage ofhospital beds. 
Repeatedly in Legislative Council meetings, the crucial roles of beds were 
emphasized; members described how one was surprised seeing two children 
occupying one bed, how 200 camp beds found in Kowloon Hospital which supposed 
to have only 574 normal ward beds, and how camp beds were placed under high 
orthopedic beds because of shortage of space.^^ Members in their discussion slowly 
converged in their preoccupation in hospital beds? and believed in the primacy of 
hospital services. It was tnie that the shortage of beds stood high by then, extra 
efforts in this problem were well justified. Nevertheless, my conjecture is that an idea 
as such should be utilized with appreciation of its contextual background. If it is 
taken out of context and became a rhetoric, it can cause an imbalance in the 
development of services. Evidence showed that local policy debates persistently 
dinged onto this preoccupation with bed numbers, this mindset prevailed among 
policy makers at least up to the date when the administration employed the Scott 
Consultants. 
Scholars nowadays contend that a health system should primarily focus on 
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keeping people healthy, not so much on the curative dimension. Overestimating the 
importance of curative care leads to misallocation of resources, massive expansion in 
public spending, and most of all’ the system will neglect the social, economic and 
environmental causes of illness.^^ Between a health system and an illness treating 
system, there are fundamental differences that policy makers need to be aware of. 
Back in the sixties, the preoccupation of curative care was clearly reflected in 
the white paper. The government having the limited resources for health care, 
hospital services should be of top priority. The administration decided that it did not 
possess the resources for comprehensive services, partly because at the dawn of the 
sixties, the government financial situation fluctuated dramatically. It plunged from 
the usual surplus budgets to an annual deficit of over forty five million dollars in 
1960，and then swinged back again with a hundred and forty million surplus in 
1962.57 Though the white paper also addressed issues like geriatric and mental 
problems, subsequent implementation of the policy confirmed a gross neglect in 
these areas. The emphasis placed on curative care by the white paper was justifiable 
in the early sixties. But when policy makers and advocates held fast onto this belief 
and became preoccupied, they failed to rectify the policy when circumstances 
changed. 
Another development in 1966 was the first emergence of the idea that the 
economically better off service users should be charged. Legislators who witnessed 
the massive service expansion worried about the future financial burden, while the 
administration gave explicit reassurance that the principle that "those who can pay 
will be called upon to pay within their means"^^ would be observed. Emergence of 
this concept had the prelude of severe criticism against the Tung Wah Group in 
1965.59 The charge against it was its unjustified free medical care. The annual 
subvention to its three hospitals was enormous, yet the users were not suffering 
abject poverty. The Group's constitution as well as management committees were 
denounced as out-dated, and completely not keeping pace with a modem society. 
Amendment of the Tung Wah Hospital Ordinance was called for.^^ 
Nevertheless, this concept of charging the service users never gained enough 
recognition to become a mainstream thought. Since early post-war years, the 
government had been anxious to prevent outbreaks of epidemics, and thus adhered to 
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the free medical care. With the new generation learned to appreciate the services, this 
mode of service delivery was taken for granted, ensuring health became the mandate 
of the colonial rulers. 
Following the eruption of riots in 1966 and 67, the criticism toward the Tung 
Wah quieted down. There were no more disputes in the Legislature; the Group was 
left alone with its traditional practice. The administration avoided provoking further 
unrest by intervening into the Group's operation. After the riots the administration 
was badly in need of legitimacy, and had to repair the shattered benevolent image.^^ 
Expansion in service provisions and more social welfare would help regain support 
from the community. Under the influence of social unrest and the 'legacy of free 
medical services' in the past，the concept of charging the patients failed to take roots. 
To sum up, the stage of convergence spanned over nine years from 1958-1966. 
A relatively short period it may be, it witnessed a convergence in policy priority and 
reform pace. This achievement was marked by the emergence of the colony's first 
medical and health polic> white paper. Secondly, this stage saw the consolidation of 
a 'preoccupation in curative service'. Additionally, the term "convergence" here also 
refers to the convergence in the thinking of the professionals, generalists and 
legislators over the issue of 'Should service users pay?'. Though the idea of 'let the 
capable users pay’ began emerged toward the end of this stage, this thinking failed to 
become a mainstream thought. On the contrary, the belief that medical services as 
primarily the responsibility of the colonial government continued to be at the centre 
stage，it lingered on even to the nineties. 
1967-1984: Reaction and Growth 
First of all, this stage is coined as 'Reaction', meaning that the changes in the 
service delivery system, especially in the first half, were viewed as part of the 
reaction to riots in 1966-67. Secondly, medical and health services in this stage 
experienced a steady 'Growth', but not as impressing as our common sense may 
suggest. The community building project of Governor MacLehose did not bring forth 
massive expansion in this policy area. As mentioned earlier, the most frugal 
expansion of expenditure in the medical and health services happened at the stage of 
"Convergence of Opinions". Besides, the increase of recurrent expenditure in the 
seventies did not necessarily reflect the Government's planning priorities during that 
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period, but rather the results of previous project decisions.^^ To be accurate, this 
stage of growth had been steady and incremental, govemed largely by the policy 
white paper. 
This stage is a relatively long period, eighteen years marked by the riots in 
1967，the government re-organization according to the McKinsey's Report, the 
MacLehose's period of social service expansion, the implementation of the colony's 
second white paper on medical and health services, and finally the emergence of 
privatization ideas within the legislature and the administration. In this period the 
legacy of free medical service and the preoccupation with curative care continued to 
be unwavering in spite of occasional challenges from the actors within the policy 
arena. Threading through the above events was the influence of the medical 
profession. The professionals' policy making power was further curtailed, yet the 
profession still had plenty of leeway in influencing policy ideas and directions. For 
example, it was Dr. Fang, the chairperson of the Medical Development Advisory 
Committee, who first made an explicit proposal that hospital services should be 
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privatized. The idea gained immediate support from Dr. Henrietta Ip, another 
legislator from the medical profession. As it would be demonstrated, influence from 
the medical profession contributed to the preoccupation in curative care. On the other 
hand，it was also the professionals who usually took initiative to inject novel ideas 
into the policy arena, such as privatization and setting up ofhealth insurance. 
The first major reorganization of the colonial government machinery was 
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often regarded as marked by the publication of the McKinsey Report in 1973， yet 
the reorganization ideas had emerged much earlier than this. Proposal of revamping 
the government structure and organization first appeared in 1965, which was initiated 
by Mr. Dhun J. Ruttonjee, who regarded the colonial administration structure as out-
dated and that it was in need of restructuring. The proposal received poor response 
from the administration. The Colonial Secretary maintained that "fundamental 
changes must inevitably be slow"^ ,^ and the system then was believed to be able to 
adjust and adapt itself. Yet in the two years following 1965, the colony experienced 
some swift changes that made the revamp of government machinery a more relevant 
issue. Apart from the slight economic recession and unemployment in 1965，the 
major changes that shook up the colony were the riots from 1966-67. 
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Ih 1966 the riots were less organized, aroused by domestic factors of 
economic recession, unemployment and the fare rise of the Star Ferry service; while 
in 1967, the up-rises were more organized with certain political objectives, and were 
triggered off by labor disputes in March. Communist supporters sharing the 
sentiment of the Cultural Revolution launched protests against the colonial rule. The 
unrest spread, and in June the operation of certain public utilities were blocked by 
strikes. In August, bomb attacks and terrorists tactics were employed. The disorder 
virtually lasted from March to December when it eventually came under control. 
An immediate impact of the riots was the awakening of the gap between the 
governing and the governed. In the Hong Kong Annual Report of 1968, it was 
commented that 
"most government services are arranged on a functional basis, each service separately 
and centrally administered by a different department. With the growing complexity 
and sophistication of government machinery the workings of the civil service have 
tended to become more specialized and perhaps less concerned with the human 
background of its operations."^^ 
And repeatedly in 1971, the gap between the government and its people was again 
acknowledged in the report.^^ New district offices were hurriedly set up to channel 
information from the community to the central government. Another impact of the 
riots had been the awareness of the youth population as a potential source of 
problems. In 1968，there was extensive deliberation of issues pertaining to this 
population segment in the legislature. These included a new interest in the setting up 
of various youth projects, committees and councils, the problem of education and 
employment, the need to organize festival and conference, giving guidance to youth 
organizations, securing livelihood, etc. Also a concem with brain drain was recorded. 
Besides attending to the youth, the administration was concerned with how to relate 
with the Chinese on the whole. Nevertheless, attending to the youths, working closely 
and attune to the Chinese would not be sufficient without the lavishing of tangible 
benefits. After the riots the administration was in need of legitimacy to rule, and to be 
useful was the strongest claim to such legitimacy.^^ Expansion in various social 
service provisions and welfare would help the government to regain support from the 
community.68 This resolution to provide more services combined with the earlier 
growth of the social service sector in the sixties, resulting in considerable 
overloading of the government machinery. 
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with M. MacLehose came in office in 1971 with his conviction in community 
building, these service developments were confirmed a real need, and no longer 
haphazard expansions. In his 'blueprint for the 70s"^^, the Governor placed emphasis 
on the four pillars, that is social welfare, medical and health care, education and 
housing, which were considered crucial to forge a caring community in which 
members will care for the others. Conceivably, the government machinery needed 
revamping to cope with the future tasks. Thus, the McKinsey and Company was 
appointed to investigated into the matter. 
In their report，the consultants attributed the deficiency of the administration 
firstly to rapid growth and personnel problems, and claimed that "[t]he need for 
change in Government machinery stems primarily from growth"7^ Secondly, the 
deficiency was related to "the Hong Kong Government's fundamental difficulty of 
trying to expand services in the face of a continuing decline in the proportion of 
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skilled and experienced staff, and the resulting dilution of their efforts." These 
arguments carried certain t ruths? and the consultant report was framed as a scheme 
to enhance public services expansion. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that 
the reorganization had an additional intention of further bridging the gap between 
governing and the governed. The report suggested to revamp the central government, 
raising certain branch head posts in order to achieve better control of policies. The 
principal branch heads were raised to the same level as the first grade heads of 
departments, but the Secretary for Home Affairs (SHA) was an exception. This office 
enjoyed a higher power, attaining the level as the Deputy Colonial Secretary, which 
came next only to the Colonial Secretary and Financial Secretary. Its scope of 
authority was also extended to cover and replace the Secretary of M o r m a t i o n ” The 
new Home Affairs and Information Branch within the Colonial Secretariat was 
responsible for the government's public relations and coordinating the activities of 
the major departments concerned with information. It also administered the City 
District Officer scheme and maintained other traditional links with the people/^ The 
district offices, in tum, became the chief institution of channeling yearning and 
opinions of the community since the riots7^ Thus, underlying the reorganization 
activities and expansions (including medical and health care), the administration was 
conscious to provide a remedy to the distressed relationship with the community. The 
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reorganization endeavors, though spaced apart with the riots for about five years, 
could still be considered a reaction (or response) to the riots. 
There were further repercussions in the circle of medical and health services. 
Firstly, tensions between medical professionals and generalists within the 
government intensified. The consultants suggested the open up oftop-leveljobs to all 
grades. This became sensitive as the Medical and Health Department traditionally 
resisted the appointment of non-professionals to the department. The open directorate 
policy was interpreted as an invasion to their turf7^ Structurally, the consultant 
proposed to separate the branches from the department, with the former vested with 
policy making power and the latter mainly for execution. Since the Health and 
Welfare Branch (which the department came under) was generally headed by 
generalists, the autonomy and power of the profession in the policy arena was 
curtailed. This unhappy state of affairs carried on and eventually in early eighties. A 
legislator from the profession made a request for the creation of Secretary for Health 
to oversee the development of medical and health services. And it was firmly 
suggested that the post should be filled by a medically qualified person. This was, of 
course, never entertained by the administration, which countered that the move 
would lead to duplication of effort and confusion over respective responsibilities. 
The administration made it explicit that the policy of opening up directorate level 
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posts to any qualified officer would remain unchanged. From the pre-war years up 
to this stage, the professionals and the generalists competed for leadership in this 
policy circle with the generalists always having the upper hand. This was consistent 
with the government's philosophy that ultimate political control should lie in the 
hands of generalists, while specialists should only enjoy such decision making power 
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on condition that they have been transmogrified into generalists. Within the 
Department, the relation of the two groups could be distressing all along, as one of 
the Director (a doctor) mentioned: 
"In the middle 1970s, a Secretary/Branch system was introduced into the 
Government... policy branches assumed not only the role of coordinators of policies 
but also as monitors and policy makers even for highly technical departments such as 
the Medical & Health Department... the administrators of the medical & Health 
Service are no longer in a position to formulate policies and to take the vital and 
necessary actions for the smooth running and improvement of the services without 
intervention from both administrative and political quarters.../^e Department is 
unable to acquire adequate financial and manpower resources without engaging 
itself in exhausting and sometimes futile battles with the relevant Branches of 
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government. That so much has been achieved so far has been in spite of’ not 
because of’ the Secretary/Branch system and is a measure of the maturity and 
dedication of the professional officers concemed"^^ (emphasis added). 
Another repercussion of the McKinsey investigation was its direct involvement in the 
preparation of the medical policy white paper in 1974.^ The formula for determining 
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the requirement for hospital bed was recommended by the McKinsey Consultants. 
The consultants' report also put forwarded the future use of programme planning with 
time frame of five to ten years, this planning strategy was adopted later on in the 
medical policy white paper. The completion of the McKinsey investigation actually 
overlapped with the end of the 1964 medical and health white paper. As a result, the 
administration and the consultants both saw it befitting to use the medical and health 
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services as a pilot to try out the usefulness of programme planning procedures. 
The spirit of the McKinsey's planning lay in the focus on controlling end 
results rather than the inputs. The control of departmental activities was in terms of 
the results achieved. Secondly, evaluation of the objectives are to be undertaken 
annually, the ten-year plans were carried forward year by year. These features were 
reflected in the 1974 white paper of medical and health services. The MDAC 
assumed the role of planning forward and evaluating progress annually. While the 
attainment of objectives was gauged in terms of quantifiable figures, the most often 
utilized figure was bed ratio and provision. Other examples included the output of 
medical and nursing schools, the shortfall of clinics, etc. This practice of policy 
review left little room for rethinking the fundamental direction of the policy. The 
plan habitually rolled forward by readjusting last year's objectives in a manageable 
way. Scholars have often described the government's policy making philosophy as 
incrementalism, due to its unwillingness to involve in wealth redistribution and 
cautiousness in having long range financial commitments. However, it appeared that 
the incremental character of policy making might also lie in the way which a policy 
was reviewed and renewed. 
The second white paper published in 1974 was named The Further 
Development of Medical and Health Services in Hong Kong, which immediately 
followed its predecessor dated back in 1964. At the dawn of the seventies, there was 
revival interest in the legislature in the future development of health services. The 
idea of charging the users was repeatedly raised in the meetings. Some attempted to 
45i 
rephrase charging as the removal of social stigma attached to the services. 
Nevertheless, as before, this principle of letting the capable users pay failed to gather 
enough support for itself. The medical fees in the government clinics and hospitals 
continued to be nominal.^^ The new white paper made no explicit statement on how 
government would be financially committed, but it did make clear that to the extent 
the economy allowed, the government would continue to develop the services in 
accordance. 
The new ten-year plan did not change the conviction of hospital care as 
primacy. This was reflected in the way the officials set the tone of policy discussion; 
in the emphasis of the white paper, and in the service type which the government 
refrained from providing. 
From 1974 to 1984, the health problem was attributed exclusively to the bed 
shortage, whether it was in the Governor's address or other officials' speech, for 
example, 
"At present the major deficiency is in the provision of hospital beds" (Govemor 
address). 
"As a result of sheer population pressure particularly in recent years, our first priority 
is to meet the pressing need by concentrating on providing for more beds in the 
general wards." (Director ofMedical and Health Services^ 
Secondly, the white paper had apparent imbalances in placing much emphasis in 
curative care. Other problems such as rehabilitation, primary care, regulating the 
private sector became marginal issues, or no issue at all. It is true that rehabilitation 
was later on catered for in another green paper in 1976，which was adopted as white 
paper in 1979. But this only illustrated that the administration viewed medical and 
health services as strictly curative. Other modes of care would be considered 
separately when necessary. 
Thirdly, the preoccupation of curative care was reflected also in the issue of 
Community Nursing Service (CNS). The rationale of the service is to render nursing 
care in a home-based manner. The visiting nurse would perform treatment such as 
dressing wounds and medication, which would keep a portion of geriatric or disabled 
patients from the hospital. The proposal was repeatedly raised in the legislature since 
1972. It was not until 1979 did the government accept the program. Its acceptance 
was based on its effectiveness proven after many years of operation by the voluntary 
agencies.85 jj^^ CNS plan was estimated to be able to save three million a year, but 
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‘ • g6 the often official reply was that staff shortage was making the plan not feasible. The 
Director of Medical and Health Services then made clear the government's 
determination in developing curative medicine. 
"The idea [of CNS] per se is of course commendable but I must point out that our 
policy is largely influenced by two important existing factors which will continue to 
prevail for this decade; firstly，to relieve the overcrowding of our hospitals which 
reflects that there are still many disease conditions to be treated in hospital and not at 
home; and secondly, to provide complementary hospital services parallel with the 
development of new towns. Also, because of the shortage of nurses, the priority must 
be adequately to man existing institutions and those being constructed under the 
development programme"，？ 
The logic that - overcrowdedness indicated many diseases require hospital treatment -
is faulty, as many patients ended up in wards simply because of no placement in the 
nursing homes. These chronic health conditions did not benefit from hospitalization, 
but eating up expensive services. The staff were no less annoyed by seeing these 
cases deteriorates day after day because of no appropriate service could be rendered. 
Guided by the 1974 white paper, a structural change of service delivery system 
was undertaken, that is, the regionalization policy.^^ This simultaneously led to the 
reorganization of the Medical and Health Department. Since the revamping of the 
department structure and the addition of new senior posts required much adjustment, 
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the recommendations contained in the white paper had to be shelved for one year. 
The first phase of regionalization commenced in April 1977 with the aims of: i) 
integration and comprehensive provision of preventive and curative services for the 
regions, ii) optimizing the use of facilities and manpower, iii) coordinating 
. 9 0 
emergency service. 
As the ten-year plan rolled on, new criticism against the system mounted up. 
For example, inadequacy in primary care system was debunked, yet the 
administration tumed a deaf ear to the issue.^' The surging medical expenses worried 
the legislators, and an overall policy in the area was considered unavailable by many. 
The administration countered that the MDAC produced regularly and annually ten-
year period forecasts，and the colony's health services were not running without a 
blueprint. In response to the professionals request of an all in all policy review, the 
administration made explicit that the review to be undertaken "would cover the 
management system of [the] medical services, with particular reference to hospitals, 
their organization and their administration.. .review would also assist us in 
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determining the most appropriate roles for the subvented and private sectors".^^ This 
was the later on W.D. Scott Company's review ofhospital services and delivery. 
On March 27th 1985, just about the time the government appointed the W.D. 
Scott Pty. Company, legislators from the medical profession voiced their vision of 
privatizing hospital services. Foreign examples were quoted to substantiate the 
feasibility of this novel idea. They articulated that government hospitals and clinics 
should be managed independently, each with autonomous board of directors and a 
block grant. Hospitals would stay non-profit making, but they should generate 
modest income to support itself. The charging rate is to be kept within means of 
average wage earners. The public money thus spared could re-channel to policy 
development, environmental health, subventing pioneer project, and other 
endeavors.93 This vision very much resembled the consultant report that published a 
year later. 
Happening side by side with these forgoing developments in the medical 
services was the germination of privatization ideas among the legislators and within 
the government. The concept ofhiving off public services appeared in the McKinsey 
Report. The government could shed its administrative load to the private sector on 
condition that it kept its role in defining the institution of service delivery, laying 
down performance criteria, and also in defining prices. The report was adopted but 
the government's attitude to hiving off activities remained lukewarm throughout the 
seventies. Leafing through the Hong Kong Hansard, one can find numerous episodes 
of unofficial members pressing for a curtaied public sector and the hiving offof some 
public utilities.^^ Nevertheless the administration was not sympathetic to the 
proposals. Official arguments against privatization were summarized as follows: 
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* Public expenditure level (in the seventies) should avoid the stop-go problem. 
* Public expenditure in the seventies needed to be sufficient for the overall community 
building. 
* The privatized corporations will employ at least as many officials as the former 
Government departments, thus unlikely to save public money. 
* Privatization would lead to slackening of central control and resulted in higher 
overhead expenses. 
* No cogent evidence support the idea that hived off department would be more 
efficient and economical. 
* Stabilization of the civil service was crucial (especially since the 1997 issue became 
prominent). Privatization may unwittingly work against stability. 
* Factors like land supply, political considerations and security requirements dictate 
that the government should not put its activities into private hands. 
Figure 2. Official Arguments Against Privatization. 
To be accurate, the administration was a two faced Janus. On the one hand, it 
strongly discouraged cuts in expenditure when the services demanded expansions. 
On the other hand, the Financial Secretary reiterated budgetary principle that the 
public sector should not grow for any significant length of time at a rate substantially 
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at variance with that for the gross domestic product. Those debates of 
appropriateness of privatization reflected that both the proponents and opponents 
were not well articulated in the concept. The rationale behind it was understood, but 
the various modes and hybrid types of privatization were not systematically teased 
out. Privatization was at times used interchangeably with hiving off activities. It was 
unclear then what activities were core (or peripheral) to the government. This very 
nature of the activities in fact largely determined whether it could be safely 
transferred to the private hands or not. Additionally, the pros and cons arguments of 
privatization were raised without being substantiated by real life examples. Thus the 
points made were often rhetoric. 
To complicate the situation further, the urges to limit public sector growth 
intertwined with the demands for re-organizing government structure. Privatization 
demands as a result often sounded like comprehensive revamping ofthe government. 
It was conceivable that the administration would resist them. Since the late seventies, 
members (e.g. Ms. Lydia Dunn) reiterated the privatization and reorganization issues 
almost annually. The structure of the McKinsey Report was put to question at the end 
of the seventies. Though the administration at time queried the claim of another 
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major r e v ^ p when the McKinsey system had run for less than ten years, it still 
embarked on several small to middle ranged investigation within the government 
Secretariat, the purpose was to identify any organizational deficiency. L>house study 
of the post-McKinsey Secretariat organization and relationships with departments 
started in 1977. The survey completed in 1978 when it was concluded that no solid 
grounds existed for any fundamental change in a system which had been in operation 
for a bare five years. At the dawn of eighties, another attempt to look at the overall 
organization of the central government was launched a g a i n ， T h e efforts of 
investigation were not due to suspicion in the effectiveness of the overall government 
machinery, but the poor management practice, as the Chief Secretary once 
commented: 
"too little regard had been paid to the management of civil service, to the management 
of the very people who had to make these important schemes work...stark fact that for 
long in much of the civil service there had been neglect of the basic concepts of 
proper, caring staff-management, one can see what a daunting, enormous problem this 
was and unhappily, still is".^ ^ 
Several related investigations were done throughout the eighties which eventually led 
to the Public Sector Reform document. Yet focusing from 1973 to 1984，the 
administration found it not convincing to extensively use privatization strategies or to 
undergo fundamental changes in the departmental structure. Listead，there were 
incremental changes almost every year. These were considered pragmatic and 
p r o g r e s s i v e . 9 8 In this period, the acceptance of privatization grew within the 
administration, initially it was almost a simple disinterest, in a few years time 
officials were positive toward exploring the feasibility, and then came a promise that 
hiving offactivities will be undertaken in the right time.^^ hi 1984, paramount criteria 
of civil service stability was put forward in all potential privatization plans. The 
administration then assumed that the contracting out strategy would be less sensitive 
and problematic.ioo 
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1985-1990: The Privatization o fMedical Care - Controvpr.^ips and Decisions 
Toward the second half of the eighties, several major developments could be 
summarized. Firstly, as discussed in the last section, the administration all along had 
much reservation rushing into privatization endeavors, lest the civil service would be 
disrupted. However, in a relatively short period of time since the W.D. Scott Report 
came into light, the government embarked on the setting up of the Hospital 
Authority,ioi affecting the status of one tenth of civil servants ,��� not to mention the 
hospital personnel of the subvented sec to r�� ] (This abrupt tum in direction requires 
more detailed discussion later on). Secondly, the release of the W.D. Scott Report 
invited much controversies from the public and the staff. The theme largely centred 
around the financing of medical care and the staff welfare. Thirdly, the medical 
profession continued to introduce innovative policy ideas from time to time. Its 
attempts to arrest attention of policy makers were not without success. Fourthly, the 
privatization ideas quietly underwent transformation within the central government, 
the concept moved from vagueness to claiity, incorporating more dimensions and 
meanings. 
The proposal to review the hospitals administration was approved by the 
Executive Council in May 1984. Coopers and Lybrand W.D. Scott Company, a firm 
of Australian management consultants was commissioned in February 1985 to carry 
out the review. The consultants, report, namely The Delivery ofMedical Services in 
Hospitals, A Report for the Hong Kong Government Executive Review, came into 
light toward the end ofthe same year]04 j^  was released afterwards in 1986 for public 
consultation, which lasted for nine months. Later on a summary report of public 
consultation was published by the Health and Welfare Branch (i.e. Report on the 
Delivery of Medical Services in Hospital - A Summary of Public Opinions). 
Legislators debated the consultants' report in October. The proposal of setting up an 
independent Hospital Authority was eventually endorsed in the Executive Council in 
September of 1987. A pioneer organization, the Provisional Hospital Authority was 
scheduled to set up in April the following year to pave way for the actual Hospital 
Authority. However, probably due to public opposition and complexity ofthejob, its 
date of operation was postponed six months. Parallel to the preparation work ofthe 
Provisional Hospital Authority was the split up of the Medical and Health 
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Departmerit into Hospital Service Department and Department of Health. This 
organizational changed was undertaken on 1st April 1989 in spite ofopposition from 
the hospital civil servants. One year lapsed before the Provisional Hospital Authority 
submitted its final report. It was endorsed in Executive Council in March 1990. A 
corresponding ordinance was enacted and funds approved in July. Eventually, the 
Hospital Authority was set up on 1st December 1990. 
The above tum in policy direction can be termed as both conservative and 
radical. The conservative side lies in the preoccupation in curative care. The 1974 
white paper came to an end after guiding service development for a decade. The 
government did not embark on another overall review. Instead, it placed most of the 
weight on secondary institutions. The scope of policy making was very much 
narrowed down. The preoccupation of curative care as we demonstrated had 
consolidated in a much earlier stage, and it was further reinforced in the government's 
decision to review exclusively hospital services. The radical face of policy 
development in this stage is the setting up ofHospital Authority. The project affected 
a large group of civil servants. Their worries lay mainly in career stability (since the 
new institution would possess more flexibility in hire and fire), cuts in fringe benefits, 
discrimination in training and promotion, and sometimes professional autonomy and 
ideals. The W.D. Scott Report sparked off a range of mobilization among the civil 
servants, which reached its climax in 1989. The administration resorted to generous 
emolument package to soothe the emotions, yet the package turned out to run the risk 
of over spending, creating discrepancy between the Authority's staff and other 
departments' civil servants. 
Another 'battle ground’ pertaining to the W.D. Scott Report had been the issue 
of financing medical services. The government was accused of privatizing medical 
care by setting up Hospital Authority. Before the Report was released to the public, 
legislators (e.g. Dr. H.K. Chiu) raised the worry of tremendous reaction from the 
public concerning privatization. When social security system was far from adequate, 
the government should be expected to shoulder the medical expenses.^^^ This worry 
tumed out to be legitimate. In subsequent development, the administration had to 
reiterate over and over again that there was no plot to shirk responsibility, as the 
Secretary of Health and Welfare forcefully remarked: 
"Ifby 'privatisation' is meant the selling off o f public hospital system, to be operated 
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on a purely commercial basis, I can certainly reassure them this was no part of the 
consultants' brief, and that the Government has no intention of reducing its 
commitment to the provision of subsidised hospital services. The consultants were 
asked to review the organizational structure fbr the management of our public 
hospitals and to advise whether better integration would be achieved through the 
establishment of autonomous hospital authorities."'®^ 
"concem has been expressed that the establishment of a statutory authority would 
imply that the Government would be relinquishing, at least in part, its responsibility 
for the provision of medical services to the population as a whole, and that this would 
penalise those who rely on such services. I would like to repeat tonight the assurance 
which I have given before, both in this Council and elsewhere, that it was no part of 
the Government's intention in setting up this consultancy to abdicate its responsibility 
in this area."io7 
Examples of similar reassurance were numerous,^^^ and were similarly useless. The 
impact on the mood of the public in this period was in fact two-fold. The W.D. Scott 
Report created fear of privatization in the first place, and just after the government 
clarified that such worry was groundless, the Provisional Hospital Authority 
promoted the idea of cost recovery of hospital services, claiming that a fifteen to 
twenty per cent of cost recovery would be affordable for most of the families. This 
idea stood in opposition with the deep seated legacy that medical services should be 
free at use. The public was not convinced of the level of cost recovery. As Dr. Leong 
commented: 
"There should be little surprise to find the public reacting in panic, firstly to the 
thought that hospitals will be 'privatized' by the HA concept, that is to say to make 
their own ends meet, and secondly to the sudden introduction of the proposal that 
hospital fees will tag highly to cost. At the end of the day, Government is being seen 
as shirking her responsibility in the provision of adequate medical care for all and the 
whole service will fall on the shoulder of an independent body. The HA therefore 
becomes the scapegoat."'^ 
Even worse, the users suspected that the cost recovery principle would be actualized 
even if the Legislative Council tumed out not to pass the Hospital Authority Bill”® 
In the midst of negative valuation, the principle failed also to receive sympathy 
among legislators. The government was urged to anchor the principle with another 
consideration, namely the principle general public affordability/" Since affordability 
was very much contestable, and as a matter of opinion, the cost recovery issue 
dragged into the nineties without much progress. In the interim, the Secretary for 
Health and Welfare reassured that fee waiver arrangements would be put in place 
before major changes in existing charging policy would be made. And secondly, the 
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fee structure would not be changed until improvements in services were seen."2 
A third developmental trend during this stage was that the medical profession 
continued to push forward its own course and vision of health reform. It appeared 
that the profession did meet with success, though it had not been able to manipulate 
the government into adopting its ideas at the time it wished. The government paid 
attention to professional proposal(s) when it regarded that the proper time had come. 
For example. Dr. Henrietta Ip urged the setting up of general health insurance scheme 
as early as 1978.^ She dugged up the issue again in the mid-eighties arguing to use 
tax concession to encourage firms and individual to purchase a basic medical 
insurance. The administration felt the difficulties for the proposal was still immense 
as individual had no incentive to insure so long as public service was cheap, while 
raising the charges was not easy at that stage. Dr. Ip, however, saw the medical 
insurance a way to expand the spectrum of choice for the sandwiched class, also a 
way to generate funds for the service i m p r o v e m e n t � " The government eventually 
gave in and agreed to investigate the issue through an appointed working group in • • . 
1990. 
Another breakthrough was the setting up of the Academy of Medicine. The 
Hong Kong Medical Association claimed that it voiced out the need ofpost-graduate 
medical education as early as the late sixties, but the idea was not entertained then. 
The need was reiterated again in the Legislative Council in the mid-eighties by the 
professionals.''^ This time the Secretary of Health and Welfare gave consent to 
investigate the issue, a green light was given to set up the institution in 1989. 
Thirdly, the profession took the led to criticize the government's neglect of 
primary care and family medicine in policy development. As Dr. Chiu put it, "the 
overwhelming concentration of care in hospitals is an over emphasis and that the 
public is led to believe that hospital services is all they need to solve their health 
problems".ii6 Nevertheless, the administration were not ready to relinquish its 
preoccupation with curative care, defending that the problem ofhospital services was 
paramount and should be granted the most a t t e n t i o n . " ? And the consultants' review 
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need to be confined to hospital service so as to make the job more manageable. It 
was not until 1989 did the government address the issue by appointing a working 
group to review the primary health care system.^'^ On the whole, the medical 
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profession Tiad been successful in getting the administration to look into areas that it 
regarded as important. Yet on the other hand, professionals did not have control over 
the timing and the final decision whether to transform an idea into concrete policy 
statements. Studies on primary health care and health insurance were done in the late 
eighties, yet by the time of writing this section the government still had not 
committed on either reform. 
The last trend in this stage is the evolution of privatization concept, hi the past, 
the term privatization had no rigorous definition. Government officials, politicians 
and the public often interpreted it differently. Evidence showed that the government 
embarked on a study and clarification of the concept after it saw the pressing need of 
institutional reform. These pilot studies were launched in around 1989.12® Before that, 
how well the officials understood the concept was questionable. 
In this stage within the central government, the idea of privatization underwent 
quiet transformation. Since the day W.D. Scott Report was published, privatization 
became particularly sensitive for policy makers. The report revived public interest in • 
the medical and health services, yet the heated debates in tum sensitized the public 
toward the privatization concept. Every move of the administration to re-organize or 
re-structure itself ran the risk of being interpreted as an attempt to shirk from 
responsibility (or plainly an act that would sacrifice Hong Kong people's interest). 
Perhaps for this reason, in this period, the government's experiments, studies and 
discussion on privatization were kept low profile and internal. Quietly, the 
administration developed new institutional set up and concepts to go about reforming 
the government machinery. These innovations were not strictly privatization in terms 
of function and formal arrangements, they could be considered hybrid forms which 
grew out of the privatization concept. 
Colin Sankey, Deputy Head of the Efficiency Unit of Hong Kong 
Government'^' maintained that, in the early 1980s there were signs that management 
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controls and systems were not keeping pace with the rapid developments then 
taking place. The need for improvement was twofold: "firstly, planning and 
forecasting techniques had to be improved, and secondly, firm restraints had to be 
placed on the growth of public expenditure". Measures were employed as a result to 
bring down the growth of consolidated expenditure. Sankey commented on the 
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-- • 12,3 tightening budgets as a blunt instrument to improve departments' operation. It 
seemed that tight controls had the effect of squeezing out innovations and new 
initiatives, while keeping the old spending pattem was largely intact. It gradually 
dawned on the administration that 'Value for Money’ should be a principle that came 
before mere control. This cognition triggered off a series of 'Value for Money 
Studies' and Top Down Reviews'. 
'Value for Money Studies' was launched in the early 1980s. The results 
appeared encouraging with many posts being identified as surplus to requirement. 
However, to realize these promises were not easy. There was reluctance on the part 
of departments to identify and address the areas of inefficiency/^^ Besides, the 
Studies were interpreted as "staff cutting exercises" which were damaging to staff 
morale. In response to this obstacle, the administration shifted to use Top Down 
Reviews' and 'Attack the Baseline’ exercises which sought a wider review of policy 
objectives and priorities.'^^ The aim was to put the business of a department under 
close examination and re-assess its fundamental functions. For example, "what is it 
doing? What should it be doing? Are the business objectives obvious to the 
management? Has the organization andA>r its mandate been over time?"^^^ With the 
initiatives of these reviews, some departments attempted to achieve better 
effectiveness and to save up resources，but were soon faced with the resistance and 
inertia of the organizational and statutory frameworks. Sankey described these 
institutional constraints as straitjacket which prevented the civil service from 
reforming itself significantly.'"^ Moving onward; it appeared inevitable to touch on 
the institutional structure if improvement was to be sought.'^^ This tum of direction 
finally led to the putting together of ideas of privatization and its hybrid forms into an 
internal paper named Public Sector Reform, which was produced by the Finance 
Branch in 1989. 
The Public Sector Reform paper placed much emphasis on fundamental 
changes ofthe institutional structure of civil service. It clarified the relation ofpolicy 
making, allot of resources, and policy execution. Attempts to handle these relations 
could be dated back to the McKinsey Report, which recommended the 
S e c r e t a r y / B r a n c h System to assume policy making roles, while the affiliated 
departments performed the tasks derived from the policies. However, in practice, the 
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boundaries seemed to be unclear. As Ms. Lydia Dunn once commented: 
"The Secretaries are generally senior, but the ordinances under which departments 
operates confer authority and responsibilities on Heads of Departments. Secretaries 
are not mentioned. The Departmental Heads appear also to have financial authority. It 
is they who are generally shown in the Estimates as vote controllers and I believe they 
are also accounting officers"'"^ 
The Public Sector Reform paper attempted once again to rectify the relations between 
branches and departments. Firstly, overall resource planning should be the turf of the 
Governor and the Chief Secretary Committee. Secondly, the policy making power 
should lie in policy branches, in collaboration with the Chief Secretary Committee 
and Resource Branch. In this way, the authority of Secretaries was further 
strengthened and consolidated. The executive agency heads only assisted and advised 
in the policy making process. Beside, the obtaining resources would be exclusively 
the job of Secretaries. And thirdly, policy execution would be the duty of 
departments. In the realm of policy execution, three types of activities were identified, 
namely core services - refer to regulatory activities, fire service, public order and 
security, which should not be hived off to private producers; support services - that is 
services provided within the government structure to sustain smooth operation (e.g. 
vehicles, computing); and commercial services - which are services directed to the 
public at a charge, such as airport and the Post Office. With this threefold 
categorization and other pertaining criteria,^^^ hybrid forms of privatization could be 
introduced. Some services would continue to be controlled by traditional departments, 
others could be transformed into trading fund organization, public bodies, contracting 
out, or simply privatized. The decision depended on the nature ofthe service. 
The Puhlic Sector Reform initiatives were essentially focusing on re-
structuring the institutional set up of the civil service, opening it up for adopting 
various degree and modes of privatization. Nevertheless, the Public Sector Reform 
initiatives also involved reform strategies of personnel management, performance 
pledges, etc.i3i At this stage, the administration's interpretation of privatization was 
far more articulated and refined than in the earlier stage. The concept appeared less 
confusing and acquired a bundle of principles which guided decision makers to 
weight individual government activities to see if they were suitable for privatization, 
corporatization, contracting out, etc. It must, however, be pointed out that the 
principles in themselves did not constitute a systematic process by which 
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departments were being examined, t i other words, the government had the principles 
for doing privatization assessment, but no systematic plan to arrange these 
assessments, so as to ascertain whether the time was ripe for a department (or an 
activity) to be privatized.'^^ 
After the Public Sector Reform paper was internally released in February 1989, 
a high power Public Sector Reform Steering Committee was set up under the Chief 
Secretary's Committee to guide and co-ordinate various pilot studies and to take the 
reform programme forward.'^^ The pilots came in five areas'^^, which could be 
regarded as continuations of the reform initiatives set out by the Public Sector 
Reform paper. The pilots aimed to explore their feasibility, and comment on future 
planning to actualize these initiatives. At the end of the eighties, the government had 
already several new potential plans of privatization and contracting out activities, 
such as privatization plan of chemical waste treatment facility, Island East Refuse 
Transfer Station, airport carpark, vehicle examination, and parking meter.^^^ 
1991-1995: Consolidation and Other Re forms 
This section accounts firstly for the consolidation of HA, (including its new 
relation with government departments; bringing together the public and subvented 
sector, consolidation of manpower, and building the corporate infrastructure). 
Secondly, the repercussion of the HA on other areas of health care, and lastly, the 
progress of government's privatization projects within these five years. 
During this stage, the development of local health policy had no major 
breakthrough. Both the professionals and the academic criticized the lack of an 
overall policy^36, yet this quest for another comprehensive white paper was not yet 
entertained when this section was being written. Policy development in this stage 
could be summarized as the Hospital Authority consolidating itself on the one hand; 
and on the other hand, reform efforts in several areas being sparked off. These new 
movements appeared to associate with two sources. Firstly, as mentioned before, the 
medical profession succeeded in injecting new policy ideas that the government 
would at times considered worthwhile exploring. The newly sparked off reform 
efforts were often ideas put forward by the doctors earlier. Secondly, the Hospital 
Authority itself drew much attention on the future rising health expenditure and the 
awareness that primary care had been neglected for two decades. The government 
thus launched new efforts to look into these matters. Actually, the Health and 
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Welfare Bfanch in the Iate eighties was overloaded by the complicate tasks involved 
in setting up the Hospital Authority, making the branch unable to simultaneously 
consider reform in other areas. Once the Hospital Authority started operating on its 
own, the officials in the branch were freed to engage in other endeavors. It was also 
highly probable that the Hospital Authority created new need to re-adjust other 
segment of the health system, such as primary care.'^^ 
The Hospital Authority went through a process of consolidation in this stage. 
This process could be described as compressed and rushed. A wide range of 
interrelated and formidable tasks needed to be achieved in a relatively short period of 
time, thus making the work schedule compressed and many tasks had to rush. The 
consolidation process could be viewed under several respects. 
Firstly, though the Hospital Authority Ordinance had laid down the major 
principles governing the set up and operation of the statutory body. Li daily operation, 
a lot of questions arose on the roles of and relations between the body and the 
government. As a result, the start up of the Authority involved much negotiation 
between the two，and a working document known as the Memorandum of 
Administrative Arrangements'^^ was eventually drafted to define their roles. This 
document covered the objectives of the statutory body, the relationship with and 
accountability to the government, the funding issues and financial autonomy, the 
transfer of assets and liabilities, the ownership of premises, insurance, etc. Besides 
the making ofthe Memorandum, there were other tasks in relation to the government. 
For example, after establishing the Authority, there was immediate need to integrate 
its own Head Office with the headquarters of the Hospital Service Department. This 
was achieved by tuming the old regional offices of the department into new sub-
offices ofthe Authority. This arrangement more or less retained the old system, and 
was thus considered unsatisfactory. The Authority decided to disband these offices 
later on in its third year of operation. This removal of the middle layer management 
reduced the size ofthe Authority's Head Office by 78 percent (that means 167 posts 
were abolished from the original establishment).^^^ 
The second dimension of consolidation was the bringing together ofthe public 
and subvented sectors. This means a fundamental revamping of management in both 
government hospitals, specialist clinics and those originally non-government 
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institutions. The wide range of tasks pertained to this issue were compressed into a 
relatively short period of time. At the time of the establishment of the Authority, the 
hospitals in the territory were managed by sixteen dissimilar systems. A primary task 
of the Authority was to replace them with one unified management system. The 
Authority came into negotiation with the hospital boards of the subvented sector. The 
unification was achieved through signing twenty three agreements with fifteen 
different organizations.'^^ The tradition of these ex-subvented hospitals were to be 
preserved as far as possible, such as fund raising and certain autonomy in 
appointment of staff. In retum, these hospitals would in principle submit to the 
policies laid down by the Authority. 
The third dimension which was badly in need of consolidation was manpower 
resources. Though the main features of the bridging over terms had been laid down in 
July 1990, it was necessary to finalize the details of the package. Options were 
opened to the staffto remain as civil servants or to become the Authority's employees. 
The opting process aimed to stabilize and boost the morale of the hospital work force. 
Throughout the three years of the opting period, there were altogether seventy four 
briefing sessions held to familiarize the staff with the package. *^^ 
A fourth area of consolidation was the "corporate infrastructure"^^^ of the 
Authority. By corporate infrastructure, it means the development of the Authority's 
own communication system, information system, procurement and supplies system, 
planning procedures, re-designing the payroll, etc. Besides, to carry through the 
building ofthis infrastructure, the Authority worked out the appointment of its own 
legal advisers and auditors. Recruitment of managers was also crucial to handle the 
large quantity ofmanagerial work. Apart from disbanding regional offices mentioned 
earlier, another fine tuning of the Head Office structure came in l994, when the 
tripartite structure (Secretary General, Director of Operation, and ChiefDevelopment 
Officer)i43 was put to an end, and the executive power was unified into the office of 
the ChiefExecutive. 
There were other reforms of health care system in this stage apart from the set 
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up of Hospital Authority. Among these reforms efforts, the more prominent ones 
included the publication of primary health care working group report, the study of 
health insurance, and the study of fee and waiver system. 
60 
A working group started investigating local primary health care in 1989 
submitted their report in 1990，which was later on published as Healthfor All, the 
Way Ahead in April 1991. The report put into perspective the role of primary health 
and primary medical care, urging the government to recognize the significant role 
played by primary care in safeguarding the health status of the population, and more 
importantly, it contributed to keep low the occupancy of hospital beds, which would 
in tum improve hospital services. The report made altogether one hundred and two 
different recommendations covering a wide scope of primary care, hi 1994，the 
administration claimed to have undertaken ninety-eight out a hundred and two 
recommendations in the report.^^^ This success was probably due to the many 
recommendations which did not require much additional resources or alteration of 
structure. Besides, some recommendations were vaguely phrased, such as "to 
safeguard the public health of the community and minimize the incidence of 
preventable disease and disability through provision of quality and efficient 
preventive care services".^^^ It was a matter opinion whether the government had 
achieved them. To many, the reform in primary care since the report was only 
incremental and gradual. More fundamental changes such as the set up of Health 
Authorityi47 was not addressed by the administration. 
Two other study groups focused respectively on medical insurance; and fee and 
waiver strategy. These efforts were joined together to forge the Green Paper named 
Toward Better Health - A Consultation Document in 1993. The paper proposed 
several models which could be utilized to fund future medical and health services. 
These proposals received poor public evaluation since the community once again 
suspected the creeping in of "pegging fees to costs". Upon the closing of the 
consultation period, a summary of public views was complied by the Health and 
Welfare Branch for the legislators. The document revealed that one of the proposals 
which the administration found most favorable was supported only by healthcare 
professionalsi48, who were probably more conscious of the cost of producing medical 
services. The debate of the financing of health care dragged on thereafter without 
concrete resolutions up to the end of 1995. Two major policy debates within the 
legislature were moved by medical professionals in 1994, one on health care 
financing and the other on overall policy making,'^^ yet the passed motions had 
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apparently no effects oh the administration's inertia to mop up the issue. 
Concerning the progress of privatization in this stage, the administration 
exhibited fbll committment to the public sector reform.'^^ The pilot projects which 
had started back in 1989 reached completion in 1991, and the original Public Sector 
Reform Steering Committee was re-organized into a Public Sector Reform Policy 
Group in 1991. The new Committee was chaired by the Chief Secretary.^^^ The 
objective of this new Committee was to provide policy guidance to the development 
of public sector reform (while the committee back in 1989 was mandated only to test 
out the concepts and ideas from the Public Sector Reform). Additionally, in mid-
1992, a special unit provisionally called the Efficiency Unit was set up directly under 
the Chief Secretary's office. The Unit was manned by Administrative Officers and 
consultants. It appeared that the Unit was vested with adequate authority to "cross 
traditional boundaries" within the civil service, so that it could ensure the reforms 
being effectively undertaken”^ After a trial of six months, in 1993, the Efficiency 
Unit had become a permanent se t -up”� 
Comparing with the past, the government had moved at a faster pace in hiving 
off and privatizing its activities after the Public Sector Reform initiatives were 
introduced. In the eighties before the publication of the paper, there were only five 
cases of privatization (or hiving off, contracting out, etc.), but after the paper came 
into light, the government had, from 1989 to 1995, around fifteen projects carried out 
or being considered (see Figure 3). 
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Before the P.S.R. Paper (1980-89) 
-Vocational Training Council set up in 1982 
-Railway hived off to the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation in 1982 
-Government carparks contracted out in 1984 
-Housing Authority set up in 1987 
-Hospital Authority set up in 1989 
After the P.S.R Paper (1989-1995) 
-Abattoirs privatized in 1990 
-The chemical waste treatment facility privatization plan considered 
-Airport car-parks contracted out 
-Plan to contract out Aberdeen Tunnel considered 
-The Island East Refuse Transfer Station - building and operating privatization plan 
considered 
-The Vehicle examination privatization plan considered 
-Management of parking meters privatized 
-Implementation of the sewage strategy privatized 
-The Registrar General's Department reorganized 
-The Land-fill privatization plan considered 
-The Cargo-working areas privatization plan considered 
-The traffic control (Tsing Yi and Ma Wan Areas*) privatization plan considered 
-Privatization plan considered for the management of three public housing estates ** 
-Privatization plan considered for the management of cargo loading quays. 
-Plan to contract out Indictment of illegal parking considered. 
Figure 3. Privatization Projects and Plans 1980-1995 
Sources : Hong Kong Hansard, (1989/90) Pp. 87-90，(1990/91) Pp. 783-785, (1991/92) P.4182; Wen 
WeiPao 14.06.95，25.10.95, 05.01.96; TaiKungPao 11.12.95, 07.02.96. 
Notes : * Traffic control involved the management of automated traffic signs, surveillance cameras 
system, and emergency phone system. 
** Housing Authority made decision in June 1995 to privatize the management of estates in 
Junk Bay, Shaukeiwan and Kwun Tong, the management involved trash collection, 
environmental hygiene, security, hawkers control, car-parks, collection ofrents, handling 
complaints, etc. 
On the whole, after the refining of the understanding of privatization concepts 
and modes in the late eighties, the government in the nineties set out to put into 
practice these public sector reform initiatives. 
Summary - The Four Prominent Developmental Trends 
The development Hong Kong's medical and health policy for the past five 
decades can be divided into six different stages. This arrangement differs from those 
proposed by other scholars in our literature review; the first difference being that the 
stages used here focus exclusively on medical and health policy, whereas other 
available stage models focus on social policy at large, and health issues are only a 
subsidiary part under the umbrella term of social policy. Secondly, the available stage 
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models d6 not examine the parallel development of privatization, while in my 
historical account of the policy development, balanced attention is paid to the 
flourishing of privatization ideas. 
To sum up, embedded in the development of Hong Kong's medical and health 
policy are four trends. Firstly，there is the 'legacy of "free" medical services', which 
was rooted in the clashes of Chinese and Westem perception of medicine. The 
Chinese had little trust on Westem medicine, yet the colonial administration, out of 
the pressure to control epidemics, started to offer free services so as to attract more 
Chinese users. Free medical service continued in the desperate, early post war years, 
and was further consolidated after the 1966-67 riots，since the administration then 
was in need of legitimacy. This legacy weighted down the pace of reform in cost 
control ofhealth services, and it is hard to be reversed even in the nineties. 
The second trend is the growing 'preoccupation in curative care’ since the 
colony's first medical and health white paper was published. This preoccupation was 
further reinforced in the second white paper. Its influence persisted up to the mid-
eighties when the government decided to reform the hospitals and neglected the 
entire primary care system, let alone a comprehensive policy review. 
Thirdly, the 'dynamics between professionals and generalists' is witnessed. 
An unwritten understanding between the medical professionand the generalists in the 
administration emerged. In this labor division; the profession retained its turf in 
affecting policy alternatives, while the generalists dominated the agenda setting 
activities. The medical profession was constantly pressing for its own cause. There 
were attempts to curtail the influence of the professionals, it is true that the ultimate 
policy making power lay in the hands of the generalists, but the profession succeeded 
in injecting novel ideas into the policy circle. Though the doctors had no control over 
the government's agenda setting and had their request entertained instantly, their 
quests were often addressed by the administration at a later time，when the 
administration considered appropriate. The profession's influence on the policy was 
not simple. On one hand, the profession introduced new ideas (e.g. privatization, 
insurance, primary care, etc.). On the other hand the professionals might have taken 
part in reinforcing the preoccupation of curative care, as traditionally their training 
focused more in this area. 
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Lastly, there is the trend of 'flourishing ideas of privatization'. The idea 
emerged as early as the McKinsey Report, advocated by the business sector thereafter. 
The government initially resisted the concept and up to the first halfof the eighties; it 
was not enthusiastic toward privatization, considering it a weakening of central 
control. Such a perception gradually altered in the late eighties when the government 
administered internal studies and gained understanding of the concept. The 
privatizing of medical care could be said to have happened in a period when the 
administration was not well informed of the diversity and vitality ofthe privatization 
concept. 
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Chapter Three 
Forging The Policy 
This chapter set out to analyze the factors that contributed to the forging of 
privatization decisions. These factors are as laid down in the framework in the 
introductory chapter (see Figure 1). These factors are commonly recognized as 
impetuses of privatization, thus I set out to examine them in the context of Hong 
Kong, to see if they can satisfactorily account for the case of Hong Kong. Yet as 
reasoned in the preceding chapter, the medical services development in H.K. bears 
several trends，which are prominent and influential even in the nineties. In view of 
this, this chapter also explores the impact of these trends, so as to compare their 
influence with other commonly recognized causes of privatization. The sections in 
this chapter are devoted to reason; to search and establish the relationship between 
the factors and the privatization decisions. The ultimate goal of this search is to reflne, 
revise, and to amend the initial framework of analysis, which is put together as a 
result of the earlier literature review. These and other amendments in later chapters 
will be put together in the closing chapter of the entire project. 
In brief, among the eleven factors examined, I contend that the preoccupation 
with curative care, the bureaucratic factor, and the professionals-generalists dynamics 
showed the strongest influence on the decision to privatize hospital care. The rest 
eight factors either showed only a weak effect or their influences are hard to be 
determined. Some commonly known factors such as the economic factor and the 
political factor did not appeared to affect the HA policy very much, though they were 
influential in the government's overall privatization tendency. 
Secondly, I identified miscalculations made by the administration, both in the 
evaluation of public opposition toward raising service charge, and the financial 
benefits that privatization may bring. 
Thirdly, toward the end of this chapter, it is attempted to re-construct the 
policy making story, suggesting possible explanations on why and how the 
administration incautiously committed to privatize hospital care. 
The following sub-sections examine the eleven factors individually, starting 
with those that exclusively affected the medical circle, then move on to other local 
factors, and finally the external factors are examined. 
71 
Pro fessionals-Generalists Dynamics Nutiired the Privatization Decision 
In general, is the medical profession powerful in shaping medical and health 
policy? There are a lot of disagreeing opinions on this topic. Scholars like Hay Joel 
and Jones believed in the professionals as having a commanding position in policy 
making, as Hay Joel maintained: 
"A striking feature of health care policy formulation in Hong Kong is the tremendous 
concentration of oversight and decision-making authority into the hands o f a very 
small group of people. I was told by many that there is a small clique of people 
(almost all doctors) who virtually decide what will happen to Hong Kong*s 
health care. . .No one within the system is likely to challenge or criticize existing 
policy or suggest innovations, because this small elite has so many potential 
mechanisms of retaliation",' (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, Joel did not explain how the profession is capable of launching 
'retaliation' against its opponents. C. Jones suggested that the administration had 
clearly felt in a poor position to challenge the doctors' authority head-on. And before 
1984, there was no populist politicians around with an interest in taking a stand on 
the principle of popular health care.^ The profession is free from direct attacks of 
politicians, this absence of political pressures also means that the generalists could 
not maneuver with and take advantage of such pressures when they wrestle with the 
doctors. 
However, other scholars and insiders tended to see the opposite. For example, 
Ian Scott and John P. Bums^ concluded that decision making authority ultimately lies 
with the generalists. As mentioned before. Dr. Thong, once the director of the 
Medical and Health Department, lamented the futile battles he fought with the 
generalists in the midst of the policy making process/ 
The conjecture here is not a simple evaluation of whether the doctors are 
powerful or not. Instead, it is argued that ever since 1946, the profession's capacity in 
moulding policy declined progressively, and the agenda setting is nb longer 
controlled by the professionals. Nonetheless, it has remained the most creditable 
actor in affecting policy alternatives. The profession unceasingly tries to draw the 
government's attention to its interpretations and proposed policy alternatives. These 
interpretations and particularly the policy alternatives have not been consistent over 
time, meaning that the medical profession advocated for different policy outcomes, it 
goes after no single, unified course. A major tum in the profession's aspiration 
72 
throughout the time span covered has been a shift from the pursuit of curative 
medicine to primary care. Additionally, my findings appear to have confirmed a 
pattem that the administration is used to accept the validity of the professionals' 
outlook of policy and alternatives. Yet, the timing for an issue to rise to the top ofthe 
agenda, and the final decision making remains thejob of generalists. 
The progressive diminishing of the profession's say in policy making is clearly 
observed in the previous chapter. Since the stage of 'convergence', that is 1958-1966, 
challenges against the doctors' administrative competence mounted up considerably. 
In the following stage of development, this mistrust in the profession was translated 
into institutional structure of the central government, the McKinsey Report's proposal 
of branch and department arrangement curtailed the profession's power markedly. 
The Medical and Health Department which was originally a planning and decision 
making centre, had become a mere executive agency. Toward the late eighties， 
doctors were further alienated from policy making when the department further split 
up into the Department of Health and the Hospital Services Department. The 
planning duties were totally lifted up to the policy branch. 
This arrangement created and maintained tension between the doctors and the 
generalists. Conflicts arose as described by Dr. Thong (refer to chapter 2). Mr. Derek 
Gould (Principal Assistant Secretary for Health and Welfare), another insider, also a 
leading figure of the policy branch, made it explicit that: 
"Government's specialists and professionals enjoy less status and power than the 
generalist-administrators, perhaps because their ethical frame of reference and 
allegiance normally lies with international professional bodies outside o f government. 
Friction between generalists and specialists is not uncommon, partly due to envy of 
the former's status and career prospects, but also because the latter do not appreciate 
their proposals being changed to suit political expediency". 
There is another institutional reason that tends to limit the profession's freedom in 
exerting pressure on the government. The professional body - Hong Kong Medical 
Association (HKMA) is limited in its power to organize the profession for collective 
action. This inferior status of the association was due to a historical legacy. Firstly, 
the HKMA is not the sole entity that represents doctors of the territory. The British 
Medical Association (Hong Kong Branch), also shares the legitimacy of 
representation. Under the present regulation, the power of registration and discipline 
of doctors is handled by the Medical Council, not the HKMA. The HKMA has 
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representative(s) in the Council, but they are appointed by the Governor, thus, the 
ultimate power rests with the government. The HKMA functions more like a social 
club.7 Without monopolistic control over its members, the HKMA is unlikely to gain 
leverage over policy making issues by mobilizing the doctors ofthe territory. 
Though being circumscribed into the role of policy execution, the professionals 
within and outside the government structure managed to exploit their expertise, and 
secured the identity as the most creditable actor in introducing policy alternatives. As 
elaborated in the previous chapter, solid evidence showed that policy ideas like 
privatization, health insurance, primary care reform, post graduate medical training, 
overall financing issues, etc., were all initiated by the professionals. The 
administration never fails to address and consider in details the alternatives proposed 
by the profession. 
The administration's trust in expertise is reflected in other issues that pertain to 
the medical profession's turf, for example, in the amendment of registration 
ordinance and the enforcement of drug labeling. Detailed accounts of these examples 
cannot be included here.^ Briefly speaking, in the drug labeling issue, the Pharmacy 
and Poisons Board in 1987, reached unanimous conclusion that it was the best public 
interest if Hong Kong practices full labeling of dispensed medicines. In 1992，the 
Board proposed amendment to the law to make it mandatory, it was made public 
before the Omelco Health Panel in 1993. The legislation process was then close to 
commencement, yet the HKMA in the last minute succeeded to reverse this decision. 
Mentioning this case is to demonstrate that the government took back its decision to 
legislate, and allowed the doctors to regulate themselves through their code of ethics. 
It indicated the profession's influence is considerable in moving the administration 
toward different alternatives given a particular policy goal is determined. One of my 
interviewee suggested that, the generalists are usually not as bold as the doctors to 
come out with policy alternatives, due to the lack of knowledge and expertise in the 
area. And more important, the frequent job rotation has greatly discouraged the 
generalists to look deep into the issues, nor to commit to any formulation of policy 
alternatives. The result is - the administration is more compromising in the choice of 
policy alternatives, but tend to be more rigid in policy goals. 
The government relies on the profession to suggest alternatives, but the 
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problem is the profession's cognition of policy issues changes, it does not go after 
one single course. Its understanding of what is crucial to health evolves with 
advancement in technology and medical science, it roughly follows its professional 
counterparts around the world. As a result, the alternatives it supports change 
simultaneously. The most vivid example - it is the medical profession that reinforced 
belief in curative medicine; it is the same profession that first turned round toward 
advocating primary care. The point is, it costs the profession relatively very little 
altering its outlook of health and of policy development. However, a similar 
detouring is very costly for the administration, because earlier commitment to an 
alternative means some political price paid; some vested interest formed; some funds 
and manpower poured in. The specificity of these invested assets makes changes 
more costly. 
To sum up, the analysis of the professional-generalist dynamics yields five 
observations: i) within the time span of this study, the influence of the profession in 
policy making declines; ii) it successfully affects policy alternatives but not agenda 
setting; iii) it directly advocated the review ofhospital services and their privatization; 
iv) the profession's outlook of health and policy changes over time，and 
simultaneously its pet projects changes; v) the profession is responsible for 
reinforcing a belief in curative care, which would explored below. 
A Preoccupation with Curative Care 
To say that the profession reinforce the culture of over emphasizing hospital 
care is not ungrounded. For quite a period of time after 1946, Westem medicine is 
almost obsessed with curative care.^ It was not until the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration 
on Primary Health Care as a global strategy of health for all by the year 2000, did the 
profession showed changes in its attitude towards curative care. Though Hong Kong 
participated in the 1978 convention, actual response to this changing tide came 
relatively slow. Currently, it is believed that a health system is fundamentally 
different from a illness curing system. To stay healthy is radically different from 
getting cured. The logic follows that a health policy is much broader in scope, 
incorporating smoking bans, environmental preservation, cultivating healthy life style, 
road and occupational safety, reduce obesity and under-nourishment, health 
education; removing poverty, and most of all preventive care. But for a 'illness 
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treating policy', one is concemed only witb how to ration hospital services, cutting 
cost and waiting lists. 
Insiders of the local medical profession admitted that doctors overlooked 
primary care for a very long time.'^ The profession's outlook of local health policy 
heavily influenced the choice of policy alternative of the government. A 
preoccupation with curative care in the mid-1980s' exhibited strong affinity to the 
subsequent decision of reviewing exclusively the hospital services. Since hospital 
bed provision is a paramount concem of the colony's health care since 1946, and the 
professional circle endorsed such view, it is conceivable that the decision makers 
believed in a review of hospital services as essential, particularly when the 
jurisdiction of the 1974 white paper came to an end. 
Taking one step backward, how was the preoccupation in curative care 
sustained within the local professional circle? The answer is the imbalance in the 
undergraduate medical training. It was recommended in the The Hong Kong Working 
Party on Postgraduate Medical Education & Training - Report & Recommendations 
that education and training in general practice should be strengthened and upgraded" 
at undergraduate as well as post-graduate level. These recommendations indicated a 
gross neglect of training general practitioners in the past. General practice or family 
medicine is an indispensable part of primary care.^^ However, medical students for 
most of the time are trained to cure patients, they leam, practice and work in public 
hospitals, hospitals are paramount. The obsession of curative care is an acquired taste 
through the seven years of undergraduate training. 
There are other causes that reinforced this preoccupation, as described in 
chapter two?) the dramatic plunges in mortality rates (infant, matemal and the 
overall rate), changes in morbidity patterns, all contributed to the illusion that 
primary care was sufficient and frugal. What left to be fulfilled were the ambitious 
hospital projects. 
With this preoccupation still dominant and prevailed in the policy circle in the 
mid-1980s, the policy actors easily achieved consensus over the primacy of hospital 
services. This mindset led to the assessment that review and management reform of 
hospital care as deem necessary in 1984, which was the year that the previous white 
paper expired. 
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The Indirect Effect of the 'Legacy of Free Medical Service' 
In chapter two, it is concluded that one of the four prominent trends in local 
medical policy over the decades was the 'legacy of free medical service'. At the first 
glance, this is not so much different from the system in the United Kingdom, which 
under the National Health Service pSfHS)，a large portion of services were also free at 
consumption. However, the U.K. is a welfare state which viewed itself as declaring 
war at the social evils of Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. However, for the 
minimal administrative state of Hong Kong, the legacy of free medicine was rooted 
in pragmatic reasons rather than a blueprint of welfare state. 
Recapitulating chapter two's arguments, in the pre-war years the colony was 
inflicted with recurring plagues which threatened the well being of the military 
personnel and seamen. There was a desperate need to improve the sanitary system 
and the residents' health status. Since the colonial rule was resented and the Chinese 
and Westem medical cultures clashed with each other, the administration had to 
relied on cut price, free or even compulsory services to maintain the colony's health. 
In the early post war years, the community was simply unable to supply itself with 
medical services. For similar pragmatic reasons, the government assumed the roles of 
both provider and producer. Towards the end of the sixties, riots broke out which led 
to further services expansion as a mean to win back the shattered government image. 
At this stage, the legacy of free medicine could be considered well consolidated and 
accepted by the public as a norm. 
The legacy which bome out of pragmatic and political reasons, has a special 
relation with the privatization of medical care. Under its influence, the general public 
has gone against privatization lest that the 'free' service tradition would be abolished. 
On the part of the proponents of privatization, they saw the legacy as an out-dated 
institution, which could not be maintained if future expenditure on health is to be 
controlled. All in all, the legacy itself cannot be said as having a positive effect of 
forging the privatization decision. Its effect was one of working against privatization. 
To be more precise, this legacy has influenced not with the decision to review 
hospital services, or the decision to set up the Hospital Authority. It exhibited, 
however, influence to the subsequent institutional design of the HA, and also to the 
obstacles that interfered the policy at the stage of initiation. The public opinion in 
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favor of free services has sabotaged the HA's original design of cost recovery, the 
charging structure recommended is never put in practice. Secondly, during policy 
initiation one of the major obstacle, or constraint imposed on the HA was the debate 
on financing health services, here, the legacy played an important role in forging 
public opinions.i4 
Concerning policy formation, my conjecture is that the government had under-
estimated the persistence and strength of this legacy at the early stage of policy 
making. In other words, if the legacy has to do with the privatization decision, it was 
the administration's failure to reckon its influence, this poor judgment prompted the 
administration to pursue an unpopular policy. 
So far, research in Hong Kong rarely explore the depth of which the legacy has 
taken root in the public. Three related surveys may help to provide us a preliminary 
understanding of the issue. In 1989, the South China Moming Post commissioned 
Survey Research Hongkong to study the public's response to hospital fee rise. Among 
540 respondents, 45 percent support a fee rise, while 43 percent objected. Later on, a 
study by Andrew L. Luk.'^ in 1994 explored patients' perceptions of quality of care in 
hospital, hospital fees and medical insurance. When asked one's opinion on raising 
hospital fees, the percentage of support and objection were respectively 44.4 and 45.7 
percent. Another study on itemized charging was done in 1995,^ ^ the findings 
revealed that over 70 percent of the interviewees opposed the idea of itemized 
charging. This scheme was being perceived as a creeping charge raising policy, 
which the informants were objecting to. The above three surveys focused on different 
things, hence the findings cannot be compared. However, they have indicated that 
from the late eighties to the mid-nineties, the public opinion had not changed. Even 
after the necessity of sharing the cost ofhea)th has been repeated again and again, the 
public still held fast on the belief that free medical service is the obligation of the 
government. This legacy remained a stronghold to be overcome in the path of 
reforming the present financing arrangement. 
All in all, the legacy tumed out not affecting the decision to review hospital 
services as much as the subsequent institutional design of the HA. It showed close 
relation to the institutional design and to the obstacles during policy initiation. 
Secondly, during policy formation, the administration failed to reckon the extent of 
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influence of this norm, the privatization plan therefore sounded more promising than 
it actually was. This misjudgment prompted the administration to adopt the HA plan, 
only to discover later on that public resistance was formidable. 
Contextual Factors of the Medical Field and their Dissipated Effects 
Pertaining to the field of medical and health, there was a cluster of factors that 
commonly believed as related to the decision of reviewing hospital services. These 
factors are, firstly, the rising demand on services, which was usually reflected 
through overcrowdedness and the camp bed phenomenon, and also through the long 
waiting list to surgery and specialist's treatment. Secondly, there was a contextual 
factor of demographic change" which increased the public's expectation on the 
system. 
The conjecture here is that, this cluster of factors did not showed strong 
association with the decision of reviewing territory wide hospital services. The 
reason is that these contextual factors did not necessary lead to the above decision, 
nor to a privatization decision. The effects of them were dissipated, it can be equally 
probable that they lead to an overall review and another white paper on health; orjust 
a review of salaries and condition of employment, or commitments to new hospital 
projects, expanding the output of health personnel, collaborating with private sector, 
reforming primary care, or even other forms of crisis management. This cluster of 
factors is not specific in its effect towards forging a particular route of reform. Health 
system of Westem countries all shared these problems of poor morale, long waiting 
list, and the like, yet they pursued different paths of reform. Owing to the dissipated 
nature of their effect, these contextual factors are considered not showing clear 
association toward the privatization decisions concerned. 
Moving onward, the focus is on several domestic factors that are anticipated to 
have influenced the decision of privatizing hospital services, as well as the 
privatization ideas of the government in general (see Figure 1). In other words, the 
discussion below will have two concerns, each factor will be considered for they 
effect(s) on the health sector and on the administration's privatization policies at large. 
Yet the main focus will still be on the area ofhealth. 
Political Factor - An Insufficient Explanation 
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Among various impetuses of privatization suggested by scholars, the political 
factor is one of the often used explanation. Privatization is interpreted as attempts to 
undermine organized labor, to gain electoral support, to shed responsibilities or to 
break voting habit, etc. Except for shedding responsibilities, the forgoing political 
issues appeared to be either not predominant, or simply not exist in the mid-1980s of 
H.K. Then how would academics interpret the political motives behind local 
privatization process? 
B 1 . Cheung reasoned that financial and managerial explanations are not 
sufficient to account for privatization and/or public sector reform in Hong Kong. 
Instead, he offered a political perspective - developments pertaining to the transfer of 
sovereignty back to China have undermined the colonial government's authority, this 
"decline of authority and relative autonomy o f the government has also adversely 
affected its incorporatist or integrative capacity vis-a-vis society, thereby further 
contributing to a weakening of state power...The rationale for government 'off-
loading', seen in such perspective, is not only that the private sector can do the j o b 
better, but also that the government is becoming increasingly unable to cope with the 
job",i8 also, 
"[shifting] the focus of public service from political responsiveness and eff icacy 
towards the more mundane technicalities of management efficiency...public sector 
reform [is] a conflict-attenuating strategy designed to deal with the current crisis o f 
political overloading".'^ 
The whole reasoning sees privatization as creating buffers, to distance the 
government from the politically troublesome activities. Privatized activities, even 
when they go wrong or run into difficulties, will be viewed as the incompetence or 
problem of the private entrepreneurs. The government will be spared of criticism and 
political pressure. This reasoning may be true for commercial services such as the 
railways, tunnels and recreation facilities (e.g. Ocean Park). For example, for 
corporations like the Mass Transit Railway and the Kowloon Canton Railway, the 
government only appears to involving in price setting. Other forms of interventions 
are kept at a very low profile,^^ such that the public may not aware. 
However, for hospital services, since only the production function is privatized, 
the government remains as the primary funder, it cannot expect public attention to be 
drastically diverted from the government. For the users, the media and the general 
public, the Hospital Authority is viewed not very much different from the traditional 
Medical and Health Department. Whenever pricing issues arise (e.g. itemized 
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charging), or other crises break out (e.g. mislabeling of gas cylinders), the Health and 
Welfare Branch is seen to be highly involved and concerned. In the end the 
government is still held largely responsible for the performance of the Authority. 
This is not essentially an illusion because the policy making functions, funding, and 
monitoring are all in the hands of the government. All in all, the HA's perceived 
identity is often more public in lieu of a non-governmental body hived off from the 
government, like the railways. 
My point is, if one adopts the 'buffer’ explanation to the HA reform, then one 
must also assume that the government was unable to anticipate the publicness ofthe 
HA, such that the government unwittingly expected the HA to has sufficient 
buffering effect. For this assumption, I found no concrete evidence supporting it. On 
the contrary, officials back in the mid-1980s' figured out that entering the period of 
transition, the stability of civil service became paramount factor for all potential 
plans of privatization,^' under such political environment, the revamping of hospital 
services did not seem to be a worthwhile endeavor. The revamp disturbed over one 
tenth of the civil servants and invited large scale industrial actions. As one 
government insider told me during interview that 'if the government today is able to 
choose all over again, it probably dare not to do the same thing, transfering the entire 
body of hospital staff is a real big issue’. I would therefore contend that the political 
environment of the sovereignty transition period appeared to be an inappropriate 
factor for explaining the decision of reviewing hospital services and later on revamps 
of the system. 
Bureaucratic Problems - A Crucial Factor to the Privatization Decision 
The bureaucratic factor propels privatization, the common understanding is 
that the traditional government bureaucracy had become obsolete, failed to discharge 
duties effectively and efficiently. The departments may be over-manned, rigid, 
lacking responsiveness to users' need, and the morale among staff is poor. 
Staff morale and management problem were found in the public bureaucracy of 
H.K., and the government was alerted of the situation. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
though the government in the seventies resisted legislators' request to revamp the 
central government, at the beginning of the eighties, the Chief Secretary lamented 
that too little regard had been paid to the management of civil service, the structure 
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was not at all caring to the staff who were the principal agents of accomplishing 
duties. 
Among documents reviewed in this research project, the government 
apparently has never admitted that the bureaucracy as over-manned, rigid or 
irresponsive. Officials tended to acknowledge more the problem of control，and also 
appeared very conscious of the Value for money, aspect.^^ Donald Tsang admitted 
that the increasing size and complexity of government activities has made central 
control difficult to sustain.^^ On another occasion, he gave the diagnosis that the 
government bureaucracy needed to 'delegate authority' down to the bureaucracy, 
otherwise effective control will be jeopardized.^^ Officials viewed various civil 
service reforms as bome primarily out of pragmatic and technical needs, rather than 
having other underlying political considerations. Bureaucratic defects as understood 
by the administration were in three respects. Firstly, as producing sub-optimal 
outputs with the money spent; secondly, as the problem of poor control, meaning that 
policies rolled on year after year without an accurate assessment of their 
effectiveness.25 Lastly, the civil service structure was like a strait-jacket that limited 
innovation and creativity of those working in it.^ ^ 
It is evident that the forgoing recognition of problem actually led to series of 
investigations^^ throughout the eighties, which could be seen as a continuous process. 
Subsequently the end product was the emergence of public sector reform initiatives. 
It is observed that the problems of the public bureaucracy, which accumulated 
through years of operation did prompt the administration to look for solutions, and 
the hiving off activities and the public sector reform were two of the attempted 
solutions. 
For the area of medical and health services, criticism towards the service 
delivery structure was commonplace among the local academics, the media and the 
pressure groups (e.g. Coalition for an Eastem District Hospital in the early 1980s， 
Hong Kong Observers' Forum). Complaints were frequently launched against the 
hospital staff, such as discourteous remarks and request patients for tipping (in early 
years). There was also criticism against the delivery system, such as long queues at 
clinics, and long waiting lists for surgical and specialist treatments. The resource 
allocation system was also accused as unfair. It created discrepancy of funding in the 
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regional and district hospitals, this caused the former to be crammed with patients, 
while the latter under-utilized. These issues were very much concerned by the 
professionals who work within the system, and the profession in tum was a major 
advocate for reviewing hospital services. In fact, the Scott Report in the end devoted 
much discussed in length of problems like overcrowdedness, working environment, 
and the like. This indicated that the bureaucratic deficiencies of hospitals were then 
genuine concerns of the consultants and the government which appointed them. The 
informants in my interviews also attributed considerable weight on this factor in 
shaping the reform. 
Economic Factor 
Government officials commented that the public sector in Hong Kong has been 
slim, accounting only for a small percentage of the GDP when compared with other 
Western countries.^^ However, with the slow growth in economy over the recent 
decades, officials admitted that there was pressure to keep the size of the public 
sector in check. Besides, with commitment made to the major infrastructure, the 
government saw the need to identify savings from the existing programmes. 
Figure 4 shows respectively the growth rates of the GDP and the CAE (i.e. 
consolidated account expenditure). From the seventies up to the nineties, the growth 
of GDP slowed down on the whole, while for the consolidated account expenditure, 
it exhibited a pattem of fluctuating with GDP growth. During the blooming years 
such as 1972-74, 1976/77 and 1986/87, the public sector expanded simultaneously, 
while for periods of bust, the CAE plunged, but with a certain time lags. The two 
graphs follows roughly the same pattem but a bit out of phase. This is conceivable as 
the expansion of services in the bloom years cannot be trimmed back immediately 
when the bust year starts.^^ Figure 4 makes clear that the government has a policy of 
pegging development of the public sector to economy growth. In this sense, when the 
GDP growth rate gradually retards, the government felt the need to hold back the 
public sector. The economic factor as a result, is showing association to policies that 
limits the public sector，which privatization is surely one of these. 
Considering the size of public sector,^^ Figure 5 showed data from 1970s' 
through 1994. Remarkable expansion started in mid-1970s and it reached its peak at 
the tum of the decade. After that it scaled downward steadily, and around the several 
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years when series of decisions were made to set up HA, the public sector size was not 
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particularly alarming. On an average, the public sector size is 16.4 percent, compare 
this figure with that from 1983 to 1989, which the average size was 16.1 percent, the 
public sector had no sign of running away at the time privatization of hospital 
services is considered. The point is, the economic factor which is concerned with the 
GDP growth and public sector size, was not signaling a crisis situation during the 
years when the HA and related plans were forged. It is not clear that the economic 
factor had played a central role in affecting these decisions. At least, it did not seem 
to has created a sense of urgency among the policy planners. 
On a whole, the retarding of GDP growth and commitments to infrastructure 
have prompted the administration to pursue privatization policies as a way to hold 
back the public sector. Yet when specifically pinpointing on the area of medical and 
health, the economic factor was not particularly outstanding in the mid-1980s. 
Fiscalfactor 
Privatization generates relatively instant revenue, especially in the form of 
assets sale. As mentioned in the literature review section, privatization sizes down 
the public sector and hence in a long run, brings alleviation to budget deficits. The 
fiscal consideration is therefore often a contributing factor of a state's privatization 
policies. Abromeit even argued that privatization in the United Kingdom was 
essentially a fiscal policy, privatization was not so much an instance of implementing 
a radical programme of structural change, but rather exemplifies the dynamics of a 
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short-term programme, put up for pragmatic and fiscal consideration". For 
Abromeit, privatization should not be considered at the level of ideology, nor 
conscious efforts of structural change (e.g. extend popular ownership). It has always 
been something more 'mundane' or 'down to earth', it was merely about generating 
quick money, and at most, lesser budget deficit in the long run. 
Back to the case of the Hospital Authority, to what extent can the fiscal factor 
be considered responsible for forging the policy? Does the HA generates revenue? Or 
does it reduce budget deficit? 
First of all, from the beginning the government has no intention of selling away 
the public hospitals and other related premises. The government then was attempting 
to shift the production function and partially the provision function to the non-
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government sector. Meaning that the operation and daily output of services will be 
shifted beyond government boundary; while the policy making, funding, etc.，will 
largely remain in public sector. Thus, even if the HA succeeded in generating 
revenue, it would be limited on one hand, and on the other, these funds will be 
clawback to the policy area, this specificity brings little leeway for the central 
government to save resources for other purposes. Besides, the social values (e.g. 
equity) underlying hospital service and its labor intensive nature, make it not a good 
source of generating income. 
Concerning the deficit aspect, the Hong Kong government has an impressing 
record of yielding surplus. Actual deficit are rare cases throughout the colonial rule. 
Considering the 1970s, the only deficit year was 1974/75, there tumed out to be an 
actual deficit of 378 million. Tang commented that it was a resultant of economic 
recession world wide, which was unanticipated by the Financial Secretary. On the 
other hand, for the three consecutive years which was just before the decision was 
made to review hospital services, the colony's experienced its most serious deficits 
that ever appeared. From 1982/83 to 1984/85, the actual deficits were respectively 
3,500 million; 2993 million; and 559 million. Thereafter, the colony run on 
remarkable surplus again. In explaining the three years of financial difficulties, Tang 
commented that they were also due to external factors uncontrollable by the Hong 
Kong govemment.33 
On a whole, the fiscal system is required to generate surplus as much as 
possible in order to achieve financial stability. As argue by Tang, "[t]his is very 
different from Westem Keynesian theory which argues for using a deficit budget to 
increase the level of aggregate demand such that the economy could be fine-tuned to 
reduce its cyclical fluctuation".^^ Additionally, London does not want the colony to 
add burden to the British tax-payers, thus the colony's public expending has always 
been kept at the minimal. 
To have a balanced view, several points can be made: firstly, the colony for 
most of the time runs with surplus, there should not be much pressure to cut deficit 
by using privatization strategies. Secondly, the portion spent on medical and health 
also showed no sign of growing out of proportion.^^ Thirdly, it is evident that the 
expenditure on this policy area actually expanded after (not before) the decision to 
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review hospital services was made,^^ this surging figures indicated that the HA 
project was not effective in cutting expenditure in real terms, even if it was intended 
to do so. Fourthly, however, the severe deficits in the three years preceding the 
decision to review hospital services, coupled with the emergence of the 1997 issue, 
could have created a pessimistic atmosphere about the likelihood and ability of the 
colonial government to shoulder the financial burden. The extent to which the 
privatization decision was caused by this pessimism was unclear. However, 
considering the above four points, I incline to argue that the privatization policy in 
hospital services was not bome out of deficit considerations. Surplus is the norm of 
the system, the policy area has no fast expansion, the incentive of privatization 
provided by the fiscal factor is minimal in this sense. Therefore, the fiscal factor on 
the whole exhibited a weak effect on the policy decision. 
If one considered the effect on the overall policies of privatization, the fiscal 
factor functioned more or less the same as the economic factor. Since the low tax rate 
policy will not be altered, the administration has incentive to reduce wastage of 
resources in the process of its operation. In many projects of infrastructure, where the 
design, financing, building and operation can be handled by the private sector, 
tuming them out to the private is a way to alleviate the government of considerable 
expenditure. 
Ideologicalfactor 
When employing the ideological factor to account for the rise of the 
privatization policies, it refers to the present of strong pro-market voices and beliefs 
within the policy circle. The common labels for these beliefs are the New Rights, 
Thatcherism, efficiency of market and competition. Sometimes, ideological motives 
of privatization are said to be a belief in public ownership (in the case of assets sale), 
or in minimal government. 
Scholars in discussing local health policy, would at times resort to the 
ideological factor to explain policy development. For example, C.W. Wong and C.F. 
Li inclined to argue that the roots of HA project could be traced back to a long 
standing principle of the colonial government - that no long term financial 
commitment on the medical and health services should be made. In reality, this 
argument did not seem to be the case. Since the first policy white paper on medical 
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services, the government remain as the primary funder and provider. Services charges 
has been nominal all along, a charging structure review in recent years brought no 
significant changes. That is, six years after the HA in operation, the public is still 
paying very little for medical care. Besides, the two authors seemed to overlook that 
in the same policy paper they mentioned, the drafters made an conclusion which 
reads: "it is clear that the burden [of medical services] will fall mainly on public 
funds".371 suggest that it is a weak argument to say that the core of the government's 
ideological orientation toward health policy is a reluctance in making long term 
financial commitment. It is also without ground to say that the HA policy is the result 
of such ideological orientation. These arguments are not befitting to account for the 
HA issue simply because they do not agree with the facts. 
Looking into the ideological aspect, in H.K. the commercial elite has been the 
major carriers and advocates of pro-privatization ideas. Leafing through the Hong 
Kong Hansard, whenever request was made to push forward privatization, it was 
made by the elite from the business sector. Their proposals included the hiving off 
government activities, the revamping the central government, holding back the public 
sector expansion and the like. My finding is that this pro-privatization speeches first 
appeared in around 1977, similar requests were frequently recorded from late the 
1970s till the mid-1980s, which afterwards tended to appear in a more sporadic 
manner. Among the legislators who spoke in favor of privatization, most of them 
held leading post(s) in the business sector, except a few who's occupation was an 
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accountant or solicitor. 
However, the point is, ideological influence that had been exerted on the 
privatization policy of health was not propagated by the commercial elite, nor did 
they complain that the expenses on this respect as alarming. Rather, it was the 
medical professionals who took the initiative. In the territory of health, the medical 
profession seemed to be the pro-privatization actor more than the commercial elite. 
Though one can single out the medical profession as the pro-privatization actor, 
it is no evidence that the ideological factor had crucial effect on the policy decision. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the officials were able to exhibit strong determination to 
resist the privatization demands. At the dawn of the eighties, the administration's 
attitudes slowly softened up, however, privatization policies were still not openly 
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pursued. The government had sufficient autonomy to resist the demand for 
privatization. Instead of practicing privatization, the administration undertaken 
studies and investigation of the concept in a low profile. The ideas of privatization 
was not well clarified then. 
A more balance view is - in both commercial and health services, certain 
ideology carriers (business elite and doctors) had attempted to push for more 
extensive privatization practice. The government might have yielded to some ofthese 
requests, however, the government was not without its own policy priority and 
timetable. The administration, as demonstrated in the earlier chapters, was very 
concerned with security issues and slackening central controls.^^ 
Moving onward, the discussion tums to the factors external of the colony, hi 
late developing countries, privatization is often seen as being sponsored or 
propagated by external powers, while in more advanced industrialist societies, 
privatization is at times a result of international competition and imitation. When 
privatization gained momentum under the administrations of Thatcher and Reagan, it 
became a trend that members of the international community felt pressure to join in. 
For the case of Hong Kong, under the colonial rule, a close relation between local 
and home government exists, together with the top administrative posts largely held 
by British (or Commonwealth) expatriates,^^ imitation or transplanting of 
privatization ideas and strategies seemed a even more natural process. 
Perhaps because the channeling of poUcy ideas and/or strategies from the U.K. 
to Hong Kong are considered as self-evident, there has been apparently no research 
conducted to establish that similar relationship exists in privatization policies. The 
scope of this study also cannot afford to go into detailed the making of this 
relationship, because this will deviate to much from the discussion of health policy. 
Nevertheless, it is considerjustifled to assume such relationship exists.^^ 
Influence from the NHS 
The concem here is whether or not privatization of the hospital services in 
Hong Kong was influenced by changes in the British National Health Service. It is 
assumed that innovative ideas in the health policy back in Britian will be able to 
reach the policy makers in Hong Kong, that is the generalist administrators. Another 
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channel of transmitting ideas is through the professionals. The medical profession's 
attitudes toward these ideas and practices will be transmitted to the local professional 
circle through bodies like the British Medical Association (Hong Kong Branch), and 
also through training institutes local and abroad. 
In 1979, the British government commenced its privatization policies on the 
National Health Service (NHS). The first step was to encourage more provision of 
•amenity beds' and 'pay beds'. The former means more privacy by charging the patient 
a higher price; while for the latter, is to allow private patients and private 
practitioners to receive and perform treatments respectively in public NHS 
hospitals.42 
In 1982, the management structure of the NHS was trimmed.^^ Additionally, 
evaluative measures were imposed to systematically review effectiveness of NHS 
services on an annual basis. In the 1983 election, the Thatcher government returned 
to office with greater majority, thus strengthened its determination to privatize the 
NHS. An indepth review on the management of NHS was launched, an immediate 
result was the introduction of competitive tendering,4 This involved subcontracting 
ancillary services like cleaning and catering.^^ 
Other reform efforts initated included revisions in the NHS statistics collection 
system (from 1980-1985), and a white paper named Promoting Better Health 
published in 1987, which introduced competition in general practitioners' business. A 
larger scale reform came after the 1988/89 review of the NHS, which yielded the 
Working for Patients white paper. This document pointed to a revamp of method in 
allocating resources, yet no major change in funding responsibilities were effected.^^ 
The main theme was to separate the provider (cr funder), the producer (e.g. hospitals), 
and the purchaser (e.g. general practitioners), so as to achieve an managed, internal 
market within the NHS. 
Comparing the review of Hong Kong's hospital services in 1985 with the 
reforms in Britian in the early eighties, they have several things in common. First, 
where the NHS reform targeted at cutting wasteful operation and a redundant layer of 
bureaucracy; the Hong Kong system review also concerned with high wastage of 
manpower, and the removal of the mal-functioning regional offices of the Medical 
and Health Department. Second, the NHS saw the need to call in management 
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expertise; the local review also recommended to reform the management, 
government funded hospitals at that time were operating with sixteen different 
management structures and styles.^^ Lastly, as the NHS encouraged users to pay more 
for better hospital services, similar developmental trend was also recommended in 
the local review. It appears likely that local reforms had been stimulated by the 
British experience, followed the direction of managerial reforms and the Value for 
money' reforms. Another supporting piece of observation is that the reforms of H.K. 
bore only the features of the NHS reforms in the early eighties, and not those more 
recent developments, such as managed competition and the purchaser-producer split. 
This can be explained as the HA blueprint could not copy from ideas that have not 
even realized. The managed competition idea of NHS consolidated only after 1989, 
by then the HA was already on its way of establishment. 
Appraising the Effects of the Eleven Factors 
Having examined the eleven factors individually, this section concludes my 
assessment of their impacts. With this assessment, it is aimed to make amendments 
to Figure 1 (the amended framework is included in the last chapter of this thesis). 
Like other non-natural occurring events, policy making is an activity that 
involves the human subjectivity (e.g. in making decisions), this subjectivity like a 
black box comes between the circumstantial factors and the decision, making the 
establishment of a causal link difficult, if not totally impossible in most cases.^^ 
Similarly, in this study, il is not possible to pinpoint at the exact causation(s) of the 
policy decision. In lieu of arguing that a particular factor caused certain 
event/decision, I settle for a looser explanation of one factor showing influence 
and/or asociation with the policy decision. It is inevitable that the degree of strength 
of these influences are, a matter of whether sound and convincing judgment can be 
made. All in all, the author attempts to describe the effect of the eleven factors using 
figurative labels such as: strong, weak, dissipated, undetermined, direct, and indirect. 
From the analysis of the eleven factors, several observations are made: Firstly, 
strong association with the review of hospital services are exhibited among three 
factors, that is the 'dynamics between professionals and generalists', the 
'preoccupation with curative care', and the 'bureaucratic factor’. Compared with the 
rest of the factors, these three showed strong and direct influence upon the policy 
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actors, who in tum forged the policy. To further delineate, the professionals-
generalists dynamics had fortified the 'preoccupation with curative care'. Since 
doctors sustained remarkable influence in the policy directions, and it was their 
tradition to emphaize curative care, they thus helped to consolidate an obssession in 
curative medicine. 
Secondly, weak association are observed in the 'ideological factor’，the 'flscal 
factor’，'extemal influence' and the 'influence from NHS'. The influence of these three 
cannot be ignored lightly, since to various extent they had contributed to the policy 
ideas. Nonetheless, from the evidence at hand, there is no concrete support that they 
had been central to the privatization decision. The fiscal factor is a vivid example, as 
demonstrated earlier, there were aspects in the colonial's fiscal condition that support 
privatization, however, there were also aspects that made the pursue of privatization 
in social services unjustified. 
Thirdly, the cluster of 'contextual factors' such as demographic changes 
showed dissipated influence on the policy. These circumstantial factors were directly 
related to the area of health, yet they did not automatically imply a policy choice. 
They signalled crisis in the health system, but did not point exclusively to the 
adoption of a privatization plan. Hence, their effects were considered as dissipated. 
Fourth, for the 'political' and 'economic factor’，in spite of their undoubtable 
influence on privatization policies as a whole, they did not appear to have direct and 
clear direction of influence on the health reforms. Their exact effect on the adoption 
of HA plan can be said as undetermined. 
Lastly, the 'legacy of free medical services' is a peculiar factor. Its effect is 
direct and strong on the institutional design of the HA. Yet during the period when 
there were heated debates over whether to privatize or not, the legacy operated 
indirectly. That is, when the officials wrongly estimated the legacy's strength, they 
become biased to the desirability of the privatization plan, and eventually pushed 
forward an unpopular policy. The legacy itself did not affect the decision directly. 
After appraising the impact of individual factors on the privatization of 
medical care, the following section set out to reconstructs, in the light of these factors 
and circumstances, the story why government rushed into reviewing the hospital 
services and endorsed the HA project. 
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An Unlikely Decision - Reconstructing the Policy Making Storv 
The privatization of medical care seemed to be an unlikely decision in the mid-
1980s'. In the first place, why did government rush into this policy when the civil 
service stability was easy to upset? Since the dawn of transition period, the 
government's authority declined, the vested interests looked upon China for cues 
concerning their future. The staff unions were gaining bargaining power and they 
were fully aware of it.^ ^ While the Chief Secretary stressed the importance of staff 
stability in 1984, it made no sense that then all of a sudden the Health and Welfare 
Branch headed for the privatization policy. 
Secondly, the environment in 1984 is commonly diagnosed as 'turbulent'.^^ 
Scott maintained that in an such environment, governments tend to introduce macro-
regulations, this inclination makes comprehensive policy making or revamps of old 
systems more likely. However, in Hong Kong, the turbulence of 1984 was 
accompanied with the dismantling of government authority. The turbulence was 
caused by political factors well beyond the colonial government's control. This 
declining power tends to work against major policy reforms. Scott observed that the 
administration since 1984 actually adhered fast to incrementalism in policy making 
(plus some corporatist like strategies), the situation could be termed as 
incrementalism with diminishing authority. Viewed against this background, the 
government should not have pursued a revamp of the hospital system. The project 
apparently failed to placate any societal interests, and it did not help either to reduce 
turbulence or to create stability. 
Thirdly, the administration had no previous experience of privatizing labor 
intensive human services, then why did it pick out the entire hospital system in its 
first attempt. Is it not more reasonable to have some pilots first? Or to start with 
projects lesser in scale to test out the public reaction on privatization? Besides, the 
HA project seemed to be a one shot attempt, without a broader policy background or 
direction behinds it. There were no other privatization plans for human or social 
services since the HA. For example, the primary health authority was proposed but 
the government refrained from acting upon it. No thought was given on projects like 
setting up a welfare authority to replace the existing social welfare department and 
the subvented sector. The decision to privatize hospital services seemed careless and 
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haphazard, without broader, overarching policy objectives behind. 
For this unlikely decision, this paper offer two ways of explaining the policy 
making story. In my assessment, both explanations are likely to have happened, and 
they are not mutually exclusive: the first explanation is that the policy was made out 
of misinterpretation of the policy problem. Officials and the other prominent 
actors of the medical profession misinterpreted the problem situation by defining it as 
inefficiency in the secondary tier of care. This consensus was forged by their 
'preoccupation in curative medicine’. Examples of such mindset are numerous: 
"At present the major deficiency is in the provision of hospital beds" (Governor 
address). 
"As a result o f sheer population pressure...our first priority is to meet the pressing 
need by concentrating on providing for more beds in the general wards" (Director of 
Medical and health Services).^' 
In reality, the true problem lies in the underdevelopment of primary care, community 
and chronic care services. The primary care system cannot effectively perform the 
gate-keeping function; while the chronic and elderly patients are stuck in hospitals 
without alternative placements. The obsession in hospital care was endorsed and 
reinforced by the previous policy papers, by debates, and most of all, by the medical 
profession. As mentioned before, the generalist policy makers are not experts in 
formulating policy alternatives, leaving much room for the professional to maneuver 
for what it sees as essential. When the profession endorsed the importance ofhospital 
beds, the policy makers would incline to agree. 
Moreover, the financial incentives embedded in the privatization plan was 
exaggerated through the administrative misjudgment of the 'legacy of free medicine,. 
The Scott Report recommended that the future HA could make-even the initial 
launching cost in five years. Secondly, a recovery of three percent of bed cost could 
be achieved. For the Provisional Hospital Authority, it even proposed that a level of 
15-20 percent cost recovery will still be palatable for the users.^^ Planners anticipated 
that with the expansion of the middle class, that raising the charges would not create 
overwhelming discontents. Unfortunately, this assessment tumed out to be entirely 
wrong, legislators and the public was far more reluctant to relinquish a system that is 
virtually free. The government had made the decision out of an unrealistic definition 
of problem together with distorted information. 
Officials then were not well articulated in the ideas and forms of privatization. 
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Privatization and other forms of marketization strategies were used interchangeably. 
As established in chapter two, the administration only started to clarify and expand 
the concept since the mid-1980s. Without well defined ideas nor real life experience 
in privatizing human services, it was likely that poor judgments could have been 
made concerning the policy impacts and the level of social acceptance. 
The second explanation interprets the privatizing of medical care as a 
conservative policy. Though outwardly the HA project seemed to be a large scale, 
fundamental revamp of the hospital system, in could also be seen as a narrow scoped 
and conservative policy. Tbe administration refrained from, or discarded ideas of 
undertaking a comprehensive policy review. Here, the obession of curative care 
might have operated again, giving the wrong impression that the hospital reforms can 
take the place of an overall policy review. The administration might have expected 
the privatization plan to risk staff unrest, but still considered it more palatable than 
making long term and comprehensive planning. 
Here, the government is looked upon as either not good at long term planning 
in social services, or it is not having the determination to undertake long term 
planning, or both. Supporting arguments for this view can be found in Scott's works 
on the policy implementation in H.K. He identified three major types of policies -
namely, routine business of governmental departments, social policy (e.g. health, 
education), and politically/economically required policy (i.e. railways, bank 
takeovers).53 For the routine policies, the implementation are effective since 
government has a well developed bottom heavy structure, meaning that the line 
functions are well geared to accomplish such duties. On the other hand, when the 
economic or the political situation demands, the administration would demonstrate 
strong will to make responses, even when it mean to undercut other policies. 
However, in social policies, the norm is to make plans less ambitious, and the 
necessary political will are often missing. 
Derek Gould, an insider from the government secretariat also confirmed such 
observation. He maintained that social policy making is visibly more incremental 
than the government's physical and economic policy. The reason for this appears to 
be that, 
"despite twenty years' experience. Government still feels inexperienced and less 
confident formulating 'personal’ policies which interference with Chinese cultural 
values than more remote 'infrastructural' ones where it has demonstrated its past 
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success over a loner period of time".^^ 
The lacking of confidence in social policy making was reflected in the abundant use 
of consultation papers and green papers when a new change has to be introduced. 
This practice is far less common in the physical services and the infrastructure 
projects. 
Besides, Scott observed an additional barrier towards long term social planning, 
that is the bottom heavy government bureaucracy.^^ It was the colonial government's 
tradition to place much emphasis in fortifying the line function, partly because an 
effective and sufficiently large number of line officials will facilitate the 
administration to handle crisis situations, which has been common in the colony's 
history. The top level structure is relatively lean, meaning that the policy makers are 
persistently overworked, with little time to review policy outputs, let alone planning 
for fundamental changes. 
The top level officials in the mid-1980s were predominantly non-Chinese, this 
had made the policy branches even more cautious and hesitating in social planning. 
Social planning is not just to make the right or most rational decision, as in 
infrastructure development, it also demands political correctness, this is more and 
more the case in the realm of local sociai policy development. Planners have to 
compromise technical rationality to gain acceptability.^^ As E. Wong commented: 
"it is no longer sufficient for Government to devise solutions that are 'technically' 
correct. They must also be 'politically' correct by having been arrived at through a 
democratic process"? 
Non-Chinese policy drafters high up in the government bureaucracy are clearly at an 
disadvantage position to appreciate what the majority of the community perceived 
and valued. That is perhaps why the government was repeatedly fired at as not having 
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the political will to reform the health system. 
Lacking the political will and favorable institutional make up to undertake 
holistic planning in health care, the administration in 1984 was easily prompted by 
the circumstantial factors, and settled at a more conservative policy. The scope of 
review was narrowed down sharply until it concerned only with curative hospital 
care. 
Summary 
Summing up, this chapter set out to account firstly how the privatization policy 
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was forged. Eleven factors are considered, so as to explain the formation of the 
policy and pertaining decisions. To establish the relations between the factors and the 
policy decision are what the discussion aimed at, in lieu of looking for the causal 
relationships. It is found that the dynamics between professionals and generalists, an 
obsession with curative care, and the bureaucratic factor showed strongest 
association to the policy decisions. On the other hand, most other domestic factors 
(e.g. political, economic) only exhibited weak relations to the privatization of 
medical care, though these factors are responsible for forging the privatization 
policies and ideas at a larger context. For the external factors, it is confirmed that the 
HA policy to certain extent modeled the NHS reforms in early 1980s. 
Apart from tracking down the direction and strength of influence of these 
factors，this research also set out to reconstruct the story of policy formation back in 
the mid-1980s, given the influence of the factors. Two possible explanations are 
offered, they are intertwined and probably happened side by side. The policy making 
story could has been one of misinterpretation of policy problems by the 
administration. It is also a case of social policy making which is conservative by 
nature, but disguised as a radical endeavor. 
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The forgoing chapter discussed the emergence of the policy, this chapter 
demonstrates that the HA project is an incomplete case of privatization. By 
"incompleteness" of the HA, it is refering to: 
The policy was designed in such a way that it tackled the operational issues of 
inaugurating the HA, while some political issues,' along with issues pertinent to the 
structure of the health system were left 0ut.2 
The Hospital Authority in the end can only be qualified as a management reform, 
tackling the day-to-day operation problems within publicly funded hospitals. This is 
problematic because the community did not expect merely a management reform. 
Since the HA project immediately succeeded the 1974 white paper on medical and 
health services, there was legitimate expectation in the community that the HA 
reform should be a comprehensive one, fully addressing problems of the health 
system. 
This chapter account for two major areas of incompleteness. The first area is 
reflected through the institutional design of the HA. For the second area of 
incompleteness, the focus is on the cost recovery and the health financing disputes. 
The incompleteness of the privatization policy is reflected in the institutional 
design of the HA. This design left unattended certain issues that are pertinent to the 
structure of the health system. Discussion is the first half of this chapter focuses on 
the institutional changes brought by the Hospital Authority. Besides, a comparison 
with the U.K. will be made to highlight the uniqueness ofHong Kong. The aim of the 
discussion is to shed light on the implications of this institutional arrangement, and 
how it reflected the incompleteness of the policy. 
Institutional Desi2r1 of the Health System before 1985 
Since the white paper in 1964 was released, the government's role as the 
primary funder has been taken for granted. In Kolderie's term, the government is both 
the provider and producer of medical services. This structure underwent very little 
changes in the white paper in 1974. In this set up, good policy implementation is 
equated with rational use of resources. The strategy adopted for such rationalization 
was regionalization.3 
On the eve of the Coopers and Lybrand W.D. Scott Company being 
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commissioned to perform the review, the institutional set up of Hong Kong's medical 
care system can be described as follow: the government was the primary funder, 
while the producers were essentially public. The medical services were apparently 
free at the point of consumption, with access by all. The institutional arrangement of 
the hospital services in 1985 was a simple hierarchical structure. The public hospitals 
were directly and centrally controlled by the Medical and Health Department. For the 
subvented sector, it was a significant co-producer of hospital services, accounted for 
over 39 percent of the territory's hospital beds in 1985. The subvented sector received 
most of the recurrent expenses from the public purse, while daily management relied 
on the subvented organizations. On staffing issues and territory wide policy 
development, there were consultative bodies (e.g. Medical Development Advisory 
Committee) to advise the government. Throughout the decades, growth ofthe private 
sector is not deliberately encouraged, stimulated, or made use of. 
The Consultants' Proposal 
The consultants claimed to suggest an institutional structure^ that would fulfill 
the objectives of: a) raising the occupancy level of the subvented hospitals, b) to 
reduce overcrowding and c) to provide better working environment so that the staff 
wastage can be reducd, while service delivery can be more efficient.^ 
What the consultants envisaged was a hospital management structure which is 
beyond the boundary of the government. It aimed at devolution of responsibilities, so 
that individual hospitals will be responsible for their own management. The reason 
suggested for this arrangement was that the centralized control of the Medical and 
Health Department had been ineffective. The proposed independent authority 
separates and yet accountable to the government, it has a board which is appointed by 
the government, and the government continues to assume the role as the ultimate 
funder.^ Under the authority board are three branches, the first is the Clinical 
Services Development branch which focuses on service development planning. The 
second being Regional Management, the third is Corporate Services such as finance, 
administration, procurement and supply, personnel, etc/ Though it lies outside the 
government boundary, the authority has two links with the administration, namely the 
'policy and planning linkage' that connected to the policy branch; and the 'health 
linkage', that is a coordination relation at the service implementation level with the 
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Department of Health, 
Another important feature was closing up the gaps between the subvented and 
the public sector. The greatest implication here is the employment conditions of staff. 
The consultants suggested that the Authority has to be independent in this respect. 
Hence a separated Staff Advisory Commission was called for, meaning that the 
traditional Commission on Civil Services Salaries and Conditions of Services will no 
longer make recommendations on the employment conditions the ofhospital staff.^ 
The consultants claimed that the proposal was based on the principle that 
interests of the stakeholders needed to be balanced. The stakeholder groups were 
respectively the central government, the subvented organizations, the staff and the 
community.'^ The central government's interest lies in cost control and whether the 
money is properly spent. The subvented organizations expected improved financial 
situation and at the same time ready to flght off any cuts in autonomy or ownership of 
properties. The staff groups demand forjob security and undiscriminating treatments. 
Lastly, the community would only accept improved services at a nominal price. In the 
midst of these not totally reconcilable interests, the authority's board was the main set 
up to coordinate the stakeholders. However, this arrangement was never actualized. 
Figure 6 depicted the compositions of the boards of the PHA and the HA upon their 
constituting. Among the four (bold typed) stakeholders, the staff and the community 
were obviously at an disadvantage position, limited seats were opened to them. But 
for the academics and elite from the business sector, they enjoyed more say in these 
boards. The community and staff representatives had only one seat each in the HA 
board.ii It was occupied by Ms. Y.S. Lo, who was a district board member, and Dr. 
1) 
C.H. Leong. While disproportionately seven seats were granted for the academics, 
and many to the business sector. 
Affiliation / Status Number Affiliation/Status Number 
PHA HA “ PHA \ HA~ 
Official 6 2 Legco Member 6 4 
Subvented Sector 3 3 Academic 3 7 
Staff — 1 1 ~ U n i o n i s t 1 — 1 
Community Representative 0 1 Professional Body (e.g. HKMA) 1 0 
MDAC Member 1 0 ~ PHA / HA Member 1 3 
Others (e.g. business elite) 3 6 
Figure 6. Composition of Boards of PHA and HA upon establishment'^ 
Another significant feature of the consultants' report was the money incentive 
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it offered the policy makers. In additional to the various ways of saving and cost 
recovery measures, it gave the promise that: 
"Over a five year period, it is anticipated that all that the initial costs o f the changes 
would be recovered, and thereafter the Authority would be in a much improved 
financial position compared with today"." 
This sounded attractive initially, however, as demonstrated before, all these financial 
speculations had under-estimated the powerful legacy of free medical care. The 
consultants upheld the idea that increase in fund would only increase demand, thence, 
they started with the premise ofkeeping the current level of funding as far as possible, 
and then considered alternatives of financing.'^ Their conclusion was that the only 
viable paths were to take strong action to reduce the cost of operation, which would 
be achieved through the improved managerial control of the HA. Secondly, to set up 
a system of cost recovery to increase revenue. 
Cost recovery aimed at the collection of revenue not from taxation (direct or 
indirect), but from charging the users. Calculation of the standard bed charge should 
be changed from the notional food costs to a broader base. The suggestion is 3 
percent of the bed costs. Besides, a charge for attending the Accident and Emergency 
Department was proposed, together with the admission charge, the charge to cover 
major procedures such as the C.A.T. Examinations, operation theatre use, and the 
l ike.i6 
There was also the Class-B beds proposal. This service seeks not the standard 
of the first or second class wards, nor any significant differentiation in the medical 
treatment from that available in third class wards. It accept patients not on their 
specific type of ailment or medical condition,^^ but on the patients' willingness to pay 
more for better service. Consultants suggested that Class-B beds would provide: 
i) A smaller ward and more room for patient; 
ii) freedom from overcrowding and campbeds; 
iii) more comfortable bed; and 
1 8 
iv) choice of food, flexible visiting arrangement, improvement in decor. 
All the above charges and cost recovery measures had an additional purpose of re-
directing demands to the private sector. It was estimated that some 200,000 
households will be willing to make use of the Class-B beds.^^ Besides, as the public 
services are charging at a higher rate, some of the patients would have more incentive 
to seek private treatment, thus the over-utilization problem in the public hospitals 
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would be alleviated. The consultants admitted that these cost recovery arrangement 
were essentially market interventions. Though in general it has been the government's 
policy not to interfere with the market, it was argued that under certain circumstances 
intervention is inevitable (the example of raising tunnel toll to redirect traffic was 
quoted as supporting evidence).^^ 
The cost recovery measures would direct patients away from the public sector, 
yet the ultimate aim of them was to achieve managed competition between the 
sectors, which did not exist in the past. It was anticipated that the HA reform package 
would increase the efficiency and the service quality as well. Therefore, in a long run, 
the public hospitals will be competing with the private sector, providing incentive for 
the latter to improve their services. The consultants upheld the aspiration of future 
collaboration with the private sector. This was reflected in their proposal of setting 
up mechanism so that public hospital doctors could receive private patients, while 
private practitioners could make use of public hospital facilities. With some limited 
rights of private practice, public hospital doctors could enjoy better remuneration, 
thus reducing their incentive to opt out of the public sector. On the other hand, 
private practitioners entering the public sector may provide some relief to the 
<y 1 
manpower shortage problem (depending on the design of the mechanism). The 
future as envisaged by the consultants would be a proper mix between the public and 
the private, both making use of each other's strength and facilities to enhance the 
services. And the system would more evenly distributed the rewards among health 
personnel. 
The Provisional Hospital Authority's Back-slided Proposal 
Comparing the Scott Report and the Provisional Hospital Authority Report, the 
latter focused on detailing the structure of the HA, which was more of the operational 
level. This was well justified as the terms of reference of the PHA demanded it to do 
so. Nevertheless, when exclusive emphasis was placed on issues like bringing 
together the public and the subvented hospitals, on managing teaching hospitals 
together with the universities, and on building the HA's corporate infrastructure, the 
PHA was unable to address broader issues of the hospital system. For example, the 
consultants' original blueprint of bringing into collaboration the public and the 
private sectors was not tackled, the different tiers of medical and health care were not 
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provided with a framework for integration. And the HA design tumed out to forge a 
non-competitive environment which differs from that proposed by the consultants. In 
this sense, the institutional design put forwarded by the PHA was a regressed, back-
slided proposal. The potentially managed, competitive market was not realized, while 
the characteristic of the old institutional arrangement was preserved, which the two 
sectors apparently never came into contact. 
Following the blueprint of the Scott Report, the PHA designed the structure of 
the HA. The Authority is separated from the government, having its own Staff 
Advisory Committee and other bodies for consultative purpose. Internally, the top 
management is a tripartite structure with three principal officers: the Director of 
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Operation, the Chief Development Officer and the Secretary General. Side by side 
with the top management is a committee system which is organized on functional 
basis. Such as service development, management, personnel, community relation, 
teaching hospitals and financial matters?^ The committees are delegated with power 
to perform duties and make decisions according to their terms ofreference. 
The executive committee is the chief decision making body of the entire HA.^^ 
For the rules governing appointment of individuals to this committee, the PHA 
suggested that: "apart from official members and senior staff of the Authority, 
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membership should not be prescribed in detail in the legislation" (emphasis added). 
The reason is to allow maximum flexibility for the administration, and to ensure that 
legitimate interests of all concerned are taken into account in the selection and 
appointment process. The end product as mentioned before, the composition of the 
HA membership upon establishment was disproportionately allocated (see Figure 6). 
This composition was in accordance with the PHA's conviction that 
"one of the main reason for the success of large multi-national organizations in the 
developed countries has been the assembling of teams of top experts in the various 
fields related to the particular business"? 
Professional expertise was given priority to popular participation, the health industry 
was better under the dominion of specialists, than the lay persons. 
A major difference between the Scott Report and the PHA Report was on cost 
recovery measures. Where the consultants were optimistic about the financing of the 
HA, the PHA on the contrary was obviously less optimistic and more uncertain. This 
was probably due to the PHA affected by the public opinions since the release of the 
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Scott Report. Except for the medical profession，the general sentiment of the public 
was against privatization and the increase in service charges?^ On the one hand, the 
PHA supported the introduction of Class B beds, and gave evidence supporting the 
general increase of daily bed c h a r g e ? On the other hand, it assumed a 'wait and see’ 
attitude in charging the Accident and Emergency services, and other service items.^^ 
The institutional design proposed by the PHA was eventually endorsed by the 
Executive and Legislative Councils, and put into practice since 1990. Comparing the 
earlier status of the system with the proposal of the PHA, the latter's design of the 
HA design resembled the old system in a sense that no new relation with the private 
sector was forged. The consultants vision of a collaborating with the private sector 
was shelved. It might not totally be the decision of the PHA to set aside this issue, in 
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fact, the health personnel and the general public of Hong Kong were conservative 
in allowing public hospital doctors to have private practice, or to have private 
practitioners using public facilities. The blurring of public-private boundary was not 
welcomed. The HA operates in an environment where contact or carefully regulated 
competition with the private hospitals are absented. 
Another feature of this institutional design is that, the system did not get in 
touch with other tiers of care, such as the primary care and the tertiary care. Though 
we can expect certain linkage between the HA and the Department of Health, but this 
relation provided no framework to integrate different tiers of care, without careful 
deliberation and design, this linkage can be nothing more than just a channel of 
communication. 
Comparison with the United Kingdom 
Having examined the institutional set up of Hong Kong's privatized medical 
care, this section makes comparison with the National Health Service in the U.K. so 
as to appreciate the special features of the HA. 
The NHS was instituted in 1948, but its roots could be traced to 1942, when a 
report by Sir William Beveridge (report named Social Insurance and Allied Services) 
was published, the report provoked debates which shaped the vision of the future 
NHS. In 1944, a white paper on National Health Services was published, making 
health services a universal r ight , the government was ready to assume most of the 
responsibilities to keep the people healthy. A simplified description of the system is 
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that, the Secretary of State for Social Security is accountable to Parliament for the 
NHS's operation. To assist him accomplishing this accountability, he "relies on the 
Department of Health and Social Security for policy advice and on the fourteen 
Regional Health Authorities and 190 Districts Health Authorities for the strategic 
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planning and operational management of the service". 
Entering the 1980s, the NHS was shaped by the marketization movement and 
the demand of increasing organizational autonomy. This was obviously a result ofthe 
influence from the privatization policy at large. The privatization trend could quickly 
affected NHS not only because of the Conservative Party won two consecutive 
elections in 1979 and 1983, but also because of privatization had been a bipartisan 
project, pursued by both parties.^^ Abromeit maintained that "the question of 
nationalisation and denationalisation in Britain was a political football only on the 
level of programme and ideologies, but hardly in practical politics".^^ 
The sub-sections below make comparisons between the institutional changes of 
the NHS and the case of Hong Kong, with a time frame focuses at the tum of the last 
decade. 
The Purchaser-producer Split and Managed Competition 
A document titled Working for Patients was released in 1989, since then the 
NHS provider, producers^^ and purchasers^^ was connected in contractual 
relationships. Some originally public hospitals became self-managing 'trusts', having 
freedom to hire and fire, to accumulate surplus, and to manage themselves. These 
institutions and other private hospitals will compete for service contracts of the 
government. Secondly, the NHS also makes contracts with the GPs along with 
private health organization, after receiving a lumpsum^^ from the NHS, they stand for 
the users to buy service from the hospitals, nursing homes, etc. They can minimize 
the cost by keeping the patients as healthy as possible, and also by shopping for the 
most cost-effective service. In this way the primary care system acts as a diligent 
gatekeeper for the secondary tier of care, keeping patients away from the hospitals as 
far as possible. The purchaser-producer split induced competition among producers, 
however, the competition has more constraints than that in a free market. The 
government required the competitors to operate according to rules and funding 
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regulations prescribed by the govemment.^^ For the case of Hong Kong, competition 
and health care service contracts are not elements of the system design, both before 
and after the HA reform. The government is provider while the HA hospitals as 
producers, however, the provider is no user in itself, nor does it stands for the users to 
make decisions. In this way, the consumer's choice remains less noticeable, while the 
hospital doctors remain influential in prescribing treatments and even health needs. 
The provider-producer split in Hong Kong does not create competition as in a 
purchaser-producer split, it only allows more financial and managerial autonomy on 
the producer's side. 
Bringing Together Different Tiers of Care 
Compared with Hong Kong, the reformed NHS has greater potential to get 
different tiers of care integrated. In fact the institutional design makes the different 
tiers interwoven together, not by traditional linkage of referral systems, 
communication channels, nor collaborated efforts of the front-line health workers. 
The system is run by instituting incentive structures, so that the producers, no matter 
private or public (e.g. hospitals, infirmaries), will respond to market demands, 
compete to produce the required service. While the purchasers (usually GPs)，will do 
their best to keep patients healthy, and thus suppress the demand for hospital care to 
the minimal. As mentioned before, by keeping patients healthy, the practitioners can 
make more monetary retums. 
On the contrary, the HA has no clear gatekeeping mechanism, admission relies 
on the assessment of the Accident and Emergency Department and the public clinics. 
Some observed that, patients who wanted to jump queue for admission would abuse 
the use of the Accident and Emergency Department.^^ For the public clinics, they 
have only around 20 percent of the total market share,^^ while for the private 
practitioners, though thay are responsible for most of the primary medical care 
produced, they have no particular motivation to keep patients out of the hospitals. 
Different tiers of care works on their own, without the incentive to work closely 
together, or to provide a continuous service structure. 
Direct and Indirect Fund Flows 
The 1989 reform altered the traditional funding system. In the past, the NHS 
funds was channeled through District Health Authority to the hospital. Another path 
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was through the Family Practitioner Committees (a type of government body) to the 
general practitioners (GPs). The hospitals and the GPs then served the users at 
apparently no charge. The new system makes the funding flow indirect, GPs as 
fUndholders became one of the controllers, dictated to which hospitals or nursing 
homes that the originally public money should flow. The fundholders are purchasers 
as well, and thus it can be say that the fundholders perform some traditional function 
of a provider, that is to determine where should the resource goes. 
Whereas in Hong Kong, the funding of the HA is similar to the pre-1989 NHS, 
the independent body receives direct funds from the Treasury after its annual budget 
was endorsed at the financial committee of the Legislative Council. The flow of fund 
is direct. In this simplistic design of money flow, the government has no way to 
suppress or redirect demands away from the public sector. 
Public-private Mix 
The U.K. is less conservative than Hong Kong in instituting a public-private 
mixed structure. Blurring of boundary between private and public sector is more 
readily accepted in the U.K. than in H.K. Since 1979, the NHS public doctors are 
allowed to take private practice to a certain extent without having to forfeiting NHS 
privileges.4i In Hong Kong, such practice is limited to a small number senior faculty 
members of the teaching hospitals. 
Other than the private practice of public doctors, mixing of the two sector 
means something more in the U.K. For example, it can take the form of co-planning 
between authorities and the private sector, to close down public big hospital and use 
the budget to build and fund a small private one, it can also mean commercial 
involvement in the running of parts of some hospitals.^^ In Hong Kong, the HA 
contracted out items like laundry, cleaning, carparks, and catering private 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s , 4 3 while collaborating with private health producers on planning is no 
more than rhetoric. The HA once indicated interest to involve private hospitals in 
better organizing of primary medical care,^^ yet from my interviews with private 
hospitals' management, the HA has initiated contacts with them no more than daily 
routine like procedures of patient transfers. 
To sum up, in comparison with the NHS after 1989, the local HA system is 
characterized by its attempt to enhance autonomy in hospitals but without 
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competitive element. There is also no a split between purchaser and producer to 
facilitate macro efficiency. The fund flow of the H.K. system remained direct. Lastly, 
the private sector and other tiers of care are not deliberately brought together with the 
public hospital system. 
The foregoing sub-sections revealed the institutional characteristics of the HA, 
moving on, the discussion will tease out why this institutional design is coined as 
incomplete. 
Neglected Issues Pertinent to the Structure of the Health Svstem 
The neglected issues involve the integration of service structures internal to the 
health system, the boundary issue of the public and private sector, the traditions of 
the medical profession, and the normative issues of health services. Normative issues 
are common to human and protective services. For example, in the privatization of 
prisons and law courts, the debate is often not so much about efficiency and 
competition, but on value issues such as 'should corrective/disciplinary services 
retain a public status’，'would private tribunals trade verdicts', and the like. The 
privatization ofhuman, caring, or protective service inevitably leads to the rethinking 
of how certain societal functions be discharged, should they remain public, or should 
the market takes over? The decision is bound to be influenced by tradition, as well as 
how much changes the community can tolerate. 
The first structural issues left unattended by the HA policy is the integration 
between different tiers of care. There is close connection between primary care, 
secondary hospital care and tertiary convalescence/rehabilitative care，，A proper 
integration between them is needed so that effective gatekeeping to the secondary 
care can be achieved, while the chronic patients can be promptly transfered to the 
tertiary setting, without imposing unnecessarily strains on hospital beds. 
The policy makers were preoccupied with the myth of curative care, the HA 
was designed without a clear scheme to integrate with other tiers of care. As once 
recommended by the consultants, the authority will be in need of a strengthened 
medical policy function within the Health and Welfare Branch,^^ so that it can relate 
with the Department of Health, and works towards fulfillment of the overall policy. 
Nonetheless, the administration did not respond to this recommendation.^^ Without 
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an overarching health policy, the HA may develop according to its own parochial 
interest, breaking away further from other tiers of care. Even if the HA under strong 
leadership does pursue along the path of integration, it does not mean that other 
health producers can be mobilized equally well, as when the government intervenes 
through a solid policy. For example, without government intervention, how would 
the territory's private GPs play an active role in gatekeeping, as in the NHS system? 
A second issue neglected by the government is the integration of the private 
and public sector. This is not simply about expanding or contracting the private 
market, but about what are the respective roles of the two sectors.^^ For example, 
primary medical consultation in H.K. is done largely in the private sector, but the 
system have no effective arrangement to engage the private general practitioners into 
suppressing demand of hospital care for the community. Each sector does its own 
thing, this situation is detrimental to the macro efficiency. Another example of poor 
integration between the sectors is the under utilization of hospital equipment - the 
private hospitals in the past owned expensive, advance medical equipment, but due to 
a limited number of patients, the machines were under utilized. On the other hand, a 
large number of patients in the public hospitals had no access to these vital services. 
In short, integration of the two sectors is not talking about market shares, but how to 
designate proper roles to each sector, to enhance macro efficiency, as well as optimal 
use of resource. 
In the Scott Report, the consultants envisaged a mix of the two sectors, where 
equipment, expertise and manpower can flow across the boundary ofthe two. This in 
the end allows doctors from the two sectors to have compatible income. Besides, 
service producers from both sides will compete and perform better. However, to 
achieve this mix is not without obstacles. As we know that the Hong Kong 
community holds rather conservative views toward the proper role of the public and 
the private doctors. Public doctors should remain purely public, they should not trade 
their professional service for money; while private practitioners should be low profile 
in doing business. The medical profession is also sensitive towards the full use of 
market logic in the field of medicine. Even the managements of private hospitals 
have much reservation in marketing their services as other consumer products. 
Besides, the Hong Kong Medical Council has a tradition of being strict and 
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conservative on doctors engaging in advertising. In face of these tradition and taboos, 
the chance for the two sectors to come together naturally is slim. Under these 
circumstances government intervention is necessary. However, the administration 
neglected this issue of finding the proper turf and roles for the two sectors. The 
policy failed to spell out any future scenario of integrating the two. 
A spokesman of the Hong Kong Medical Association mentioned in 1985 that 
the success of privatization depends on the element of autonomy.^^ This reflected the 
conception of privatization at that time. Currently，more scholars^^ tend to agree that 
key to success of privatization is competition. A privatized service or department 
without competing rivals will not has its efficiency enhanced very much. The HA is a 
structure of this type, its design reflected that the policy makers who adopted it might 
have believed in autonomy breeds efficiency. For the HA, improvement in efficiency 
and service quality relies heavily on the initiatives offered by its purposefully shaped 
corporate culture, and its autonomous allocation of funds. The institutional 
arrangement offered no competition between service producers, thus, the 
improvement of service is not led by a managed competitive environment, but relies 
very much on the autonomy and the HA's corporate culture, or in the end it means 
relying on the HA's own initiatives. 
Without proper public-private mix, plus the effect of an ambiguous scheme of 
cost recovery for the HA, the implication on the private producers has become 
significant. As some legislators foresaw before the HA was set up, there will be 
distorted competition, threatening the private producers.^^ This speculation tumed 
out to be true, currently some private hospitals are at the brink of being squeezed out 
of the market. Dictated by the low charge policy of public medical care, and at the 
same time quality of hospital service could not be kept stagnated at the 1985 scenario, 
what the HA could do was to exploit public funds to improve service, while charging 
at a disproportionately low price. The result is driving private producers out of the 
market.52 On the other hand, the original purpose of re-directing demand to the 
private sector was sabotaged. 
Evidence show that the occupancy rates of the private hospitals plunged from 
the average of 80 percent in the 1980s, to around 40-60 percent in the 1990s.^ ^ The 
caveat is that 'occupancy rate’ is not a totally satisfactory indicator^^ of how well a 
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private hospital is doing，however, a drastic drop of twenty to forty percent can still 
reflect the shrinking market share of private producers. 
The managements of private hospitals are now desperate looking for new ways 
to boost up their business. Some of them for the first time employ marketing 
company to design promotion strategies.^^ Others resort to introduction of serivce 
packages (e.g. child birth service package), streamlining administration, frozening 
price or price cut for some medical examinations, and fund raising. Besides, 
advanced medical technology is still regarded by some private producers as the 
cutting edge of their business . However, I speculate that private hospitals are going 
to lose this race of technology. The reason is that HA is freed from the procurement 
constraints of traditional government departments, it now enjoys a high degree of 
financial autonomy. Thus, the HA hospitals are catching up fast in acquiring new 
medical equipment. In a long run, their private counterparts will lose the competition 
due to insufficient funds. 
Another coping strategy of the private producers is to act collectively. They 
started working toward the set up of a federation of private hospitals since September 
1995.57 The prospective federation will serve functions like collective procurement (a 
way to cut cost), collaboration with the HA, negotiation of price setting to avoid cut 
throat competition, etc. One prominent function of the federation as foresee by the 
insiders is to press the government for an environment of fair competition. 
The government in the past has little intervention, nor motivation to stimulate 
growth of private hospitals/^ the issue is simply neglected. Currently, in face of the 
private producers being squeezed out of market, the government has no other choice 
but to rethink the balance of the private and public sector. As a spokesman of the the 
Health and Welfare Branch mentioned in 1995: "The government is [now] reviewing 
the respective roles played by the private and public sectors in the context of 
healthcare reform and overall healthcare financing".^^ 
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In the second half of this chapter, the discussion start by shifting the focus to 
the political issues of privatization. Among the several political issues that arose as a 
result of privatization, the cost recovery and health financing disputes are singled out 
to demonstrate the incompleteness of the policy. Cost recovery means to recover the 
cost of producing hospital services, here it refers mainly to charging the service users. 
For health financing, it refers to finding the fund sources for the health system, and 
also the technical issues of how the fund should flow within the system. All in all, 
health financing is about the of appropriating certain segment of the population, and 
to channeling the asset for the improvement of health for all. 
In one conclusive statement, I contends that the HA project is incomplete in a 
sense that its institution was built but with no cost recovery level set, nor a 
corresponding financing policy for the health system. 
The following sub-sections firstly outline the political issues arose during 
policy initiation. Second, the discussion moves on demonstrating the incompleteness 
of the policy, respectively in the area of cost recovery and health financing. Lastly, 
since the disputes has become confounding, with many different policy models, I 
therefore attempt to classify various health financing models systematically under an 
unified framework, so as to achieve better clarity and orientation. 
Political Issues of Privatization 
The privatization policy stimulated re-alignment of interests, opened up new 
possibilities for resource allocation and appropriation. In this process, the interest of 
two parties are distinctly at stake. The first is the community, meaning the users of 
medical services; while the second party is made up by the staff who work in the 
government or subvented hospitals. Severe opposition and the heaviest criticism of 
the HA proposal came from this two groups.&�It is widely accepted that the most 
prominent obstacles during the policy initiation were the staff issue^' and the cost 
recovery disputes. To recapitulate the Scott Report, there were four stakeholders 
emerged in the policy process, namely the government, the subvented sector, the staff 
and the community. The latter two stakeholders were obviously in an disadvantaged 
position in affecting the p o l i c y ? 
The community means the service users or would be users of the health system. 
The interest of this stakeholder lay with the legacy of free medical service. After 
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receiving cut price or free services for decades, any government intervention 
upsetting the existing pricing structure could expect resistance. The community was 
concerned about the concept of "user charge as a mean of cost recovery"? it was 
perceived as a threat to the users' access to service in the a long run.^^ 
The impact of the community's response on the project has been enormous. 
The HA reform was implemented by parts - the institution, the management structure 
and the corporate culture were set up, but the corresponding reforms in cost recovery 
and cost containment^'' could not be launched simultaneously. This issue dragged on 
for years from 1990 to 1996. The result is that the HA reform became a hospital 
management reform with no clear direction in how to pool and channel resource; nor 
in how to prioritize health needs with the finite resource available. 
Incompleteness Manifested in the Cost Recovery of the Hospital Authority 
The main point here is, though a funding mechanism was set up by statute to 
govem the HA, it is still incomplete because the cost recovering level and the related 
action plans are not available. 
Basically, the financial activities of HA is govemed by the Hospital Authority 
Ordinance (Cap. 113), and the Memorandum of Administrative Arrangements. Apart 
from the annual subvention, the statute allowed the Authority to receive extra 
funding f rom the government in case o f special need arises，Besides, the income o f 
the HA may also come from donation, gifts, rents, investment retums^^ and 
interests.68 The HA is enabled with the financial autonomy to borrow money from the 
government by w a y o f overdraft. 
Underlying the annually appropriated subvention is a five year forecast of 
expenditure on the hospital services. A five-year spending plan was made at the 
inauguration of the HA. it rolled forward each year with adjustments made. 
According to an internal document of the government secretariat^^, adjustment of 
subvention level is affected by several factors: i) inflation, ii) response to demand for 
services, and iii) recurrent consequences of capital projects. The HA is being advised 
in around July each year for the adjustments/^ In the negotiation of the annual 
subvention, the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for Health and Welfare play 
significant roles. The former was empowered to give directions to the Authority on 
the overall growth of its expenditure. The aim is to uphold the principle that the 
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growth in public sector expenditure is planned at a rate which approximates to the 
growth in the GDP7' After a particular ceiling price is set, the Secretary for Health 
and Welfare is supposed to gatekeep the expansion of services. He/she may 
discourage, for example, some pursuits of advanced technology, if he/she believed 
that the treatment is only additional to what is essential. This is in fact a kind of 
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rationing of health services without the notice of the public. 
The HA is not required to submit its budget for approval. It is obliged only to 
prepare annually a consolidated statement of the accounts of the itself and of the 
hospitals. Nonetheless, the Authority's economy and efficiency is under surveillance 
of the Director of Audit7^ An example of the Director of Audit exercising his/her 
authority was the investigation of housing benefits of the HA staff remuneration 
package in late 1995. The investigation was followed by much repercussions of the 
future employment temis of the HA staff. 
Though the statute gave guidance on the financial transactions of the HA's 
daily operation, it was silent on the issue of cost recovery level and strategies. From 
the documents I reviewed, it is discovered that in designing the funding mechanism 
of the HA, the government's main consideration was that: "if subvention were abated 
to take account of the Authority's projected income, there would be obviously little 
incentive for the Authority to raise income...[Yet] it does not seem reasonable that 
the Government should entirely ignore the revenue raised".^^ Striking a balance 
between the two, the policy planners finally settled at the broad guidelines that the 
Authority may retain 50 percent of any real increase in fees and charges. Secondly, 
savings up to 5 percent of the budget expenditure are allowed7^ 
Up to this point, there is no document nor any single policy statement that 
governs the exact level of cost recovery. Section 14 of the Hospital Authority 
Ordinance indicates that the ultimate authority to determine hospital fees lies with 
the office of the Secretary for Health and Welfare. However, evidence showed that 
the policy branch has no clear directives in revising the old charging scheme since 
the set up of the HA. It is therefore understandable that since it started to operate, the 
HA had several attempts to introduce new fees (yet without success). For example, in 
1995 it implemented itemized charging for a short while and then the policy was 
banned due to public outcry. About six months later, the Authority internally bid its 
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hospitals to resume itemized charging, again met with failure/^ Such gestures 
indicated that the HA yeams to recover a larger portion its operational cost, yet 
without a clear mandate from the policy branch, it attempted to conceal its actions of 
collecting additional fees. 
Incompleteness Manifested in the Health Financing Disputes 
The cost recovery issue led to a broader and more fundamental issue ofhow to 
finance the entire health system of Hong Kong. The following will discuss the 
incompleteness of the reform by looking into the emergence and the government 
response to the health financing disputes. 
It should be pointed out that funding the HA and financing the medical and 
health policy as a whole are two different issues. The debate on recovering cost from 
the users wasjust the tip of the iceberg. Underlying is the more basic problem that in 
a long run, the present system of financing through general taxation is unable to meet 
with the demands. The system needs on the one hand to be less wasteful, and on the 
other hand to increase the total amount of usable fund. Without such policy 
guidelines, the HA project, which succeeded the 1974 white paper as a major reform 
effort, could only be diagnosed as incomplete. 
Participants in the Disputes 
Several clusters of participants presented in this debate of health financing. On 
one side is the administration, which attempted to smooth out the discontents so that 
the privatization policy could fully implement. At the other end is the bearers of 
community interest, such as an array of social groupings, policy concem groups, etc. 
Their yeaming has been simple and straight forward, that is to maintain the status 
quo, sticking fast to the legacy of free medical services. The common belief is that 
the government has always been devoting insufficient fund to the system. In between 
the two poles we found professionals, legislators and political parties. Their positions 
and convictions has been unclear. To be more precise, the policy alternatives they 
suggested were often not well articulated. Their goals sounded attractive, but not 
accompanied by workable plans. 
The Community 
As early as 1986, there were social groups lobbying against the idea of the HA 
and privatization. There were the Commission on Public Policy of the Hong Kong 
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Christian Council, the Joint Committee of Catholic Groups, the Joint Committee on 
Medical and Health System, etc7^ As the debate protracted into the nineties, the 
groupings involved became numerous. For example, in 1990, there was once a 
hundred civil organizations jointly protested with the Government Doctors' 
Association, demanding to shelf the HA project. They opposed strongly to the idea of 
recovering hospital costs up to 15-20 percent/^ In another occasion, 500 
representatives from different organizations protested against the itemized charging 
scheme.79 The influence of these groupings in affecting policy decisions was 
confirmed, as the Secretary for Health and Welfare admitted that the cost recovery 
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reform measures were not actualized due to strong public outcry. 
The evolution of the public opinion can be concisely outlined as follow: firstly, 
early protests centred around the fear and suspicion of privatization, that is the 
government selling off the public hospitals. Then it gradually shifted to opposing the 
cost recovering strategies of the HA (i.e. the 15-20 percent cost recovery proposed in 
PHA's report). Later on in 1993, upon the release of the Toward Better Health - A 
Consultation Document (a Green Paper), public discontents focused on the 'pegging 
fees to cost' principle. Eventually, in recent development in 1995, disputes rose from 
the itemized charging scheme, which the HA hospitals attempted to adopt. All these 
debates were developed on the foundation of the "legacy of free medical service". 
The Pro fessionals 
For the professions (e.g. social work, nursing, medicine), two observations are 
made. Firstly, on the issue of cost recovery, they evaluated the policy in the interest 
of the users of the public system (usually lower class people), the conclusion is often 
in favor of ensuring full access to the system. Secondly, when the debate was 
transformed to the broader issue of health financing, they had greater difficulty in 
asserting a clear position. This probably due to lack of the knowledge to guide their 
judgments, as this issue remained the turf of health economists. Such expertise were 
hardly found among the caring professions. Thus, their proposals on financing the 
health system were often vague and sketchy. 
The Political Parties 
Similar to the professionals, the political parties exhibited confusion in 
handling the overall financing issue, while basically they supported full access of 
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citizens t6 the health system. Analyzing the policy debates in the Legco meetings 
from 1991 through 1995, several remarks could be made. Firstly, the 'democrats' 
(referring to the Democratic Party and the Association for Democracy & People's 
Livelihood) inclined to oppose to the cost recovery measures such as pegging fees to 
costs. They urged for increase in the government spending. Secondly, the Liberal 
Party (composed of business and professional interests) advocated for the idea of 'the 
capable to pay more,, yet politicians of the business sector also framed their policy 
stands cautiously, not to deviate too much from the dominant public opinion. The 
liberals preferred low tax rates and that the users should be allowed to voluntarily opt 
out from the public system.^^ Thirdly, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of 
Hong Kong (a party inaugurated with support from the Xinhua News Agency) 
appeared to has no particular pet project concerning health financing, they stood firm 
however, in opposition to the pegging of fees to costs. 
All in all, no matter what their political ideals are, political parties converged at 
a single point on the issue - that is to avoid giving a concrete, down to earth proposal. 
Instead, they opted for an easy way out by advocating primary care as a macro 
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strategy to reduce service demands. Avoidance of having a clear conviction on 
health financing will not invite political trouble, while supporting primary care 
improvements sounds agreeable to the public. This confirmed Gould's view that 
legislators praised reforms but at the same time rendered no political support for any 
options.83 
The Indecisive Government Responses 
Since the Scott report released, protest from the community could be seen from 
8A 
time to time, it was clear that the public was not ready to forsake the system 
providing virtually free services. Therefore, in between 1985 and the formal 
establishment of the HA, the administration arrived at the conclusion that the 
privatization policy could only be implemented by parts. An announcement was 
made that the government needed to have a broad strategic plan for fee and wavier 
arrangement, and that no upward adjustment of the hospital fees will be undertaken 
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before such plan is available. “ From then onward, there were at least two waves of 
insurance studies organized within the Health and Welfare Branch/^ and an 
additional working group was appointed to review the hospital fees and waivers. 
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The policy ideas of hovv to fund hospital services were in a state of flux, during that 
two to three years period, the policy makers could not make up their mind on any 
policy alternatives. These protracted studies and indecisiveness was criticized by the 
insiders. For example, Keith Pearson, managing director of British United Provident 
Association (BUPA) denounced the policy branch as indecisive, spending too much 
time seeking advice and too little headway in policy making.^^ 
From the testimonies collected during interviews, it is evident that the officials 
did pay much effort to leam (or re-leam) the financing of health systems. They read 
books, considered foreign cases, and sought advice. These efforts later on 
consolidated into the Green Paper in 1993. But the document was still criticized by 
some insiders as immature thoughts, confusing, and with little practical use. From 
1990 up to the day when the Green Paper was released, inputs from health 
economists seemed to be very little. In the process, the officials did seek advice from 
individual consultant(s) from the World Health Organization, but this happened after 
the Green Paper was compiled. It was unclear why the administration did not 
commission a consultancy to perform the study. The generalist officials were indeed 
not well equipped to solve this issue. On this macro issue of financing, even the 
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medical profession had liltle consensus, nor concrete suggestions to offer. 
Another point to supplement is the habitual 'delays' in the works pertaining to 
health financing. The indecisiveness of the administration was related to these delays. 
It was originally announced that Green Paper would be released in 1992，yet in reality 
it was not publicized until July 1993.89 Another example was the itemized charging 
scheme of hospital services. In 1995, the public protested^^ against the HA hospitals 
for adopting itemized charging - patients had to pay for their own artificial joints, 
pace-maker, etc. The administration agreed to investigate and see if it was necessary 
to use unified charging scheme, the officials promised to has the issue settled before 
the end of 1995, yet it was again delayed to July 1996.^' When these paragraphs are 
written, it was still unclear whether the postponed deadline will be observed. These 
delays served as supporting evidence that ideas within the policy branch has been in a 
state of flux, no single perspective prevails. 
Confusing Aspirations of the Green Paper 
Noticing that the management reform of the HA in the end would not suffice 
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for the territory's health needs, the administration in a hurry embarked on other 
reform measures, such as primary care and financial reforms. For financial reform, 
the Green Paper titled Towards Better Health - A Consultation Document was 
published. 
The document put forwarded five reform options and their combinations for 
public consultation, namely, a) the percentage subsidy approach, b) the target group 
approach, c) the co-ordinated voluntary insurance approach, d) the compulsory 
comprehensive insurance approach, and e) the prioritization of treatment approach. 
Details of the options will require paragraphs to discuss (see Appendix Two), 
but to get to the crux, the aspiration of the document can be regarded as conflising. 
The five options were essentially talking about things of different categories. Options 
a) and b) are ways of fee charging and waiver, they are only microscopic strategy for 
handling how the users should pay at the point of consuming services, or in other 
words handling fee-for-service issues. These two options address not how the system 
should be fund, nor how the money flow would create efficiency and healthy 
competition. Option e) is a way of allocating resources, again it says nothing about 
increasing the total fund, nor provide a policy of financing. Only c) and d) are ways 
of funding health services for the community.^^ As preliminary proposals, they both 
pointed to the bringing together the public and the private sector, to find new fund 
source, to redirecting service demands, etc. But on a whole, the document confuses 
the readers because it placed policies of different levels together and expected the 
readers to opt. The readers in the end did not know how determined the government 
was in undertaking reform, or would it just resort to minor adjustment in the daily 
collection of fees. 
In the last part ofthe document, the government disclosed its pet project as 
"a combination of the target group approach and the percentage subsidy approach... 
[the government] also favour the introduction of a co-ordinated voluntary insurance 
scheme as a framework within which the target group approach and percentage 
subsidy approach can operate more e f f e c t i v e l y " , � 
However, as we witnessed since the release of the Green Paper, the private insurance 
market was not coordinated by any statutory body. Moreover, neither the percentage 
subsidy nor target group approach were vigorously pursued.^^ 
The options of the document undergone misinterpretation by the media, thus 
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intensified the confusion. As Derek Gould remarked that the media erroneously 
associated the 'percentage subsidy approach' to the idea of 'pegging fees to costs'. 
This misinformation led to public anxiety. No amount of Government explanation 
during the subsequent consultation period was able to overcome public 
preconceptions of what the two things actually meant.^^ Similarly, the Secretary for 
Health and Welfare when commented the fear and opposition aroused in the 
community, she mentioned: "Such fear, dare I say, is based on ignorance and spread 
by convenient carping”，It indicated how difficult to understand and enigmatic the 
issue had become for the community. Upon the closing of the consultation period, the 
government had failed to explain to the public what kind of reform it was pursuing; 
while the public (also the legislators) did not seem to know what the policy was 
becoming.97 Furthermore, surrounding this issue were many different opinions and 
proposals given by insurers，academics and professionals. In the midst of such 
diverse opinions, most of the actors were lost - unable to apprehend government's 
standpoint, also unable to capture the essence of the debate. 
After the fanfare of consultation died down, the government did not embark on 
any options. Public hospital services maintained the traditional low price, potential 
users would not opt out of the public system. The users' common attitude is "why 
bother to get insured when the HA improves service quality but still charges the old 
rates?". The Class-B beds attract not patients from the crowded large wards, but from 
the private producers instead, thus forcing the private hospitals out of the market.^^ 
The community continues to depend on the public system, while the HA's improved 
services induce more demands. The gravity of these trends is that, years after the set 
up of the HA, camp beds returned to the wards^^ and waiting lists are growing in 
length. 
From the above debate we witnessed that both the administration and the 
politicians were indecisive. In the end, what actually is issue about, and why is it so 
difficult to arrive at a solution? What was Hong Kong's health financing system 
looked like then? And what was the Green Paper in 1993 trying to advocated? The 
last part of this chapter set out to find a proper orientation of viewing the financing 
issue. 
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The HongKong Svstem Compared with the NHS 
The local health finance system in 1984 is depicted in Figure 7. The major 
fund source has been the general taxation; while some other resources found their 
way into the system through voluntary contribution or insurance purchases. The 
public and subvented hospitals were fund directly via government department in the 
form of global b u d g e t . _ in comparison, the proportion of government funding to the 
hospitals was much larger than the direct payments made by the users to these 
institutions. As indicated by the Scott Report, this ratio in 1984 was about 22 to 1.^ ^^  
The establishment of the HA effected no significant change on the system. The 
Authority simply came in between the government and the hospitals. Hospitals were 
no longer differentiated into public and subvented. Apart from these, the HA did not 
alter the basic arrangement of the system, the money flows and their proportion 
remained essentially the same. 
The local private sector depicted in Figure 7 was simple, involving users, 
insurers and producers. There were rarely financial transactions between the service 
producers and the insurance companies. The private sector played a very significant 
role in primary care, around 65 to 70 percent of out-patient consultations were done 
in the private s e c t o r， 
Comparing with the NHS, both systems rely heavily on general taxation. The 
main discrepancy of the two systems lay in the way the fiinds flow after they are 
pooled in the government. The H.K. system is rather direct, that is，by channeling 
money to the producers via global budgets. The NHS directed a considerable portion 
of resource to the fundholding GPs, the GPs in tum buy service from curative care 
institutions，on behalf of the patients. Secondly, the U.K. government has a much 
bigger role to play in primary medical care than the H.K. government. The NHS 
allocates funds to the private practitioners via set up like the Family Health Services 
Authorities, when financially related in this way, the primary tier of care can 
functions closely with other tiers. Also, the NHS allocates funds to hospitals (both 
private and public) by means of extensive use of service contracts. Such contractual 
system is absent in Hong Kong. 
All in all, the NHS embodied several merits that the Hong Kong system does 
not shares - different tiers of care are readily brought together through buying and 
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Figure 7. Financing ofHong Kong's Medical & Health System (1984). 
Source: Adopted from The Delivery ofMedical Services in Hospitals Coopers & Lybrand 
W.D. Scott. (1985). See also The Reform of Health Care - A Comparative Analysis of Seven 
OECD Countries. OCED(1992). 
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selling services, the private and public sectors are also integrated through similar 
mechanism. Besides, with the money flow through the contractual structure, patients 
have more choice, competition among producers are managed, demands are 
suppressed through the function of the gatekeepers. 
Finding the Proper Orientation 
Financing of the heaith services has become a global issue, 18 out of 24 
countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have embarked on various paths of health financing reform. Its complexity 
made many policy reformers perplexed, the Secretary for Health and Welfare quoted 
a Canadian health economist, Dr. Robert Evans, saying that the issue was actually 
"[an] issue from hell".'^^ Currently, enormous quantity of literature on this topic 
continue to be produced, it is beyond the question to thoroughly discuss the issue 
here. Yet this paper intends to capture the essence of the Hong Kong system and get 
orientated about what the system is becoming. 
Among the contemporary literature on health financing reviewed in this 
study,iG4 the comparative research done by the OECD provided a useful typology to 
organize different models of health financing.'^^ The typology (see Figure 8) is 
formulated according to two dimensions. On one dimension is the source of health 
finance, it assumed that money either come from voluntary contributions, or by 
drawing from public funds. 
On the second dimension, it is the method of paying the producers (i.e. when 
the money flows from the source to the service producers), it is either by out-of-
pocket payments made by patients, or it can flow indirectly through a third party. In 
real life, methods of paying the producers come in numerous versions (e.g. govems 
by contracts; salary; etc), yet it can roughly be grouped under four kinds, as shown in 
the first column of Figure 8. 
This matrix yields eight possible models of health financing. For example, in 
the 'simple market exchange' model, the money come from the consumers, and the 
way of payment is by paying every time one uses the doctor's services, it is like 
simple exchange in the market place (other models in the figure are explained in the 
Appendix Three). Among the eight, the 'compulsory, out-of-pocket payment, and 
without insurance' model does not exist in the empirically. Therefore, only seven 
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different models left. This typology provided a convenient tool for putting into 
perspective different proposals ofhealth financing. 
Method of Paying Source of Finance 
Service Producers Voluntary (Private) Compulsory (Public) 
Out-of-pocket by user 
(without insurance) Simple Market Exchange N o t fotind in practL<^^ 
Out-of-pocket by user Voluntary Reimbursement Model Public Reimbursement Model 
(with insurance) e.g. Green Paper Option #3 e.g. Green Paper Option M 
Indirectly by third party 
(^ia arm's length contracts) Voluntary Contract Model Public Contract Model 
e.g. NHS after 1989 
Indirectly by third party 
(via budget & salaries Voluntary Integrated Model Public Integrated Model 
yvithin an integrated e.g. Hospital Authority 
organization) 
Figure 8. Models o fHeal th Financing 
Source: adjusted and adopted from The Reform of Health Care - A Comparative Analysis of Seven 
OECD Countries. OECD(1992). Pp. 19-29. 
First, with the typology, it is identified that the HA is a 'Public Megrated 
Model’，where 'integrated' is taken to mean vertical integration of the body which 
controlled the funds and the producer, in this model doctors are paid by salaries while 
the institutions run on global b u d g e t s , " 6 (the pros and cons of this model are 
discussed in Appendix Three). 
Secondly, the government's options c) and d) in the Green Paper can be 
classified respectively as the 'Voluntary Reimbursement Model’ and the 'Public 
Reimbursement Model'. One can say that the Green Paper reflected the government's 
intention to move the system from reliance on general taxation toward using 
insurance (both private and public) as the source of funding. Yet there is one caveat 
for this conclusion, that is, it is not sure how determined the administration is to 
undertake such reform. 
One can see that in the Green Paper the government did not consider the 
contractual models. The Tublic Contract Model', which enhances managed 
competition is now becoming a dominant type of health financing in the West (see 
Appendix Three). The Hong Kong government ignored the use of contracts might be 
due to lacking of proper knowledge. The Health and Welfare Branch back in the 
early nineties had no way tojudge whether the contractual models (e.g. the NHS after 
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1989) would function well. The reformed NHS had only run for a very short period 
and could not be taken haphazardly as a role model. 
In the Green Paper, the pet project of the administration is a better system for 
collecting fees, plus expansion of voluntary insurance market. Recently, in 1995, 
officials voiced through the press a proposal that stress heavily on users buying their 
own insurance package, with the introduction of service contracts among 
producers.iG7 These signals implies that the government is increasingly inclined to 
privatize the funding function of health services. The HA has already privatized the 
production function of hospital care, as a second step, the government steers toward 
tuming the funding role (i.e. a provision function) to the private sector. Nevertheless, 
it cannot be sure what the financing policy will be like at last. In one of my 
interviews, the informant disclosed that the policy branch in early 1996 showed signs 
of investigating the feasibility of compulsory public insurance. Since public attitudes 
are rather conservative toward introducing market mechanism in the realm of health 
care, compulsory insurance is more likely to fit the public taste. Whether the 
administration would opt for private or public insurance is still debatable. 
Apart from the options of the Green Paper, there was a diversity of policy ideas 
that evolved around the issue. Insurers and other professionals had their own pet 
1 Afi 
projects. Viewing these policy alternatives against Figure 8, several brief remarks 
can be made. Among the diverse proposals, there were some consensus. First, all of 
the policy alternatives suggested by insurers, academics and critics discarded the 
'Simple Market Exchange' model. Second, most of them to a greater or lesser extent 
wanted to retain elements of the present system, and disliked radical changes. Equity 
of access, which protects the penniless patients in the present system, is the first and 
foremost element to be retained. Third, given that the poor will not be deprived of 
services, there seemed to be support for both private and public insurance, or certain 
mixture of the two. Fourth, the contractual models are supported in some of the 
proposals. 
Afterall, it appear likely that the HA project will remain incomplete, and the 
health financing issue will drag on till 1997. There is few literature that anticipates 
the future of health care in the SAR. Dr. Yuen foresees in the future the emerging 
problem of population influx from China, status problem of mainland's health 
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professionals in Hong Kong, and the changing status of traditional Chinese 
medicine.i09 However, I contend that the unresolved financial issue will become 
acute with time. The stronghold of the legacy of free medical service must be broken 
in order to undertake reforms. In the end policy makers must decide the slice of the 
pie for health care. As Grant Gillett maintained, each society must determine what 
their regard as basic and what they regard as discretionary in health care ."� 
Summary 
To sum up, this chapter analyzes the incompleteness of the HA reform. The 
'incompleteness' is taken to mean that certain institutional and political issues were 
left unattended in the reform. The neglected institutional issues were embedded in the 
institutional design of the HA, which the first part of this chapter probed into. The 
second half of this chapter tackles the unresolved political issues, with focus on the 
cost recovery of the HA and the financing policy of the entire system. 
The institutional make up of the HA failed to bring together different tiers of 
care, and secondly, unable to redefine the proper boundary of the private and the 
public sectors. Neglecting these structural issues resulted in a fragmented health 
system as before. The HA hospitals continue to be overcrowded as no gatekeeping 
mechanism was installed. Another emerging crisis is a distorted competition which 
tends to squeeze the private producers out of the market. 
The unresolved political issue is essentially about who should be appropriated 
and how should the funds flow so that macro efficiency can be achieved. Opinions 
were highly polarized, the community strongly adhere to the legacy of free services, 
while the government was hesitant, indecisive and confused, lacking the expertise 
and determination to embark on concrete reforms. Several issues are left open ended, 
including the level of cost recovery and the forms of collecting fees (e.g. itemized 
charging). Besides, the Gieen Paper totally dropped; and a health policy is 
unavailable. These issues will retum to the agenda after SAR government takes over. 
The result of this incompleteness is that the reform was implemented by parts, only 
the institution and corporate structure of HA was set up. 
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1 There were two political issues pertaining to the privatization policy. First is the status quo ofcivil 
servants working in public hospitals being affected. The second is the debate on cost recovery as well 
as financing the health system. This second issue is actually about 'who should be appropriated', and 
'how should the funds flow so that macro efficiency can be achieved'. 
“Briefly speaking, the health system related issues left unattended by the HA policy include firstly the 
integration between different tiers of care. A second structural issue is the integration ofthe private 
and public sector. 
^ See chapter 2, section '1967-1984 reaction and growth’ for an elaboration of regionalization. 
4 In fact, the consultants considered several other, more moderate options. For example, to strengthen 
the present system without adding new institutional structure (carmot solve underutilization of 
subvented hospitals); use the existing department to control hospitals, with all staff as civil servants 
(only benefit the staff, not necessarily patient care); use the department to control hospitals with 
subvented staff remain on a different term (subvented sector will not welcome); and finally reduce the 
department's control to only public hospitals, with an authority controlling the subvented ones (defeat 
the purpose of integrating the two sectors). Each options had their limitation, the HA proposal was 
considered most optimal in terms of acceptability to interests involved. For details, see W.D. Scott & 
Co Pty Ltd., The Delivery of Medical Services in Hospitals, A Report for the Hong Kong Government 
Executive Review, (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985). Pp. 4~14-4~15. 
Mbid. P. 4-3 . 
^ Ibid. Pp. 4-2 , 4-10. 
7 Ibid. P. 5-5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
� Ibid. P. 4 � 7 . 
11 Note that Legco members in Figure 6 were exclusively appointed members or members from the 
functional constitutencies, and thus not considered as community representatives. 
'"This arrangement can be considered a success for the medical profession in securing strategic 
positions in commanding the future hospital services. 
13 The classifications in the figure requires explanation. Firstly, a member may have two 
affiliation/status, for example, Dr. C.H. Leong is a Legco member and at the same time we counted 
him as representing the major stakeholders - 'staff. Mr. Ronald Chow, is counted as Legco member 
and an unionist as well. Additionally, some other members from the business sector were also 
affiliated with subvented hospitals. Secondly, the category 'Others' for the case ofPHA means that the 
members are from sectors including business and industrial sector, management and administration 
specialists. Yet for HA, the six members in the 'Other' category involved doctor from private hospital, 
barrister, social service and the business sector. 
14 See W.D. Scott & Co Pty Ltd., The Delivery of Medical Services in Hospitals, A Report for the 
Hong Kong Government Executive Review, Executive Overview P. 3. 
15 Four alternatives were deliberated by the consultants: 1. Strong action to reduce the cost of 
operation; 2. Suppress demand of public; 3. Increase taxation; and 4. A system of cost recovery to 
increase revenue. Since a high tax rate was unlikely in Hong Kong, and suppressing demand was more 
difficult than to redirecting demands, thus only option 1 and 4 were considered possible. 
16 See W.D. Scott & Co Pty Ltd., The Delivery ofMedical Services in Hospitals, A Report for the 
Hong Kong Government Executive Review, (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985). P. 11~15. 
''lbid. P. 11-16. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. P. 11-29. 
20 Ibid. P . l l � 9 . 
-'Ibid. Pp. 9-12-9-21. 
22 It was mentioned that "the tripartite top management structure should eventually be headed by a 
single Chief Executive. However, during the initial years of the Hospital Authority, the three principal 
officers would report directly and independently to the Executive Committee. This structure to be 
reviewed in two years". See Report of the Provisional Hospital Authority. P. iv. 
23 Ibid. P. iii. 
24 Ibid. P. 22. 
25 Ibid. P. 19. 
2^  Ibid. P. 25. 
27 For details, see Health & Welfare Branch, Government Secretariat. (March 1987). Report on the 
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Delivery ofMedical Services in Hospital - A Summary of Public Opinions. 
28 A market research firm, International Research Associates (Hong Kong) Ltd was commissioned to 
collect household information on the incidence ofhospitalization in public and private hospitals. The 
results led to the proposal that even if the present fees were increased to 15% of cost, from $29 to 
$195 per day, the average additional burden on these patients would be only $2,324 per annum, and 
their total expenditure on hospitalization would still be less than 2.8% of household income. See See 
Provisional Hospital Authority. (1989). Report of the Provisional Hospital Authority for details. 
''Ibid. Pp.119-120. 
3° This conservative attitude is a tradition, the Hong Kong Medical Council forbids doctors to 
advertise, a doctor's named printed on brochures or booklets, or other materials to be distributed may 
become sensitive, construed as advertising. Public doctors doing private practice also creates uneasy 
feelings, the public would like to see public doctors remain exclusively public, while private 
practitioners should not be high sounding in their businefs. 
31 See Chandra, Jeff & Kakabadse, Andrew. (1985). Privatization and the National Health Service. 
Avebury. P. 22. 
32 Ibid. P. 47. 
33 In earlier literature, privatization tended to be seen as a tactic to undermine union strength. Currently, 
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found in Abromeit, Heidrun. (1989), ‘An International Perspective I: British Privatization Policy', in 
Thynne I & AriffM. eds., Privatization: Singapore Experience in Perspective, (Singapore: Longman, 
1989), and Scott, Ian & Thynne, Ian. (1994) (eds.). Public Sector Reform - Critical Issues and 
Perspectives. Hong Kong AJPA. P. 6. 
34 See Abromeit, Heidrun. (1989), P. 143. 
35 Producers are referred to: pharmacists or retail chemists; general practitioners; public health services; 
community health services (e.g. home nursing, ambulance, etc.)； public hospital services; private in 
patient services supplied public hospitals; and private hospital and nursing home services supplied by 
independent providers. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1992). The 
Reform of Health Care - A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD Countries. P. 113. 
36 The purchasers can be GPs, or a mini health organization formed by several GPs, they enter into 
contract with the government and received a lumpsum. They on one hand produce primary medical 
care for patients. On the other hand, they have list of patients enrolled to their service package, when 
the patients need hospital care, the GPs will purchase such service for them from the hospitals. The 
purchaser's role is thus blurr, it is both a producer and perfoms some provider function. 
37 Purchasers receive a budget from the government which is intended to reflect the need for health 
care of local people. See Chris Ham 'Health Care Reform : A Comparative Perspective' in Ian Scott & 
Ian Thynne (eds.) (1994). Public Sector Reform - Critical Issues andPerspectives. AJPA. Pp. 71-89. 
38 See Aldridge, Susan C. & Sundarapandiyan, S. (1995), "The Convergence Model in Health Care 
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39 For example, pretending to have a severe ailment, which tend to speed up admission or referral to 
specialist clinic. 
40 See Hay Joel (1992) Health Care in Hong Kong - An Economic Policy Assessment. P. 22. 
41 See Caluan, Michael; Cant, Sarah & Gabe，Johathan. (1993), Going Private - Why People pay for 
their Health Care, Open University Press. P. 7. 
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45 See Health for All - The Way Ahead (Report ofthe Working Party on Primary Health Care) (1990), 
for a discussion of types of care services. 
46 See W.D. Scott & Co Pty Ltd., The Delivery ofMedical Services in Hospitals, A Reportfor the 
Hong Kong Government Executive Review, (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985). P. 4-10, P. 
5-19. 
47 There is no overall health policy when these paragraphs are written. 
48 The proper mix ofprivate and public has become an significant issue in health reforms in countries 
like New Zealand and South Africa. In New Zealand, the private-public mix are different for different 
regions. It appeared that in some regions, expansion of private producers resulted in resource 
contraction ofthe public sector. The implication is that persons who are uninsured as well as not 
eligible to free public medicine will have lesser choice and a diminished scope service coverage. In S. 
130 
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49 See South China Moming Post, 19 Sept., 1985. 
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named The devolution ofPublic Hospital Services & Alternative Health Care Financing'. Working 
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51 See Hong Kong Hansard. (1989/90), P.2187. 
52 The caveat here is that the HA is only one of the factors leading to the decline of private hospitals. 
Other factors like the diminished purchasing power of people in recent years also tumed patients to the 
public hospitals. 
“ S e e Sing Tao Jih Pao, 8th Jan., 1996. 
54 Occupancy rate plunge is not a fully satisfactory indicator. Since advanced medical technology 
shortens patients' period of stay in the hospital, thus, given the admission number remain stable, the 
shortened stay will make the overall occupancy rate appears to be on the decline. 
55 See Ming Pao, 9th Jan., 1996. 
56 See Window, 11th Aug., 1995. 
57 The meetings were convened by a ex-Legco member, Dr. Lam Kui Chun. 
58 On a whole, the government regulates private hospitals according to guidelines endorsed by the 
MDAC. The guidelines detailed a hospital's organization, staffing, equipment, patients' right, etc. 
Deviation from the operational guidelines are brought to attention of the hospital management before 
the licence renewal process, followed by discussion on possible improvement measures and site visits 
to ensure compliance. So far the private hospitals responded positively. Apart from these, the 
government seldom intervenes the private hospitals, for example, areas such as price level or consumer 
protection are not touched by the government. Besides, other than granting land sites, the government 
has done little to stimulate expansion of the private sector. New projects of private hospitals were 
usually slow in making headway or simply abortive. From 1959 to 1989, the expansion in the number 
of private hospital beds was just 67 percent, while for public and subvented hospitals, the figure was 
265 percent. See Hong Kong Hansard. (1981/82)，Pp. 74-75; 8th July, 1992. P. 3987; 12th Oct., 1994. 
Pp. 96-97, see also Annex VI. 
59 See Window, 11th Aug., 1995. 
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Report. P.413; and Tang(1994), Comparative Theories of Social Policy Development: A Historical-
Quantitative Study of Hong Kong. U.M.I. Dissertation Services. A Bell & Howell Company. P. 225. 
61 The staff unrest and industrial action during the formation years o fHA requires lengthy discussion 
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Since the White Paper - The Further Development of Medical and Services in 
Hong Kong was released in 1974, the set up of the Hospital Authority has highlighted 
the most significant restructuring in local medical and health services. As a 
privatization project, its scale has been the largest in the history of the colonial 
government, affecting the career of over 14 percent of civil servants. This reform is at 
the same time however, also an incomplete privatization exercise. This chapter aims 
at analyzing the factors and circumstances that contributed to the incompleteness of 
the HA reform. 
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Privatization 
First of all, the Hospital Authority has been both a partial, as well as an 
incomplete privatization project. By 'partial', it refers to the nature of the HA reform 
that only the production function is tumed over to a non-governmental body; while 
the provision function of the services remained largely within the government 
boundary. Recapitulating Ted Kolderie's ideas,' he pointed out that privatizing 
production involves changes in the daily operation, in the delivery of direct service, 
and in the management of staff. Whereas, privatizing the provision function refers to 
the shifting of the policymaking, deciding, requiring, regulating, and funding 
activities to the private sector. In this sense, the HA is primarily a case that service 
production is shifted to non-govemment sector, while the provision functions stayed 
public.2 
In other words, by 'incomplete', it refers not to the degrees of privatization of 
provision and production function. Instead, I take it to mean that given a particular 
privatization project, the government fails to sufficiently tackle the pertinent political 
and structural issues of the private and public sector. In the case of the HA, the 
incompleteness is that the reform failed to address the political issue of appropriation. 
Secondly, several issues pertinent to the structure of the health system have been left 
out. The government's negligence in these issues makes the project incomplete. 
To recapitulate, in the case of the HA, the issues pertinent to the structure of 
the health system which were found to be neglected included: the integration between 
tiers of care, and the integration of the public with the private sector. Embedded in 
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these two issues are the tradition of local medical profession, along with the 
conservative public opinion on health services (e.g. market practice is not appropriate 
or befitting in health services). Secondly, the political issues neglected by the 
government are: a concrete cost recovery scheme for the HA, and the overall 
policymaking in health financing. Why did the government undertake such a large 
scale of privatization project and yet permits its design and implementation to be 
half-baked? 
It must be noted that the review of hospital services and the subsequent 
emergence of the design of the HA was five years spaced apart. The factors that 
moved policy makers to adopt the privatization proposal might not be the same 
factors that prompted the policy makers to pick the present design of the HA. In 
chapter three, eleven factors are examined to determine their relative influence on the 
privatization decision, however, one cannot uncautiously assumes that the same set 
of factors operated to forge the incomplete design of the HA. This chapter sets out to 
single out the factors that were associated with the incompleteness of the reform. 
From the data collected, I argue that the 'incompleteness' of this privatization project 
is positively related to two things. Namely the bias of the government's privatization 
ideas, and the legacy of free medical services. The following sub-sections will 
examine the biased policy ideas and the legacy of free service as alternative 
explanations for the policy incompleteness. 
Biased Privatization Ideas Explain Incompleteness 
The central argument is that: the ideas of privatization locate at three different 
levels, namely the normative, the functional and the operational level. When a 
government shifts its focus of privatization from physical services to human services, 
only the ideas of the functional andA>r operational level will not suffice the policy 
makers to comprehensively address the policy issues that pertains. Meaning that 
policy makers who are biased to perceive privatization in terms of its functional 
and/or operational aspects, will not be able to anticipate the normative and value 
issues in human services. In addition to the ideas of privatization at the functional 
and/or operational level, the government needs to has an well articulated idea about 
the structural implications of privatizing a service. Otherwise, the policy will prone 
to incompleteness like the HA policy in Hong Kong. 
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Levels ofPrivatization Discussion 
As elaborated in the literature review section, contemporary discussion of 
privatization can be classified into three categories. Or that current privatization ideas 
are found to locate at the three levels of abstraction, they are respectively: 
i) the normative level, which tackles moral and philosophical issues, like the 
boundary problem of private and public sector，the dismantling of citizenship, 
changing community into market place, privatization's impact on solidarity and 
tradition, etc. Ideas of this kind can be found in the works of Morgan, Rose, 
Kamerman and Kahn.^ 
ii) the functional level, which consider v^hat functions of the government to be 
privatized and what functions to be retained by the government. Scholars like 
Kolderie, Butler, Thynne have extensive discussion in this area/ 
iii) the operational level, which aims at finding the proper form of organization; the 
specific strategy of privatization; and the like. Starr, B6s, Savas have focused on this 
l e v d . 5 
Hong Kong Government's Biased Privatization Ideas 
There was bias in the government's ideas of privatization. This bias is seen in 
two aspects. Firstly, the discussion and the actual experience of privatization of the 
H.K. government were biased to physical/commercial services, of which the concem 
was operational in nature. Second, there was little attention pay to the structural 
implications in privatization activities (e.g. how to attain a new balance between the 
private and public sector). These observations are concluded from evidence found in 
various sources. Including internal documents, interviews, officials' perception of 
privatization as revealed in their speeches during meetings of the legislature, and 
other policy documents (e.g. white papers). 
Earliest privatization ideas came from the McKinsey Report, which 
recommended that "in Hong Kong potential candidates for hiving off would include 
the airport, the railway, the Waterworks and the Post Office".^ It showed that early 
privatization concerns laid with the physical services. In fact, the colonial 
government's actual experience of privatization before the HA came from privatizing 
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physical services, such as carparks and railway. Leafing through the Hong Kong 
Hansard from early post war years up to the mid-1990s, one can see that 
deliberations on hiving off services or contracting out government activities were 
exclusively those of physical or commercial nature. Even in the mid-nineties, 
discussion of privatization is more often focused on infrastructure development and 
services, such as port, roads, tunnels, and telecommunication^ 
In the Hong Kong government's pursuit of privatization, it was demonstrated in 
chapter two that its idea was not well articulated in the mid-1980s, the 'privatization' 
concept was vague, it was used interchangeably with other terms. Only after 1989， 
could the government's understandings of privatization be considered as well 
clarified. Even that, these ideas of privatization remain arrested in the functional and 
the operational level. The government has not paid sufficient attention to the social 
values of privatization, in contrast to the instrumental values of privatization. In this 
sense, I argue that there was a bias of ideas in the administration. 
Besides, as recorded in the Hong Kong Hansard, it is evidence that the in mid-
eighties, the administration's concem about impact of privatization were those of 
centralized control, land supply, economic returns, and security. Discussion which 
directly focuses on the social implication of privatizing was rare, except that the 
administration was aware of the need to avoid monopolistic situations in privatizing. 
On a whole, normative implications of privatization seldom if ever draw any 
attention from the administration, it seemed that the policy branch lacked the 
alertness towards them. With prior experience of privatizing physical services, the 
officials were more inclined to get focused on the functional and operational issues. 
Considerations of social values were never the motif in the general discussion 
of privatization, they were similarly not found in policy papers of the medical and 
health services. The 1964 White Paper focused on projecting future demands, while 
the 1974 White Paper though introduced the regionalization plan, it was restricted to 
the coordination work between the hospitals. It was a coordination scheme of the 
hospitals rather than a concem of constituting a holistic service delivery system. Both 
White Papers did not touch on the integration the three tiers of care, and there were 
simply no mention of the private sector. Nor did these papers anticipate that in the 
undertaking of service reforms, the institution and tradition of the medical profession, 
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and the piiblic perception of these, would have to do with the effectiveness of the 
reform. 
The public sector's relationship with the private sector was not given proper 
recognition until the report on primary care and the Toward Better Health Green 
Paper were released respectively in December 1990 and in 1993. Such belated 
recognition means that the policy branch probably had no clear idea about what 
normative issues might arise in the HA reform. That is why when the Scott 
consultants put forwarded a vision of future integration between the public and the 
private producers, the administration simply ignored it.^ Neither the policy branch, 
nor the PHA followed this vision of the Scott Report, in the end，the PHA report was 
like a 'cook book’ on how to build the management structure ofthe HA. 
The privatization ideas of the H.K. government are biased toward the 
functional/operational level. These ideas worked well when physical services are 
privatized. It is because physical services like 'town gas' and water work have only a 
limited number of value issues to be considered. Efficiency and instrumentally 
rational decisions are already sufficient criteria of quality service. A functional or 
operational focus on privatization suffice policy planners to design the policy. But in 
the privatization of human services, mere the functional ideas of privatization are 
inadequate to address all the policy issues arose. Social services are characterized by 
its human touch, its caring element, protecting the weak, and an altruistic sentiment. 
They involve a much broader basis of value considerations than physical services. 
Privatizing a human service requires planners to reevaluate issues like equity, 
equality, legitimacy, accountability, tradition, social solidarity etc]o 
In the case of medical care, the functional and the operational ideas of 
privatization in the government only suffice policy planners to design the institution 
of the HA. Such as the design of the management structure of the university hospitals, 
the organization of the headquarter, the staff transfer procedures, management of 
mix-staff, and the like. However, the value issues of the role of medicine, equity, and 
appropriation were left out. The policy planners suffered from a bias in privatization 
ideas. Without well articulated ideas pertinent to the normative realm of social 
services, the government could not come up with a complete policy design. The HA 
was physically set up, but the corresponding financing issue remained messy and 
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unresolved. The officials responsible for policy making had no prior experience in 
privatizing human service, not to say at a scale that affect over 14 percent of the civil 
servants. Their ideas of privatization, which drew from privatizing 
physical/commercial services, did not enable them to envisage, nor to put into 
perspective the normative issues that pertain to privatization of hospital services. It 
was late when the complexity of the situation dawned on them, the HA was akeady 
in operation, created an absurd situation which reform is implemented by parts. 
The lesson learned from the HA reform is that: for a government to shift from 
privatizing physical services to privatizing human services, it must first has well 
articulated ideas about the normative implications of privatization, in addition to its 
privatization ideas at the functional andA>r operational level. Otherwise, the policy 
will prone to be incomplete in its design. 
The second half of the chapter attempts to offer a second explanation to the 
incompleteness of policy. The following sub-section will start by reappraising the 
legacy of free medical services. 
The Legacy Contributed to Policy Stalemate 
The incompleteness of the HA reform is also positively related to the 'legacy of 
free medical services', which is a deep seated stronghold of the community, as we 
demonstrated in the earlier chapters. Since the administration was not experienced in 
privatizing social services, one can look upon the HA as some how an amateurish 
policy of the government. However, for the cost recovering and the financing 
disputes，the government could has embarked on some degree of reforms, in lieu of a 
total state of flux, if the public opposition had not been so fierce�* If the atmosphere 
around these issues had been less antagonistic, the policy makers could have settled 
on certain pricing and financing strategies,'^ though they might be defected in some 
way or having drawbacks due to the inexperience of the planners. 
In the first place, the policy branch is an amateur in health economics, this had 
made it indecisive and wavering in handling the funding problems. The 
administration could has overcome this inadequacy by commissioning consultants to 
search for policy alternatives. The expertise of health economists could be a great 
help, yet the policy branch did not elicit assistance from them. It was probably 
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because of initially the officials perceived the situation as a simple matter of a wavier 
and fee collection, which they could handle on their own. However, this perception 
tumed out to be wrong, the public outcry against fee rise was forceful. The officials 
soon lost control of the disputes, the gravity of all these led to the stalemate of the 
financing issues. The branch resorted to draft the Green Paper and consulted the 
public, but little headway was made, the administration refrained from committing on 
any policy options. 
Thence, I suggest that the incompleteness of the HA reform, especially the 
neglected political issues of financing, can be explained as a result of the opposition 
from the public. This opposition as the biggest obstacle of the reform, it reflected 
rigidity of welfare demands. In tum, this rigidity of welfare demands is rooted in the 
colony's 'legacy of free medicine'. Citizens havc taken for granted that keeping people 
healthy as a government obligation, rather than an individual's responsibility. To 
recapitulate, this legacy emerged from context different from the case of the UK. The 
UK's free service tradition is rooted in the consensus politics during Second World 
War, and this consensus slowly dismantled after years of development." HK's legacy 
is however, borne out of pragmatic consideration and the need of legitimacy.'^ This 
legacy seems to be even more fortified as the colonial government declines in 
authority in the midst of sovereignty transition. 
Rigidity of Welfare Demands - A Common Problem 
Welfare states in the West commonly shared this problem of rigidity of welfare 
demands. The most prominent characteristic of it is that - services once provided by 
the state cannot be cut back. The original aspiration of the welfare state is to build a 
comprehensive welfare service structure, catering citizens' needs from cradle to grave. 
However, years after its establishment, the government are now becoming incapable 
to keep up with the enormous outlays. The persistent slow economic growth forced 
these countries to cutback welfare expenses. In these cutback exercises, the rigidity 
of welfare demands manifests itself in such a forceful way that the governments 
usually failed to resist. For example, in a study of health care in Canada, Chappell 
vividly described the situation: 
"Canadian do not like services being removed from their health care system...the 
Alberta government removed eye examinations, vaccinations, tubal ligations, and the 
insertion of intra-uterine devices from Medicare coverage in a cost saving effort. The 
public outcry was so great that the services were reinsured the following year. British 
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Columbia took less time to back away from its 1988 decision to restrict the use of 
mammography, an x-ray technique for early detection ofbreast c a n c e r ” ” 
Similarly, recent welfare cuts in France and Germany sparked off industrial actions， 
respectively in the winter of 1995, and in May 1996.'^ In these recent cases, it appear 
that the governments have no effective means to overcome this rigidity. 
In the UK, though the early post-war consensus of welfare state declined, it 
does not mean that the citizens are now finding favor in the private sector and discard 
the public institutions. Peter Taylor-Gooby in his article on the British experience of 
welfare privatization pointed out that "the private sector receives a high level of 
popular approval, which exists in parallel to the strong support for the heartland 
services of the welfare state...Thus support for welfare statism does not contradict 
tolerance of the private sector"」？ In fact, hc found that the welfare cuts during 
privatization in the end off set by state subsidy to private service producers. Taylor-
Gooby concluded that in the face of such 'inertia of welfare need',^^ the British did 
not really roll back the welfare state, but to restructure it so that a proper mix of 
public and private can be achieved.'^ 
Australia experienced similar rigidity of welfare demands. Papadakls 
maintained in his study of public opinion that: the privatization rhetoric used by the 
New Rights has little effect on public's evaluation of the state's obligation in 
providing welfare s e r v i c e s . � � T h e s e rhetoric are ineffective in molding public 
perception partly because of certain institutional and historical factors are still 
influential in shaping the development of the Australian welfare state.^' 
In Hong Kong, the rigidity ofhealth service demands manifested itself through 
the protests initiated by civil organizations (as discussed in chapter four), along with 
the industrial actions of the hospital p e r s o n n e l ? Besides, similar to Australia and the 
UK, public opinion on a whole support the public sector as chief service provider, 
and the public resisted being convinced of the advantages of privatization. 
Western Examples 0fWrestlin2 with Rigidity 
In health policy making, the welfare states found themselves caught up in the 
dilemma of whether or not to cut public expenditure. Given that the public sector 
cannot provide service infinitely, some measures to suppress the demand and to 
prioritize health needs become inevitable. Some attempt to achieve this by 
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democratic procedures, some other by technical approaches, while Hong Kong 
wrestled with the rigidity by 'not making concrete policies'. Listead, incremental 
adjustments were made to the system, in this way opposition is minimized, but no 
real change was introduced. 
Appleby discussed voting as a way to settle the resource allocation disputes. 
There are only a few examples of health-care funding being the subject of a 
systematic community-wide vote or ballot, which designed to have specific and 
direct influence over the funding levels.^^ Appleby quoted one experiment of such 
kind of voting in Oregon, USA, in 1989. The state voted on an ordering of around 
2000 medical services priorities within the Medicaid program. Assessing this case, he 
maintained that due to the cultural and political background, as well as the medical 
system which is unique to Oregon, this voting experience may not be transferrable to 
other health systems. All in all, the experiment made clear that voting would make 
sense only when the voters have access to accurate information of how different 
policy options work to achieve good health.^^ However, such information is often 
hard to collect. It may be easy to collect data on how an illness response to a 
particular treatment, but it is hard to argue whether that a treated illness is equivalent 
to good health. 
Apart from voting, there are other strategies in response to health demands. 
Some health systems come up with assessment formula and indices^^ to measure the 
relative needs. The needs of the patients and of different geographic areas are 
compared, so as to attain fairer resource allocation.^^ The NHS pursued the Quality 
Adjusted Life Year (QALY) to ration the limited health resources. Though this 
procedure is not directly responding to the rigidity of service demands, it attempts to 
make the resource allocation appear to be more rational and accountable. 
The QALY can be used to guide macro planning decisions as well as micro, 
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clinical decisions. Given the technical information about effectiveness, and life 
expectancies of different kinds of treatments, the QALY guides health planners to 
pick the most cost-effective health service combination. The QALY and other similar 
technical approaches to the political problem of resource allocation invited criticisms. 
For example, the prognosis of renal failures are for most of the time poorer than 
cardiac arrests, it becomes difficult for the planners to justify the cutback of service 
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provision to the renal patients for the benefit ofthe cardiac patients.^^ Besides, critics 
attack these technical assessment of relative needs as reducing the construct ofhealth 
to simple cost calculations. How is one to measure the relative value a person's health 
to another? Or how is one to determine the relative loss of one life to another? The 
QALY type of approaches have their proponents as well as opponents,^^ yet as 
Appleby remarked that the QALY is not a technological quick fix, neither is voting 
and its associated democratic activities a quick political fix for the health funding 
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issues. 
The Local Wav 0 fWrestlin2 with Rigiditv 
In Hong Kong there is no clear, nor dominant strategy to tackle the situation 
(otherwise we would not coin the reform as incomplete)，instead, the government 
make use of some minor, incremental adjustments to maintain the status quo. By not 
altering the existing financing system, the public opposition is temporarily kept 
down. 
Firstly, as discussed before, the traditional way consultation through Green 
Paper was used to test the public's acceptance of several policy altematives. The 
consultation period also provide opportunities for the officials to propagate the idea 
of 'users charge’. The consultation also helps to instil a sense of crisis among the 
public - that the health system is becoming impossible to sustain without new funds. 
Yet eventually, the public did not bend the proposals, the administration decided that 
no policy was more advantageous compared to adopting any ofthe options. 
Secondly, the policy branch made use of small scale reforms in primary care to 
suppress the demand on curative care. This would not provoke oppositions from the 
politicians or the public, and it is commonly believed that improved primary health 
care will mean less patients need to be admitted to hospitals. The Health for All the 
WayAhead - Report ofthe Working Party on Primary Health Care (1990) made over 
a hundred recommendations on improving primary care, the government claimed to 
has achieved ninety eight of them.^ ^ These achieved items are of small scale and 
could be done with existing resource and manpower. Yet recommendations with 
wider financial implications were not pursued, for example the administration did not 
act upon the setting up of the 'Health Authority'. 
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Thirdly, to avoid over-reaction from the public, the administration re-packaged 
the privatization project by giving it a different label, so as to avoid provoking the 
community unnecessarily. Officials had no consistent, well clarified concept of 
Q-^  
privatization before the Public Sector Reform document was released. As for the 
case of HA, officials and professionals in the policy circle could not make up their 
mind on what should the policy be classified, sometimes the term privatization was 
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used, while other times it was coined as corporatization. From the mid-1980s 
onwards, privatization had become an ill-famed label. Officials who wanted to 
pursue reforms along this path acknowledged that the concept carried connotations 
that tended to make their reform efforts unpopular.^^ There was a need to look for 
new labels that could accurately depict different essence of different policies, without 
at the same time creating unnecessary anxiety in the public. Tsang in 1991 warned 
that "it was necessary to clarify a few terms often associated with institutional reform, 
namely 'contracting out', 'corporatization' and 'privatization'. These terms were used 
interchangeably, worse still, as the synonym for privatization or even public 
sector reform"35 (emphasis added). This reflected that officials then were cautious 
about the term 'privatization', and would avoid it wherever possible. 
In the end the HA was described not as privatized, because it would mean 
selling off public hospitals; nor was it called being corporatize, because it would 
imply a commercial endeavor. The HA was classified as Non-Departmental Public 
Body CNDPB).36 j^^ NDPB and public corporation are not very much different, both 
are constituted by statute，the assets and premises they used are transferred from the 
government. The only different lies in their pricing strategy, where public corporation 
aimed as full cost recovery, NDPB was argued as only aimed at partial or no cost 
recovery at all. It is likely that the NDPB label was applied to the HA only to reassure 
the public that the HA will not raise service charge without prudent consideration, hi 
fact, the meaning of the term NDPB was indistinct, it remained difficult for one to 
pick out a statutory body and argued whether it is a NDPB or not. The Public Sector 
Reform mentioned that NDPBs did not include the 'municipal councils, advisory 
committees and boards, certain judicial bodies, and the subvented agencies', yet 
without explanation nor justification. Statutory bodies in Hong Kong comes in 
numerous forms, say for example, should the Vegetable Marketing Organization or 
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the universities be classified as NDPBs? And why? There are no definite answers, 
the NDPB was a poorly defined label, which its creation seemed to serve only one 
function - to make clear to the public whether a particular privatization policy is 
going to recover its operation cost or not. 
All in all, the Hong Kong government when faced with the rigidity ofwelfare 
demands, the dominant strategy has been a strategy of avoidance. This has been 
successful in keeping public opposition to the minimal, but at the same time heading 
to nowhere. The absence of unrest is at the expense of a policy stalemate. The 
administration did not force the community to accept the Green Paper, secondly, it 
shifted the focus to incremental improvement of primary care, and lastly, it tried to 
eliminate the image of a privatization policy from the HA. 
Summary 
To sum up with, this chapter set out to account for the factors and 
circumstances that contributed to the incomplete policy design of the HA project. It 
first make clear that the HA reform has been both a partial and an incomplete 
privatization policy. 
The conjecture is: the incompleteness of HA reform can be accounted for by 
two alternative explanations which are not mutually exclusive. The neglected 
normative and institutional issues can be explained by the bias of policy ideas. With 
most of its experience and ideas geared to privatizing physical/commercial services, 
the administration was biased in its privatization ideas. Officials tended to address 
the functional/operational issues of the privatization project, but failed to tackle the 
normative and institutional implications of privatizing human service, as in the case 
ofthe HA. 
Whereas, the neglected political issues can be accounted for by the legacy of 
free medical services, which manifested itself as the rigidity of welfare demands, in 
the form of public opposition. This problem is shared by many welfare states in the 
West. To tackle this rigidity, some systems resort to voting, other by technical 
approaches like constructing health indices. For Hong Kong, the government actually 
does not wrestle directly with this rigidity of welfare demands, on the contrary, it 
1 4 6 
chose the strategy of avoidance. By avoiding conflict with the dominant public 
opinion, opposition is kept to the minimal, yet at the expense of a policy stalemate. 
‘See Kolderie, Ted. (1986), (1987). 
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alternatives of meeting a societal demand on a particular service. For example, prisons in a country are 
managed by a traditional government department, when the government move towards privatization, it 
may choose a total privatization (asset sale), or a moderate change, say retaining the provision function 
and contract out the service to private producers. In the case of HA, the government has chosen a 
moderate, partial way of privatizing. See Ted Kolderie (1986), (1987). 
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administration in 1993 was prepared to embark on the options of the Green Paper, yet due to the 
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Health Care: Is the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Year) a Technical Solution to a Political Problem?", 
in International Joumal of Health Services. Vol. 2 l ,No . 2, Pp. 351-363. 
27 In the clinical setting, individual patient's health prospect and the impact of treatments are quantified 
into QALY units. This guide medical officers to compare the relative benefits of various treatment 
plans. 
28 See Appleby, John. (1992). Pp. 76-80; and Roy A. Carr-Hill (1991). 
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“ (1991); A. Williams(1991); and M.C. Chamy, P.A. Lewis & S.C. Farrow (1989). 
30 See Appleby, John. (1992). Pp. 76-80. 
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32 Privatization was used interchangeably with hiving offbefore 1984. The Financial Secretary Mr. P. 
Jacobs in 1987gave the following scheme of classification: "We consider the general concept of 
privatization in three broad categories. They are privatization, corporatization and 
commericalization...By privatization, we mean the transfer of a public sector owned asset to total or 
partial private sector ownership." (From Privatization a speaking note by Piers Jacobs (Financial 
Secretary) to Rotary Club Kowloon North on 7 August 1987.)Whereas, Corporatization is one step 
removed from privatization, it is also aimed at achieving efficiency and higher autonomy, but with the 
government retaining 'full ownership’. Assets are 'transferred' to a separated, private entity through 
enactment of legislation. It appears that only the management and the right to use the premises are 
transferred. Mr. P. Jacobs gave the example of the Mass Transit Railway to illustrate this category. 
The remaining type - Commercialization, is simply viewed as an equivalence of contracting out. 
However, Donald Tsang in 1991 offered yet another definition for 'Corporatization', he maintained 
that 'Corporatization' involves transfer of asset ownership from the government to a statutory authority. 
(Lee, Jane C.Y. & Cheung, Anthony B.L. (1995). P. 8.) Some ambiguities still exist in capturing the 
meaning of privatization. The rationale behind privatization (e.g. enhancing efficiency, a strategy of 
reform, etc.) is generally understood, but the various modes and types of privatization sometimes 
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“ S e e South China Moming Post, i9 Sept., 1985; 15 March 1987; and 3 Dec.，1991. 
34 See C. Sankey, 'Public sector reform: past developments and recent trends', in Lee, Jane C.Y. & 
Cheung, Anthony B.L. (1995). Puhlic Sector Reform in Hong Kong. Key Concepts. Progress-to-Date. 
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To recapitulate, this study set out to achieve three objectives. Firstly, to fill the 
gap in current literature by undertaking a comprehensive review ofthe health policy 
development from the pre-war years up to the mid-1990s, with special attention paid 
to the fermentation privatization ideas. Secondly, focusing on the reform which 
started in the mid-1980s, the study is geared to search for the factors and the 
circumstances that forged the unlikely decision of the HA. Thirdly, it attempt to 
demonstrate that the HA was an 'half-baked', or incomplete reform. The study also 
set out to track down the factors which contributed to the incompleteness. 
Insightsfrom the Reappraisal of History 
In the reappraisal of the policy's history, several developmental features 
appeared prominent. These features have been influential in shaping the development 
ofthe health system, not only in one episode, but like the 'ghost in the machine', they 
appeared repeatedly. These features include the preoccupation in curative care, the 
legacy of free services, the dynamics between professionals and generalists, and 
lastly, the gradual development of privatization ideas within the government. For 
example, the preoccupation in curative care affected not only the direction of the 
1964 and 1974 White Papers, it also exerted significant influence over the HA 
reform. 
Moreover, these features at times intricate together, thus making the direction 
and outcome oftheir influence difficult to tease out. It is now know that the decision 
to review and privatize medical care was closely associated with the preoccupation in 
curative medicine. This obsession with curative care was in tum, propagated by the 
medical profession. The profession's leverage in shaping the policy lies in its 
traditional dominant position in the colony's health planning. From the 1840s up to 
the post-war reconstruction period, the doctors engineered as well as execute the 
policy. Though their status was challenged and gradually declined (through 
reorganizations of the central government) in the post-war years, they managed to 
negotiate an unwritten labor division with the generalist administrators. The 
generalists occupied the agenda setting activities, while the doctors retained their 
authority in shaping the policy alternatives. The medical profession is like a 'switch-
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man', controlling the subsequent path that the policy heads towards. It was the 
profession that strengthened the preoccupation in hospital care, and it was also the 
doctors who first voiced out the privatization plan of the hospitals. Besides, the 
profession took the lead to shift attention to the primary care. The medical 
profession's influence over policy choice has become a leitmotif of the policy 
development. 
Another insight from the historical review is - traditions and the institutional 
arrangements (e.g. the tradition of the medical profession, and the consolidated 
structure of cut price/free services) have immense influence over the policy 
development. It has been decades since they first emerged and consolidated，but they 
are still influential in the contemporary policy making. The traditional practice, 
perception and social institutions governed how the services should be produced and 
delivered. They offer a frame of value reference, which guides and prescribes 
normatively what the health services ought to be like. These set ups are resistance to 
change. As it is now know, the old system cannot accept privatization ideas, such as 
market competition, user charge, and a mixing between private and public. These 
exactly are the normative issues that the government failed to handle in designing the 
reform. The administration is experienced in solving the operational issues in 
privatizing a commercial activity, but it is inadequate in tackling the normative 
implications of privatizing a human services. 
Factors that Forged the Unlikely Decision 
From reviewing the contemporary literature, factors which are commonly held 
responsible for privatization in the West are identified (e.g. fiscal, political, 
ideological, etc). In chapter three, these and some other factors are analyzed to see 
how they had forged the privatization of hospital care. This study examined eleven 
different factors and concluded that the privatization ofhospital services in H.K. was 
not so much because of ideological or economic factors, as in the West. Rather, it 
was closely associated with the factors like: the obsession in curative care, the labor 
division between doctors and generalists, and the bureaucratic factor. These three 
were most central to the decision of reviewing and privatizing hospital services. 
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The examination of the relative strength of these factors, along with their 
direction of influence，help us to revise the earlier framework of analysis (i.e. Figure 
1). The refined and amended framework is depicted in Figure 9. Several things 
should be highlighted in this figure. First, the 'legacy of free medical services' is a 
special factor, it indirectly affected the early decision of privatizing hospital care. On 
the other hand, it strongly influenced the design of the subsequent policy. 
Second, as the loca) privatization movement is differentiated into two paths (i.e. 
the privatizing of medical care and the overall privatization ideas ofthe government), 
the eleven factors examined earlier are also differentiated according to their effects 
on each paths. For example, the political, economic factor strongly influenced the 
privatization initiatives at large, but not the specific policy of medical care. Third, the 
influence of these factors are labeled in chapter three as strong, weak, direct, indirect, 
dissipated and undetermined. However, for the sake of simplicity, the figure 9 does 
not depicts relationships that are undetermined. 
The HA reform stood out in the history of the colonial government as the 
government never had before or after, any privatization project of compatible scale 
and nature. It affected the career of 41,000 hospital staff, with which 27,000 of them 
were civil servants. It was also the one and only one human services that the 
administration chose to privatize so far. The circumstances in the mid-1980s were 
unfavorable for any large scale privatization. In explaining this unlikely decision, two 
alternative explanations are suggested. The first views the policy as an 
misinterpretation of policy problem. The obsession in hospital beds provision led to 
the faulty conclusion that the crisis rooted in hospitals. Besides, the miscalculations 
in the strength of the legacy’ and the exaggerated monetary returns of privatization 
also made the plan appeared desirable. 
The second explanation interprets the HA project as a conservative policy. In 
lieu of a comprehensive policy review, the administration opted for the smaller scale 
medical care reform. This modest choice has its institutional causes. As Scott and 
Gould argued, the institutional set up such as the lean top administrative structure of 
the central government, and other conditions like the predominantly non-Chinese top 
administrators, the government's lack of confidence in social engineering, all these 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Insi2hts and Puzzles from the Incomplete Re form 
In chapter four and five, by demonstrating the neglected normative and 
political issues, it is attempted to argue that the HA reform was an incomplete 
privatization project. The negligence are found in the following areas: i) an integrated 
service delivery structure, ii) an integration between private and public producers, iii) 
the tradition and former institutional arrangements that tend to act against the spirit of 
privatization. These negligence are evident in the incomplete institutional design of 
the reform. Besides, the unsettled political issues include the absence of a workable 
cost recovering plan for the HA, and the overall health financing policy. These 
neglected areas are evident in the indecisive response of the administration, in the 
delays of policy decisions, as well as in the confusing ideas of the aborted Green 
Paper. The cause of these incompleteness are explained by the bias of the 
government's privatization ideas and also by the 'legacy of free medical services'. 
Insights are concluded from this incomplete project. Firstly, privatization ideas 
come in three different levels, it is contended that a government when embarks on 
privatizing human services, it needs to possess a normative perspective on 
privatization, so that the intricate value issues that arise can be promptly responded to. 
Solely ideas of the functional level and the operational level will not suffice planner 
to anticipate the obstacles in privatizing human services. With the functional and/or 
operational perspective, one can search for proper form of organization, also the 
appropriate mix of production and provision functions. However, they are not 
sufficient to overcome normative problems that surfaced with privatization. 
As depicted in Figure 9, we now know that the privatization ideas (or biased 
privatization ideas) of the government did play an important role in shaping the 
design of the HA, this is resembling with the speculation I made in the introductory 
chapter. Furthermore, I incline to conclude that the experience of the HA project 
actually influence the making of the public sector reform initiatives, as reasoned in 
chapter five，the creation of the category NDPB was in fact a strategy to repackage 
the privatization movement with a label that is politically less troublesome. The 
officials leamt from the HA project that they must be cautious about public reaction. 
This observation, however is not included in the revised framework of analysis (see 
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Figure 9). It is because the creation of the NDPB issue provides only one piece of 
evidence for this observation. Further evidence need to come by before one can argue 
that such relationship actually exists. 
Secondly, there is the rigidity of welfare demands, which rooted in the legacy 
of free services and manifested in the form of protests and industrial actions. This 
kind of 'rigidity' is commonly shared in the Westem welfare states. So far, it appears 
that no government can effectively overcome this rigidity. This situation seemed to 
be a deadlock since governments cannot force a welfare cut. The H.K. government 
wrestled with this rigidity by not committing on any concrete policy directions, but to 
make minute adjustments in the system. By not acting, the government avoided 
public outcry, but the price is a slowly deteriorating financial condition ofthe system. 
The problem is how long can the present scenario sustains? 
The NHS found a third path by creating the internal market. State provided 
services are not substantially cut, the system still relies on general taxation as major 
fund source, while users continue to enjoy the services at low charges. However, the 
macro efficiency and the suppression of demands are achieved through the operation 
the internal market. Whether this arrangement can solve problems in the long run is 
still unclear. However, the more imperative and relevant question is: can the Hong 
Kong settles its issues of appropriation and financing by similar institutional set up? 
Can we install an internal market as the U.K.? 
My preliminary conjecture is - the installation of internal market is not easy 
due to several obstacles. Firstly, the conservative public opinion will not easily bend 
to welcome the introduction of market practice in the field of medicine. The general 
public of the UK is more positive towards a public-private mix, while H.K. people 
are suspicious and negative toward such mix. Secondly, the private health market in 
the UK is more robust than that in H.K. (e.g. in term of the insurance market and the 
scale of contract medicine), meaning that the H.K. society has comparatively little 
experience on competition, buying and selling in health business. It may take some 
time to catch up in terms of its market institution, before the local service producers 
can get use to the operation of the market. Thirdly, as seen in the development of 
policy ideas ofthe Health and Welfare Branch, there is so far very little proponents of 
the contractual system or internal markets. There has been much discussion of 
154 
finding new fund source for the system (e.g. voluntary and compulsory insurance), 
however, little headway has been made on the question of how the money flow 
within the system can achieve efficiency. The policy branch need to strength its 
expertise in this area before it can design an appropriate health institution for the 
community. 
To sum up, as an half-baked privatization project, the HA reform needs to be 
completed sooner or later. Six years after its set up, the camp beds problem and long 
waiting lists showed signs of resurgence. The large amount of start up funds did 
ameliorate the grave conditions of the hospitals, but the improvements also induced 
new demands. These demands and public expectations are piling up, though not yet 
reaching a crisis level, one can however expect the system to retum to the mid-1980s 
conditions in a long run. The policy branch need to strengthen its knowledge and 




A Comparison of Stage Models on Hong Kong's Social/Health Policy Development. 
Year/ Stage Models 
Period Our Jones Scott Tang Gould Thong 
Proposal (1990) (1986) (1994) (1990) (1987) 
Pre-WWII I Trading Pos7| 
Occupation Pre-WWII Residual Early Period 
& Occupation 
1945-1951 11 
1952 Divergence Colonial 
1953�1957 Take Off Incremental-
1958-1960 m ism Partial 
1960-1966 Convergence Social 
1967 Policy Recent 
Period 
1968-1970 Reform 
1971-1973 IV and Relapse 
1974 Reaction N e w Society back to Big Bang Neo-
1975-1977 & Incremental- Colonial 
1978-1981 Growth ism 
1982 Incremental-
1983-1984 ism 
1985-1987 V “ Incremental-
Privatization ism 






Sources : Jones (1990), Scott (1986), Chow (1982), (1987), Tang (1994), Thong (1987)，Gould 
(1990). 
Each of the above models carries rich contents and meaning, this appendix cannot 
afford to elaborate on them individually. Yet several points can be made. Firstly, most of 
these models tackle social services development as a whole, which are considered not 
sufficiently fme tuned to understand development of medical services. For example, the 
1970s are commonly considered as a period of quickest expansion in social services (Tang. 
1994, Scott 1986), however, it is discovered from empirical data that expansion in medical 
services were most rigorous from 1958-1966, that is, a period when opinions among 
professionals, the administration and the legislature converged. 
Second, Thong (1987) proposed a simple two stages model to account exclusively for 
policy development in the area of health. This model is however, too simplistic. The two 
periods are demarcated by the nature of work of the Medical and Health Department. Its 
simplicity means that many significant developmental trends are left out, such as the rise 
and fall of professional power, and the consolidation of the legacy of free service. 
Lastly, none of the models view social/health policy development against the 
evolution of privatization ideas within the administration. The six stages proposed in this 
thesis attempted to bridge this gap. 
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Appendix Three 
The five options of the 1993 Green Paper outlined as follow: 
a) The percentage subsidy approach 
A scheme concerning cost recovery. Under the percentage subsidy approach, the 
operating cost of each type of hospital would be subsidized to the same percentage. 
Say the percentage is set at 95 percent, since acute general beds are more costly than 
psychiatric beds, thus different charges will be expected. A standardized subsidy 
percentage will still yields different rates of charging according to the nature of the 
service. It is considered equitable and a rational way of charging. The users and 
producers will be more cost conscious. 
b) The target group approach 
A scheme of charging and wavier, bivolved three measures, namely a) semi-private 
rooms in public hospital, which aimed at a ^0 to 60 percent of cost recovery; b) 
itemized charging, which entails imposing a fee on certain procedures such as 
admission, referral to specialist clinic, drug charge, use of accident and emergency 
service; c) target wavier groups, which guarantee the less well-off patients to have 
full access to the system. The scheme is regarded as equitable, administratively 
simple, yet the semi-private beds may attracts patients from private hospitals. 
c) The co-ordinated voluntary insurance approach 
A funding proposal of the overall system. It consists of a framework whereby private 
insurance companies could compete with each other. They would submit their 
insurance packages for approval by a designated body which could be statutory. It has 
the advantage of directing demand away from the public system. The problem is non-
equitable distribution of resources. 
d) The compulsory comprehensive insurance approach 
A funding proposal of the overall system. A centrally administered system is set up to 
cover every citizens. The insurance covers primary and secondary care, in both 
private and public sector, in this way the public sector will be able to pursue more 
vigorously cost recovery strategies. Variations in setting and paying of premiums 
were not thoroughly discussed in the Green Paper. The government may choose to 
monopolize the market, phasing out private producers, or it can contract out all 
services to the market. The strength of this proposal is full coverage of population, 
yet suffer from high start-up cost. Besides, there are practical difficulties such as 
portability of the insurance. 
e) The prioritization of treatment approach 
A scheme to allocate resources. To list out medical conditions and treatments in 
order of priority and fund them according to available resources. Treatment would 
not be given to low-priority conditions. It can achieve cost containment by capping 
them and provides only those essential and affordable ones. But it involves difficult 
value decisions on what is essential. 
See Hong Kong Government. (1993). Towards Better Health - A Consultation Document. 
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Appendix Three 
Explanatory notes on models ofhealth financing: 
All in all, voluntary or private financing seems unable to overcome distributional and 
equity problems. On the other hand, public funding models tends more to limit 
choice and efficiency. No matter what the source of finance is (private or public), the 
effectiveness in cost containment, or in suppressing demands are unclear, depending 
on careful institutional designs of the system. 
Simple Exchange:-
Mode of operation: The earliest and simplest form of private health care market. 
Users pay each time to receive service. 
Pros: Government freed from burden. 
Cons: Not equitable. Health expenses may be unexpected and exceed affordability of 
users. The system cannot guarantee consumer's choice nor competition, due to 
asymmetry of information in the market. 
Remarks: Currently no country relies solely on this model. 
Voluntary Reimbursement:-
Mode of operation: Potential users out of their own will pay private insurer(s) certain 
risk-related premiums. The users pay for the health services they need and then 
reimbursed by the insurer(s). 
Pros: Can pool risks together so that unexpected expenses can still be affordable. 
Cons: Not equitable, high risk groups will be excluded. Expenditure on health 
drained by the profit making insurers. Services tend to be free at the point of 
consumption, implies that more demand will be induced. Competition may stimulate 
volume and quality of services to rise, the price will not reduce. 
Remarks: The Green Paper's option #3 fall in this type. 
Public Reimbursement;-
Mode of operation: Basically a kind of compulsory risk pooling. People make 
income-related contributions to public insurer(s) or funding bodies. The insurers or 
funding bodies will reimburse the users after they paid for their services they need. 
There is an element of subsidizing the poorer users. 
Pros: Equity in access. Can operate with multi sickness funds, this provides choice 
for users. While one single operating fund will contribute to the solidarity of society. 
Cons: If reimbursement is 100 percent, it will induce demand leading to over-
utilization. High administrative costs. Insurance is often arranged by employers for 
employees, yet the insurance is seldom portable, therefore imposed practical 
difficulty in operation. 
Remarks: The Green Paper's option #4 fall in this type. 
Voluntary Contract:-
Mode of operation: Potential users buy insurance package(s) from private insurers. 
The package offers services of certain contracted health care producers. 
Pros: GPs as gatekeeper to curative care, able to suppress demand. Fundholding 
agents can negotiate economical and quality care on behalf of consumers. 
Cons: Limited equity. Choice restricted to the contracted producers. 
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Public Contract:-
Mode of operation: Source of funds can be general taxation. The government or 
certain public bodies go into service contract with the health care producers. 
Pros: Enhance consumers' choice. GPs as gatekeeper to curative care, able to 
suppress demand. Fundholding agents can negotiate economical and quality care on 
behalf of consumers. Equity. Competition among producers. 
Cons: Institutional flaws and loopholes may cause effectiveness to decline. 
Remarks: Currently the dominated model in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and the UK. 
Voluntary Integrated:-
Mode of operation: Consumers buy package from the insurers. While the insurers 
hired doctors and other necessary personnel on their own premises. That is the 
insurers operates their own hospitals. 
Pros: Enhanced competition among insurers. 
Cons: Limited equity. Free choice to insurers but limited choice to producers. 
PublicIntegrated:-
Mode of operation: Government collects fund from the public, and in tums directly 
(or through third party) funds the producers by budgets and salaries. 
Pros: Equity. 
Cons: Lack of choice, users not empowered. Money does not follow patients when 
producers are pay by salaries and global budgets, implies there is no incentive to 
produce better services, nor to minimize cost. Efficient producers are rewarded with 
more workload, not money. Rationing of service by long queues. 
Remarks: The Hospital Authority is operating in this model. 
See The Reform ofHealth Care - A Comparative Analysis ofSeven OECD Countries. OECD (1992). 
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Chronology 
A Chronology of policy development. 
Year/Date Medical & Health Policy Development Other Related Issues / 
Remarks 
1841-42 Episodes of epidemics 
^ m 3 • C o m m i t t e e o fPubl ic Health established Epidemics struck again 
.>The post o f Colonial Surgeon set up 
1844 .First hospital opened 
(funded by merchants); 
.First missionary hospital. 
1847 The post of Colonial Surgeon approved by London 
1848 First government civil hospital (for civil servants) 
1856 Building & Nuisances Ordinance* 
1859 Governor Bowring appointed an Inspector of 
Nuisances, the real beginning of the Sanitary 
Department 
1862 Sanitary Committee appointed in December, to take 
precautions against cholera. 
1864 Chinese destitutes allowed to be treated in government 
civil hospital 
1866 Order & Cleanliness Ordinance 
1870 Establishment ofTung Wah 
Group 
1882 Chadwick Report 
~~r^~~ Public Health Ordinance enacted to constitute the .47,000 Chinese signed 
Sanitary Board against the ordinance, in 
fear of rising rent rates. 
.Hong Kong College of 
Medicine 
\ 894 Plague attacked Hong Kong 
1895 Government medical 
officers demands the 
abolition ofTung Wah, yet 
faced with opposition 
1899 Insanitary Properties Ordinance 
1902 *X*Imanitary Properties Resumption Ordinance 
• S i m p s o n / Chadwick enquiry 
1903 Public Health & Building Ordinance 
1926 Hong Kong Red Cross 
1927 School health service 
1930 Malaria Bureau ； 
1935 .>Sanitary Board became Urban Council; 
<.Medical & Health Department established 
1936 Kowloon Hospital opened 
1937 Queen Mary Hospital opened 
1941 -1945 Sir Mark A. Young came 
into office 
Japanese occupation. 
British troops regained 
I control in around August. 
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1946 Civilian rule restored in 1st 
May 
1949 Ruttonjee Tuberculosis Sanatorium 
1951 Faculty of Medicine re-established in the University o f 
Hong Kong 
1954 Tsan Yuk Government Maternity Hospital 
1955 Haven o f H o p e Tuberculosis Sanatorium 
1957 Medical & Health Department submitted 15 years plan 
to government but rejected 
1958 General Medical Council holds examinations for un-
registerable doctors 
1959 Medical & Health Dept. submitted 5-year plan 
1960 Exco adopted the 5-year plan 
1961 Castle Peak Hospital 
1963 <*Queen Elizabeth Hospital 
�Medical Clinic Ordinance 
1964 White paper 'The Development of Medical Services in 
Hong Kong' released 
1965 Riots broke out 
1967 Riots broke out 
19 71 S ir Murray MacLehose 
came into office 
1972 Mckinsey & Company 
employed to review 
managerial and policy 
making system 
~ ~ ~ W f l Medical Development Advisory Committee ( M D A C ) ~ ~ Consultancy report 'The 
established on 28 March, its report was submitted and Machinery ofGovemment' 
tabled before the Legco on31.10.1973. released 
1974 Legco passed the ‘The Further Development of Medical 
& Health Services in Hong Kong’ in July 
1975 Princess Margaret Hospital 
1976 <.Regionalisation ofhospital announced on lONov. 
• M e d i c a l school established in the Chinese University 
o f H o n g Kong (student intake commenced in 1980) 
1977 .>Proposal of health insurance rejected 
<Mst phase of regionalization commenced on 1.4.1977. 
1979 MDAC published 'Review ofMedical Development 
Programme, 
1982 Regionalisation reached final phase 
~ ~ ~ i w ~ ~ • P r i n c e o f W a l e s Hospital 
•:•Governor Youde announced to set up working group 
for reviewing hospital services (The Exco. had 
approved this decision to review earlier in May). 
1985 Australian consultants. Coopers & Lybrand W.D. Scott, 
commissioned in February to review hospital services. 
The report submitted in December. 
1986 •Consul tancy report 'The Delivery ofMedical 
Services in Hospitals' released for public comments, 
debated in Legco in October 
•:•Working party on postgraduate medical education 
and training set up 
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1987 • T h e setting up of HA tabled and endorsed in Exco in 
September. 
•:•Health & Welfare Branch published 'The Summary 
ofPubl ic Opinions’ on the W.D. Scott report in March. 
^ i ^ ~ ~ • T u e n Mun Hospital -Legco election held on 22 
•:•Original operation of the Provisional Hospital Sept. 
Authority (PHA) rescheduled from April to 1st October 
1989 • M e d i c a l & Health Dept. reorganized into Hospital 
Services Dept. and Dept. of Health on 1 st April. 
•:•Working party on primary health care review 
appointed in July, formally set up in August 
•:•Governor Wilson announced a Hong Kong Academy 
ofMedic ine will be set up, working party on 
postgraduate medical education submitted report 
• W o n g Chien Chi-lien replaced Chau Tak-hay as the 
Sec. o f H & W 
.>PHA report finalized in Dec. 
1990 + P H A report tabled before Exco in March and released 
to public in June 
•:•The Sec. of H&W announced the last offer on staff 
terms 
<*HospitalAuthority Ordinance enacted on 25 July, the 
HA formally established in 1st Dec. 
•Appointment o f 2 7 HA board members gazetted on 
23 Nov., w.e.f. 1st Dec. 
• G o v ' t took action to study insurance scheme 
•:•Working party on primary health care submitted 
report 
f ^ • ' H e a l t h for All, the Way Ahead，published on 24 
April 
•:•23 subvented hcspital signed agreement tojo in the 
HA on 24 May 
•:•Legco Financial Committee approved the HA's staff 
package 
•:•The Sec. of H&W appointed a medical insurance 
study group to study options of insurance 
<*The HA took over 38 hospital on the 1st Dec. 
1992 • T h e HA executive committee endorsed proposal to -The HA defaulted payment 
give the Director ofOperation overriding authority on ofelectrical bill caused loss 
] | Feb. ofHK$90,000 
•:•MDAC re-constituted and renamed as Health & '(^ =^^^=!&$^^^&=1.06 ^^ ^^ . 
Medical Development Advisory Committee (focus more f o V t h ^ H l S y settled 
on primary health care) by the Sec. of Ed. & 
•:•Kwun Tong Health System set up Manpower. 
•:•Health & Welfare Fees and Waivers Review 
Committee examined health financing 
1993 • A green paper ‘Towards Better Health，on health care .Alliance ofPatients' 
reform published Mutual Help Organization 
•:•The Hong Kong Academy of Medicine formally fo™ed，involved 17 
inaugurated ch^=i(j illness patients' 
self-help groups 
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1994 <*Exco shelved the cost recovery scheme ofpublic .The HA had 2 billion 
medical facilities surplus at the end ofthe 
^Stafftransfer program ran up to deadline on 30 Nov. 1993/94 budget year 
1995 <.Exco passed a re-adjusted cost recovery by items 
scheme on 21 Feb. 
•:•Sir Sze-yuen's term fulfilled by31 Mar., the 
president post taken by K.C. WOO 
• Legco passed the abolition of cost recovery by items 
on 31 May 
•The Health Care & Promotion Fund, chaired by the 
Sec. of H&W, operates through the HA, was set up on 6 
Oct., the Fund required 80 million to launch, was 
approved by the Legco in May 
•:•Director of Audit submitted report which queried the 
out of proportion benefits of HA staff 
•:•Ex-officials attended open hearing of the Public 
Accounts Committee on 6 Dec. 
* All ordinance in italics 
Sources: 
Endacott, (1958), (1987); Jones, (1990); Tang, (1994); Welsh, (1993). 
The Federation ofMedical Societies ofHong Kong. (1985), (3rd edition). Medical Directory ofHong 
Kong. The Other Hong Kong Report. (1989); (1990); (1991); (1992); (1993). 
譚阜全、趙維生、顏文雄，（1989)，周永新，（1982) °驚洋客編著，《香港掌故》，目錄 
香港大學孔安道紀念圖書館編製，（30.6.1984) ° 
South China Morning Post (From 1973 to 1995) 
Hong Kong Standard (From 1973 to 1995) 
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